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This dissertation examines the use of the French Revolution as an explanatory device for 
discussing the French-Algerian War (1954-1962). Anticolonial intellectuals in France invoked 
the French Revolution to explain their reasons for supporting colonial reform as well as their 
solidarity with Algerian nationalist aims. Through an examination of intellectuals’ public 
interventions alongside French and Algerian historical narratives, I examine the ways in which 
historical alignment signaled political and cultural distance between France and Algeria. Making 
an independent Algeria analogous to eighteenth-century revolutionary France lent political and 
conceptual legitimacy to Algerian claims to an independent national identity while also 
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Men make their own history, but they do not make 
it as they please; they do not make it under self-
selected circumstances, but under circumstances 
existing already, given and transmitted from the 
past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs 
like a nightmare on the brains of the living. And just 
as they seem to be occupied with revolutionizing 
themselves and things, creating something that did 
not exist before, precisely in such epochs of 
revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the 
spirits of the past to their service, borrowing from 
them names, battle slogans, and costumes in order 
to present this new scene in world history in time-
honored disguise and borrowed language. 
 Karl Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Napoleon Bonaparte (1852)1 
 
 
Throughout the French-Algerian War (1954-1962), anticolonialist intellectuals invoked 
late eighteenth-century words, images, persons—namely, by speaking about the French 
Revolution of 1789-1799. In some instances this practice certainly was semantically strategic, 
aligning the foundation of the modern French Republic with anti-imperial goals to bolster the 
latter. However, this phenomenon also moved from simple simile to assimilation, even 
catachresis.2 This study examines the uses anticolonialist francophone intellectuals made of the 
French Revolution during the French Algerian War and the assumptions lurking behind this 
analogy.     
The French Algerian War has become established as a privileged topic of historical 
analysis, and for many good reasons. The war begun on All Saints Day, 1 November 1954, when 
members of a newly-formed National Liberation Front (FLN) attacked a series of targets 
                                                 
1  Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte Later Political Writings, 
edited by Terrell Carver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 31. 
2  Catachresis is the misapplication or improper extension of one word or phrase to 
another context. It is, in other words, a bad metaphor.   
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throughout Algeria’s three departments, exacerbated metropolitan fears of global French decline 
and in three and a half years brought down the government of the Fourth Republic. When the 
Fifth Republic arose, it did so under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle, the Free French and 
World War II resistance hero. Yet while Algeria’s one million settlers of European descent 
thought de Gaulle would once again be their savior, metropolitan opinion increasingly favored 
peace in Algeria, even if that position also meant recognizing Algerian nationalists’ claims.  
Larger transformations in France’s place in the world served as the backdrop of the war. 
The war began scarcely a decade since the end of World War II, when both France and its North 
African territories suffered defeat and Nazi occupation. France aligned with the capitalist west in 
the postwar international order, but its imperial holdings throughout Southeast Asia and Africa 
continued to be sites of contention. The new postwar Fourth Republic renamed these territories 
part of a French Union comprising overseas territories like Martinique and New Caledonia and 
overseas departments, like Algeria.3 The government discussed prospects for greater political 
autonomy and equality in these overseas territories, but to many, including metropolitan French, 
this was still the empire bequeathed by the Third Republic. Many of those unsatisfied with 
France’s global territorial possessions still spoke in anti-imperial terms. The apparent 
contradiction between the need to liberate the world from the Nazi and Japanese yokes and the 
will to continue French overseas domination was also not lost on contemporary observers. The 
French-Indo-Chinese Wars (1945-1954), for instance, were already underway even before the 
war with Germany and Japan had ended. While the communist east would vie for influence in 
colonized and newly-independent territories, those territories themselves would also assert their 
own role in the global order, most notably through international congresses, beginning in 1955 
                                                 
3 Since 1848, Algeria was made up of three legislative departments, juridically the same 
as metropolitan departments. 
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with the Bandung Conference in Indonesia. Continued threats of widespread rebellion in Tunis 
and Morocco forced France to abandon its claims there in 1956. By the end of 1960, 
decolonization would largely be a foregone conclusion for French Africa, with the United 
Nations’ Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, as well 
as the newfound independence of 14 African countries that had been parts of the French Union.  
The war in Algeria took place in this context, crystalizing and exacerbating existing 
tensions. Most critics of French Algeria saw the territory as embodying the worst aspects of 
colonial society. A larger than normal settler population (comprising about one-ninth of 
Algeria’s total population) dominated local politics and controlled Algeria’s economic capital. 
While there were very few extremely wealthy colons, and most of the settler population lived 
under a lower standard of living than the metropole, even the poorest of the poor settlers lived 
much more comfortably and with greater political and social rights than the rest of the 
population, collectively referred to as indigènes (indigenous peoples) or Muslims.4 Thus, despite 
the legal fact that Algeria comprised 3 legislative départements of the Republic, and pro-French 
Algerian supporters would take “l’Algérie, c’est la France” as their mantra, in practice it was a 
colony, through and through. Like all boundaries, these social and ethnic divisions could be 
porous, and writers like Albert Camus saw French Algeria, despite its problems, as capable of 
                                                 
4 The terms indigènes and Muslim referred to the totality of the non-white population of 
Algeria. These terms of course comprised a variety of ethnic and religious groups, including 
various Berber nationalities, Arabs, and Sephardic Jews. There were atheist and Christian as well 
as Muslim Berbers and Arabs. By 1954 the settler population numbered about 984,000 and the 
population designated “Muslim” numbered 7,860,000. Benjamin Stora, Algeria, 1830-2000: A 
Short History, translated by Jane Marie Todd (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 22-26. 
When approaching any type of colonial history, it is important not to reify the very 
historical categories produced by the colonial encounter, especially since they more often than 
not encoded problematic assumptions about race and authority. I have done my best to avoid 
this. However, when translating the sources used I have kept the contemporary terminology used 
at the time. 
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being a model Mediterranean society, inclusive of all populations. But plans at reform, 
integration, and economic development from the 1930s onward never amounted to much, due in 
large part to the staunch resistance to reform from the colons themselves. Camus’ dreams of 
Mediterranean inclusion remained fantasy. The result was colonial retrenchment and increasing 
support for nationalist calls to separate from the metropole. 
Over the last twenty years the literature on the war has expanded beyond cursory 
treatments in fruitful and important directions. Studies focusing on the diplomatic strategy of the 
FLN highlight the international nature of the war and have shown that Algerian nationalism was 
about more than simply guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and counter-terror.5 While the war was often 
conducted according to binary categories—colonizer versus rebellious colonized—a number of 
studies have added important nuance to this analysis. There were certainly many ethnic 
backgrounds represented in both categories, and there were plenty of cases where identities sat in 
the middle of these divisions. The war’s experience and aftermath furthermore provoked (and 
continue to provoke) numerous negotiations of personal and collective memory.6 Other studies 
                                                 
5 Matthew Connolly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the 
Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Irwin Wall, France, 
the United States, and the Algerian War (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001). 
6 Peter Dunwoodie, Writing French Algeria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1; 
Vincent Crapanzano, The Harkis: The Wound that Never Heals (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2011); Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the 
Age of Decolonization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, “The 
Cost of Decolonization: Compensating the Pieds-noirs,” France since the 1970s, History, 
Politics, and Memory in an Age of Uncertainty, edited by Emile Chabal (New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2015), 99-114; Patricia Lorcin, “France’s Nostalgias for Empire,” France Since the 
1970s, 143-171; Isabel Hollis, “Algeria in Paris: Fifty Years On,” France Since the 1970s, 129-
142; Jo McCormack, Collective Memory: France and the Algerian War (1954-1962) (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); Éric Savarese, Algérie: La guerre des mémoires (Paris: Non 
lieu, 2007); Jim House and Neil Macmaster, Paris, 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 265-338; Martin Evans, The Memory of Resistance: 
French Opposition to the Algerian War, 1954-1962 (London: Bloomsbury, 1996). 
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have shown the ways in which the war, or experience of decolonization more generally, 
redefined the French Republic, from legislation to everyday cultural practice.7  
Just as the French nation and its identity were reformulated in the wake of 
decolonization, a number of studies have shown decolonization’s effects on French and 
francophone intellectual history and the role intellectuals played in the process of decolonization 
itself. The French-Algerian War exacerbated older divisions in France’s intellectual communities 
and in some cases created new rifts. Intellectuals took public positions over the course of the 
war. While some intellectuals clearly took anticolonial stances and others defended France’s 
claim to Algeria, many occupied the spectrum between these two poles, critical of the one 
without fully endorsing the other. The postcolonial situation in France after the war has 
influenced key themes in contemporary French intellectual debate, such as the negotiation of 
cultural and religious difference.8   
This study builds on many of the insights of this growing literature on the war and how 
French and francophone intellectuals talked about French history over this time of national crisis. 
During the war, but especially after large-scale military and terrorist campaigns were underway 
in 1956, both colonial and metropolitan intellectuals frequently referred to France’s own 
revolutionary past when explaining their positions on the French-Algerian War. Whether these 
statements were sincere representations of intellectuals’ motives or simply part of a rhetorical 
                                                 
7 Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of 
France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007); Kristen Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: 
Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996). 
8 Jane Hiddleston, Decolonizing the Intellectual: Politics, Culture, and Humanism at the 
End of the French Empire (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014); Cathérine Brun and 
Olivier Penot-Lacassagne, Engagements et déchirements. Les intellectuels et la guerre d’Algérie. 
Les éditions IMEC (Paris: Gallimard, 2012); James D. Le Sueur, Uncivil War: Intellectuals and 
Identity Politics during the Decolonization of Algeria, Second Edition (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2005 [2001]); David Schalk, War and the Ivory Tower: Algeria and Vietnam 
(Lincoln, NE: Nebraska University Press, 2005 [1991]). 
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strategy was dependent on the speakers and writers of such analogies and was always tied to 
specific contexts, both public and private. The intellectual left in France and its audience 
inhabited a conceptual world in which such connections had significant meaning. At precisely a 
moment when the intellectual left in France turned their focus from Europe to a non-European 
“other” these intellectuals drew upon a very European—very French—political imaginary to 
make sense of Algerian revolutionary violence and the colonial conditions that caused it. 
Understanding the importance the intellectual left placed on the French Revolution offers a 
window onto their commitments to Algeria’s revolutionary moment as well as their 
understanding of France’s own political identity.  
Of course, that French people would rehearse the core tenets of their nationalist identity 
is nothing new or surprising. Many of the intellectuals active in the French Algerian War came 
of age in the interwar Third Republic where educational curricula emphasized symbolism and 
history related to the Revolution.9 The Bastille was a symbol of liberation and the antithesis of 
oppressive government.10 The battles of Valmy, Fleurus, and Jemappes reminded citizens of 
their power as a reserve of national defense. The red Phrygian bonnet symbolized popular 
political participation. The famous members of the National Assembly and Convention offered 
heroes suitable for a wide array of ideological dispositions. Radicals had Robespierre, Saint-Just, 
Hébert, and Babeuf. Moderates could lay claim to Danton or Condorcet. And of course 
conservatives had any number of Bourbons to mourn.11  
                                                 
9  Mona L. Siegel, The Moral Disarmament of France: Education, Pacifism, and 
Patriotism, 1914-1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 163-175. 
10 Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink and Rolf Reichardt, The Bastille: A History of a Symbol of 
Despotism and Freedom, translated by Norbert Schürer (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1997). 
11  On the historical image of Robespierre, see Marc Belissa and Yannick Bosc, 
Robespierre: La fabrication d’un mythe (Paris: Ellipses, 2013); on the memory of the Bourbon 
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Beginning in the interwar years, claims for colonial independence were often structured 
by turning French patriotic rhetoric on its head, and studies by Peter Dunwoodie and Michael 
Goebel provide a useful prologue to the history told here. Many Algerian nationalists, like Ferhat 
Abbas, for example, studied and organized their political movements in Paris (often mingling 
with other international anticolonial leaders like Ho Chi Minh). In some cases, they imbibed 
those aspects of French culture they thought worth salvaging, and in others they simply found 
those aspects of the French national identity they could wield to their advantage. If the ideal 
image of France entailed assertions like article one of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen (1789: “all men are born and remain equal in their rights”), then anticolonial 
activists could show the world how far from this ideal the actually-existing France in fact was.12   
While referring to the standards of the Declaration of the Rights of Man could point to 
the need for reforming the colonial relationship as much as it did ending it, anticolonialists 
mobilized revolutionary symbols in more straightforwardly radical ways. The year before war 
broke out in Algeria the pro-liberation contingent of Algerians in the French labor union’s (CGT) 
annual Bastille Day demonstration embodied this strategy. Like Paris’ residents in 1789, 
Algerian nationalists saw in the government oppression and tyranny that necessitated violent 
destruction, even if only symbolic at first. While previous demonstrations had marked the 
national holiday in Algeria (14 Juillet celebrations in Algeria went as far back as 1880), the 
police brutality that followed and the outright calls for Algerian independence and national 
resistance made this event a sign of things to come. The French national holiday, July 14, was 
                                                                                                                                                             
monarchy’s fate, see the interesting study by Susan Dunn, The Lives of Louis XVI: Regicide and 
the French Political Imagination (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
12 Peter Dunwoodie, “The End of El Djezaïr,” Writing French Algeria, 1-36; Michael 
Goebel, Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
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now directly associated with the prospects of colonial independence. 13  As Pierre Nora has 
remarked, in the French republican imaginary, the Bastille itself remains something of an empty 
signifier that is readily applied to diverse causes.14  
By the start of the French Algerian War, references to the French Revolution of 1789 
only increased among the French left’s discourse on the political potential of developing nations. 
Parochial references to French history coexisted with international concerns. As the Soviet 
Union ceased to be the model for the socialist future, the left looked elsewhere for revolutionary 
inspiration. With the dual blows of Khrushchev’s 1956 denunciation and admittance of Stalin’s 
excesses and the defeat of the Hungarian anti-Soviet rebellion later that year, the European 
industrialized proletariat appeared to be in very sore shape indeed.15 The escalation of military 
and terror campaigns in Algeria the same year, however, drew increased attention to Algerian 
revolutionaries, whom many leftist intellectuals saw as members of a pre-industrial global third 
estate, suggesting the world’s next revolutionary development would occur where even Marx 
                                                 
13 Six Algerian workers affiliated with Messali Hadj’s nationalist Mouvement pour le 
triomphe des libertés démocratiques and one metropolitan metal worker were killed during the 
demonstration. Jan C. Jansen, “Celebrating the ‘Nation’ in a Colonial Context: ‘Bastille Day’ 
and the Contested Public Space in Algeria, 1880-1939,” Journal of Modern History 85, no. 1 
(March 2013), 36-68; Maurice Rajfus, 1953, un 14 juillet sanglant (Paris: Agnès Viénot 
Éditions, 2003). 
14 “There are and there will always be Bastilles to be taken.”  Pierre Nora, Présent, 
Nation, Mémoire (Paris: Gallimard, 2011), 256. Similar language also appeared in a 1989 spread 
in Nouvel Observateur celebrating the bi-centennial of the Revolution, titled “Ces Bastilles qui 
restent à prendre. Justice, police, administration, éducation, immigration, droit des femmes.” 
Nouvel Observateur (13-19 July 1989), 12-17.  
15  Jan Werner-Müller, Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century 
Europe (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 159; Michael Scott Christofferson, 
French Intellectuals Against the Left: The Antitotalitarian Moment of the 1970s (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2004), 17-20, 37-41; Robert O’Malley, The Call from Algeria: Third 
Worldism, Revolution, and the Turn to Islam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1996);Tony Judt, Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944-1956, Second Edition (New York: 
NYU Press, 2011 [1992]), 149.  
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had been pessimistic of its future.16 The growth of third worldism as a revolutionary ideology, 
however, coexisted with recourse to the ideals of the French Revolution; at times the two 
revolutionary referents combined. For those of the radical left disaffected by the Soviet model 
for revolution the French Revolution provided material that was always available and 
unimpeachable.  
The application of the French Revolution of 1789 to subsequent historical events was 
also by no means new in the decades surrounding World War II. Though the revolutionary 
trajectory from Rousseau to Robespierre to Lenin described by Jacob Talmon draws skepticism 
from modern academics, the desire to see the French Revolution as a political “heuristic,” 
“paradigm,” or “model” in twentieth-century France was largely the rule, not the exception.17 It 
rather fits into the process Michel Vovelle called “the game of analogies” and Sophie Wahnich 
described as an ever-recurring “concatenation of presents” that “200 years after the fact, these 
[Revolutionary] questions put men from the present into a condition of having to take part in the 
historical condition of 1793.”18 The concatenation Wahnich describes shows that the Revolution 
itself could exist as a metaphor for other historical times and places, the Revolution literally 
standing in the place of subsequent revolutions. This description gets to the heart of what made 
                                                 
16  Marx’s sentiments toward pre-industrial areas such as Ireland and India are well 
known. Marx stayed in Algeria for a short period toward the end of his life and during this time 
his attitude toward Algeria was negative, though not quite as derisive as his attitude toward 
similarly occupied areas with a large nonindustrial peasant base like Ireland or India. See his 
letter to Laura Lafargue, 13 April 1882, in Marx/Engels Collected Works, Volume 46 (New 
York: International Publishers, 1992), 238-243.   
17 Jacob Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London: Secker, 1952); Michel 
Vovelle, “1789-1917: The Game of Analogies,” in Keith Michael Baker, The French Revolution 
and the Creation of Modern Political Culture. Volume 4, The Terror (Oxford: Pergamon, 1994), 
349-350. For a more enduring example, see Theda Skocpol’s States and Social Revolution: A 
comparative analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979). 
18 Vovelle, “1789-1917: The Game of Analogies”; Sophie Wahnich, Liberté ou mort: 
essai sur la Terreur et le terrorisme (Paris: La Fabrique éditions, 2003), 13-14. 
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reference to the French Revolution so powerful for modern francophone audiences. The 
metaphor’s durability partially resides in its experienced matter-of-fact purchase on the truth. 
However, to understand references to the French Revolution from the standpoint of intellectual 
and cultural history, it is perhaps better to follow Vovelle and examine the references as 
analogies.19 While claiming the French Revolution was foundational to the modern world, the 
process of applying the French Revolution to other times and places required applying the logic 
of the French Revolution to other historical moments.20     
In this regard, examining the “plasticity” of using the French Revolution as an analogue 
referent that could be applied in multiple ways gives us access to the ways the Revolution 
provided a conceptual horizon for the meaning of political possibilities during the French 
Algerian War.21 Simply put, it mattered whether someone did or did not think there was a 
                                                 
19  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment [1790], translated by Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 225-227. The line between analogy 
and metaphor is perhaps not as clearly defined as I would like it. And, according to Kant’s 
analysis, the French Revolution as analogy is at the same time “schematic” and “symbolic.” 
Much of what Kant discusses as analogy Hans Blumenberg would later treat as metaphor. See 
Blumenberg, “Introduction,” Paradigms for a Metaphorology [1960], translated by Robert 
Savage (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 1-5. 
20  Dan Edelstein and Keith Michael Baker have recently approached the French 
Revolution as a “script.” By looking to the ways historical subjects have related to the 
revolutionary model created in France, they see a new way of comparing political moments 
across time and space. In their view, “Once known and enacted, the script can be replayed 
indefinitely; but it can also be changed, adapted, or even subverted by the introduction of new 
events, characters, or actions. The actors—or even the audience—can take over the stage.” This 
comparative approach is certainly promising, but we should be vigilant against naturalizing the 
what and how of translating revolutionary scripts from one historical moment to another, even if 
the historical subjects are themselves doing the translating. The historical question pertinent to 
me is that such a script would or could be staged in the first place. Keith Michael Baker and Dan 
Edelstein, eds., Scripting Revolution: A Historical Approach to the Comparative Study of 
Revolutions (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 3. 
21 I take my cues here from Reinhart Koselleck’s approach to begriffsgeschichte. I do not 
mean to say that there is a unified concept of the French Revolution. Rather, the French 
Revolution acted as an umbrella term under which many concepts sheltered. On changing 
conceptual horizons, see Reinhart Koselleck, “Time and History,” The Practice of Conceptual 
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fundamental similarity between the French Revolution and Algerian nationalist aspirations. It 
also mattered why they might think so in the first place.  
 This study proceeds on two interrelated fronts. First, Chapter One charts the various ways 
in which the analogy French Revolution-French Algerian War appeared from 1954 to 1962 
among anticolonialists. Initially, for intellectuals like Henri Marrou the analogy was a way of 
advocating for national reform by holding the illegitimate colonial practices in Algeria against 
the idealized first French Republic. As the war brought down the Fourth Republic the French 
Revolution became a rallying cry to fight the conservative forces advocating for the status quo in 
Algeria to remain in place and to fight the perceived threat of a fascist resurgence amongst 
French-Algeria’s supporters. This was no more apparent than among the contributors to the 
short-lived journal 14 juillet. Finally, the analogy was a way of expressing support for Algerian 
nationalists via what I call a “revolutionary confraternity.” This sentiment was an important 
motivation among those who took direct action in support the Algerian cause. One had to support 
the FLN (or their rivals, the MNA) because the FLN embodied the same historical situation as 
the heroes of the French Revolution. The French Revolution thus indexed many political and 
historical positions at the same time. The second line of enquiry examines why and the how the 
situations in both metropolitan France and across the Mediterranean made the analogy to the 
French Revolution seem natural and compelling.22 
                                                                                                                                                             
History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts, translated by Todd Samuel Presner and Others, 
Foreword by Hayden White (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 100-115. 
22 I use the term index according to the middle period of American pragmatist logician 
Charles Sanders Peirce’s semiotic theory. I interpret the index to mean any third term (physical, 
symbolic, or conceptual) that unites an array of other terms based on causal connections and 
relevant context. In Peirce’s terms, this form of index is a representation that corresponds to 
some fact of the object represented. While some strict adherents to Peirce’s theory might think 
this an overextension of the index, I nonetheless find it useful, especially given Peirce’s claims 
that experience and thought are never-ending semiosis. See Albert Atkin, “Peirce’s Theory of 
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 The following two chapters examine the key assumptions behind the statements 
examined in Chapter One. These recourses to the French Revolution in the 1950s and 1960s 
assumed it was sensible to relate it to both contemporary France and contemporary Algeria. 
While these connections may have seemed obvious to francophone anticolonialists, we need not 
take their claims to obviousness at face value.  
Chapter Two examines the role historians of the French Revolution gave to the 
Revolution’s contemporary relevance and the potential dangers of anachronism. Education 
policy under the Third Republic (1871-1940) emphasized Revolutionary imagery as a way of 
enforcing French patriotism in the wake of the Franco Prussian War and World War I, treating 
the Revolution as a living heritage. After the Vichy government and Nazi occupation openly 
contested the legacy of the Revolution, the postwar government again reinforced the Revolution 
as the true marker of French identity.23 While both institutional insiders, such as the historian 
Georges Lefebvre, as well as institutional outsiders, like activist-turned-historian Daniel Guérin, 
thought the French Revolution was invaluable to contemporary French politics, there nonetheless 
existed an undercurrent of unease about this sort of politically-charged anachronism. Many 
historians regarded the historical distance they took from their objects of study—their recul—as 
essential to their trade. Forcing their subject’s contemporary relevance risked historical 
malpractice. The up-and-coming historian of the Revolution Albert Soboul defended this 
                                                                                                                                                             
Signs,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), edited by Edward 
Zalta. Available online at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/peirce-semiotics/  
23  Siegel, The Moral Disarmament of France; Jean Leduc and Patrick Garcia, 
L’enseignement de l’histoire en France: de l’Ancien Régime à nos jours (Paris: Armand Colin, 
2003), Chapters 7, 8, 9. Leduc and Garcia note that the Vichy regime was “neither rupture nor 
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imagery. 
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position forcefully, despite an affinity for both the French Revolution and the cause of Algerian 
nationalism. 
 As Todd Shepard has convincingly argued, “The Algerian Revolution was at the same 
time a French Revolution.”24 In some respects, this statement was as literal as it was figurative. 
The second direction in which the French Revolutionary index pointed was across the 
Mediterranean toward Algeria. The French Revolution was an important referent in historical, 
sociological, and demographic studies of Algeria. Historical and social scientific knowledge also 
directly influenced French governmental policy during the French Algerian War.25 This chapter, 
however, addresses a slightly different question: in particular, how did the terms of debate 
around Algeria and its relationship to France shift so dramatically in the first place? It was one 
thing to invoke the French Revolution in the context of metropolitan crisis and republican ideals. 
It was another to recognize Algerian nationalists’ claims to political and historical difference and 
still apply the French Revolutionary analogy to them as well. The Revolution was a marker of 
political, social, and historical modernity. For the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth 
century Algeria was anything but modern in the French imagination. Such an assumption was 
one of the foundations of the civilizing mission’s logic. From the 1930s through the 1960s, the 
historical assumptions about Algeria’s historical place changed. During the French-Algerian 
War, many now viewed Algeria as modern or on the verge of modernity. Chapter Three tracks 
this change in Algeria’s historical description in the writings of historian Charles-André Julien, 
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sociologist Jacques Berque, and demographer Alfred Sauvy. All three wrote innovative studies 
on Algeria that challenged older orientalist assumptions of its historical place. They appealed to 
a wider public beyond a select field of specialists. They wrote and spoke publicly on the French 
Algerian War. And all three carried significant institutional power in their respective academic 
fields.  
 In broad outlines, the historical narrative Julien and Berque constructed for Algeria 
posited the following. On the one hand, the French presence disrupted a different, yet still 
important and coherent civilization in Algeria, creating economic and social instability. On the 
other, the encounter between the non-European Algerian population and the European 
newcomers transplanted aspects of the French Revolution’s ideals to Algeria. This occurred both 
in intercultural exchanges back in metropolitan France and the continual repetition of the 
civilizing mission’s universalism. Sauvy’s narrative differed in providing a demographic analysis 
of the colonial encounter. France’s presence in Algeria increased life expectancy but failed to 
provide improvements to standards of living that would curb an imbalance between decreased 
mortality and heightened fertility. If France was unwilling to ameliorate this imbalance, then 
Algeria needed its political autonomy to do so on its own. Sauvy, like Julien and Berque, tied his 
analysis to particularly French referents, describing the demographic situation in Algeria as that 
of France at the end of the ancien régime. The analogy to the French Revolution in Alfred 
Sauvy’s seminal article “Three worlds, one planet” is often downplayed in favor of its Cold War 
overtones, or these days simply forgotten. However, the formulation of the third world in 
Sauvy’s article succinctly summarized a major strand of French anticolonial rhetoric that had 
long been in existence, and readers easily fused it with Marxist revolutionary politics.26 The third 
                                                 
26 Alfred Sauvy, “Trois Mondes, Une Planète,” L’Observateur (14 August 1952), 14. 
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world was analogous to the pre-revolutionary French third estate. Like the third estate, economic 
and social inequalities in Algeria placed it on the verge of national revolution.  
 Chapter Four tracks the role of the French Revolution in the genesis of Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
philosophy. Previous work has shown the connections between Sartre’s thinking about postwar 
politics and his commitments to fighting racism and colonialism. 27  My reading of Sartre’s 
Critique of Dialectical Reason, preface to Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth, as well as 
unpublished manuscripts from the 1950s demonstrates the key role the French Revolution played 
in his philosophy. Sartre used studies of the history of the French Revolution as a model for 
revolutionary praxis and historical change. They provided a building block for his political 
thought during the French Algerian War. In this context, Sartre’s postwar existential third 
worldism emerged as another form of revolutionary confraternity. The place of the French 
Revolution in Sartre’s thought furthermore highlights some of the more contentious aspects of 
Sartre’s positions on Algeria as well as later revolutionary movements, namely his treatment of 
violence and the potential legitimacy of political terrorism.  
 The use of the French Revolution as fundamental referent in the French Algerian War (or 
for anything else, for that matter) relied on key assumptions about its universal purchase on 
history and politics. This claim to universal validity is important not only for what it captured, 
but also for what it could not and did not capture. The conclusion, in turn, explores some of these 
limits and examines a set of critiques contemporary French anticolonialists raised against this use 
of French historical reason.  
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In what follows, contemporary students and historians of the French Revolution may be 
somewhat (or very) surprised to read the descriptions of French history cited herein. The history 
of the history of the French Revolution (sic) has been quite tumultuous, often swinging back and 
forth like a political pendulum. Today’s historical consensuses and debates concerning the 
Revolution are not those of the mid-twentieth century. However misguided the reader may find 
various understandings of the French Revolution, they should remember the important point is to 
work outward from the subject’s worldview and leave the privilege of hindsight for other studies. 
One particular aspect of this exercise, however, bears a little more elaboration. 
The label Jacobin in French can mean many different things, and sometimes it can mean 
many different things at the same time.28 First, it can refer to the political club formed in the 
French Revolution whose members, like Robespierre and Saint-Just, are often seen as the cause 
and the leaders of the bloodier phases of the Revolution, the deposition of Louis XVI and the 
Reign of Terror. Secondly, it can refer to politicians who see their own political positions as 
radical or otherwise faithful to the essence of the Jacobin Club, however they might have 
construed that essence. And thirdly, the term can designate a specific set of political and state 
characteristics attributed to the Jacobin Republic: economic controls; centralized state 
bureaucracy; and a general adherence to natural rights, or to the rights in the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen in particular. Recent studies have shown that it is both unfair 
and unproductive to reduce these negative parts of the Revolution solely to the members of the 
Jacobin Club.29  However, as will be evident in Chapter 2, this was largely the view of historians 
                                                 
28 For a more in-depth examination of the history and use of the label “Jacobin,” see 
Michel Vovelle, Les Jacobins: De Robespierre à Chevènement (Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 
1999). 
29  For recent scholarship addressing the Jacobin Club’s place in the Revolution, see 
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in the first half of the twentieth century. For many of these historians, too, these were not 
necessarily negative associations. Likewise, contemporary readers may be puzzled over any 
connection between Robespierre and the 1789 Declaration, yet it is a connection many made 
without thinking twice. Over the course of the French-Algerian War, the designation Jacobin 
variously referred to all three meanings. Sometimes, the intended meaning would shift over the 
course of the same breath. However important such nuances and context are to understanding 
each individual statement, my main point throughout is that in each case the referent hearkens 
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The French Revolution in the Metropole and Algeria 
Intellectuals invoked the French Revolution during the French-Algerian War in three 
waves, generally correlating with the course of the fighting in the war as well as with intellectual 
activism and engagement. While the first years of the war saw limited public interventions, as 
revelations of torture and repression became known and the French Army conducted large-scale 
offensives such as the Battle of Algiers in 1957, public debate increased. From the fall of the 
Fourth Republic in May of 1958 through the end of 1959 fears of a fascist resurgence led by pro-
French-Algeria military officers brought the conflict to the metropole in an unavoidable fashion. 
In the war’s last three years the main events revolved around the presence of rightwing terrorism 
and public support for those who refused to serve in the military and others who gave direct 
support to the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). More often than not, speaking about 
the French Revolution was a way of mediating the relationship between abstract national values 
and the violence of the war. In this regard, fears of the return of a fascist fifth column, never fully 
expunged from French society after the purge following World War II, motivated this way of 
thinking. In terms of the volume of associations, the high point of the French Revolution’s 
entanglement with the French Algerian War is undoubtedly 1958. Not only was this year the 
200th anniversary of Maximilien Robespierre’s birth, it was less predictably the year in which the 
Fourth Republic fell and the Fifth Republic was born. By the end of the war, however, it became 
common to not hear the French Revolution invoked to speak about metropolitan France, but 
rather to speak about the process of forming an independent Algerian nation.  
Though these often anachronistic references to the French Revolution might appear 
sporadic at first glance, they are almost all bound by two clear logics. As far as the French 
Revolution served as a founding myth for the integrity and trajectory of the French Republic, 
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especially amongst members of the left—whether it be a revolutionary, international, or state-
bound institutional left—it provided a standard point of reference when other contemporary 
guides appeared untenable. The French Revolution worked as an indexical marker that could 
bridge a glorified French past with hopes for uncertain French and Algerian futures. Secondly, 
these invocations followed the narrative arc of the French Algerian War’s unfolding. As the war 
began on the heels of defeat in Indochina and amidst general conflict in North Africa, from 
Morocco to Suez, the French Revolution was more often than not used as a surefire reference 
point for navigating these crises within the French Union. However, as the political questions 
posed by the war changed so too did the ways in which anticolonial intellectuals discussed the 
Revolution. This chapter reads the French Revolutionary analogies according to the rhythm of 
the French-Algerian War.    
Although any foundational myth lends itself to continual reflection and invocation, the 
three primary ways French intellectuals drew on the Revolution during the French Algerian War 
highlight the historical specificity of their respective moments. First, intellectuals looked back to 
the beginning of the first French Republic to act as a guidepost for individual commitments and 
political action on the level of personal introspection and reflection. If the French Revolution 
was a reference point for the values of the Republic and its institutions, its individual chapters 
and protagonists could also suggest proper individual courses of political engagement. Second, 
intellectuals relied on the French Revolution to understand the crises of the Fourth and Fifth 
Republics. While some on the center-right, and especially those interested in keeping Algeria 
French, saw De Gaulle’s May 1958 coup as a sign of hope, many from the center to the far left 
saw the event as the return of fascist rule. But along with a reflexive anti-fascism many on the 
left responded to De Gaulle’s return by drawing on revolutionary imagery. Thirdly, 
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anticolonialists also grafted French Revolutionary images and identities onto Algerian 
nationalists, seeing them as revolutionary analogues removed by a century and a half. If the 
French Revolution had caste the mold from which all revolutions afterwards were formed, then 
certain logics prefigured the revolution in Algeria and could be used to make sense of the war’s 
events. In extreme cases, references to the French Revolution’s reign of terror justified Algerian 
nationalist terror.   
 
Defending the Purity of the Republic 
During the first year of the war, fighting occurred mainly in the Algerian countryside, 
split three ways between the FLN, the rival Mouvement National Algérien (MNA), and the 
French army. Among the FLN’s goals early in the war was recruitment and solidifying support 
among rural Algerians. This often involved forced recruitment and the enforcement of strict 
codes of conduct, forbidding alcohol, tobacco, and other activities deemed to be immoral western 
actions.30 As the FLN grew in strength they moved into urban areas where French targets, such 
as police officers, cafés, forms of civilian transportation, were more easily available. As attacks 
in large cities like Oran, Constantine, and Algiers increased, so did the attention of intellectuals 
and the French media. The most dramatic of these incidents was the Phillippeville massacre of 
August 20, 1955, where FLN forces killed 52 Muslims and 71 pieds noirs around the 
northeastern city of Constantine. In turn, the pied noir community killed at least 1,273 Muslim 
Algerians, though the post-independence Algerian government claimed the number is closer to 
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12,000.31 By 1956, the attacks on civilians prompted Albert Camus and others to call for a truce 
forbidding attacks on any civilians. The truce did not come, and following the execution of FLN 
prisoners later that year FLN leaders declared that “For every rebel guillotined, 100 French will 
be slaughtered without distinction.”32  
As the war entered its fourth year, the number of public demonstrations and scandals 
increased. Furor over the disappearance of the young Algerian mathematician and Communist 
activist Maurice Audin and the torture of Alger Républicain editor Henri Alleg, to take two 
incidents from 1957 as examples, only contributed to the momentum leading up to the crisis of 
May 1958. The journal Express and publishing house Éditions de Minuit helped ensure these 
stories would have wide public attention. Selections from Pierre Vidal-Nacquet’s 1958 L’Affaire 
Audin that were printed in Express painted a picture of a repressive colonial government willing 
to sacrifice its best and brightest. Though La Question was the first book to be banned in France 
for over 150 years, Henri Alleg’s account of his torture in an Algerian prison sold over 60,000 
copies before being banned and carried a preface by Sartre that also appeared in Express.33      
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During the first three and a half years of the French Algerian War most intellectuals, even 
many intellectuals who were in favor of ending French colonial holdings elsewhere, did not 
actively seek the establishment of an independent Algeria, but rather supported reforming the 
relationship between France and its North African holdings. The numbers of intellectuals with 
anticolonial sympathies who saw no common future between Algeria and France were small at 
the beginning of the war. For the most part, intellectual engagement reflected a desire to 
effectively implement Republican values of liberté, égalité, fraternité in Algeria, and reform its 
civic and political structures to end racism and discrimination. The civilizing mission of French 
colonialism did not necessarily need to end, for many of these critics; it simply needed to be 
practiced consistently. Even when an end to de facto colonial rule was called for, most assumed 
there were a host of solutions available that did not involve severing ties with Algeria.34  
The view that the Republic was in danger and needed to draw from its deep patriotic past 
to regain control of Algeria also existed from within the government in the early years of the 
war. President René Coty openly proclaimed in a speech at the town of Verdun—a site of 
military contestation in both 1792 and 1917—that “Down there, the nation is in danger, the 
nation is fighting.” When in the same year the Minister of the Armed Forces, Max Lejeune, 
began drastically increasing the number of soldiers in Algeria, it is telling that he named the 
directive “Opération Valmy.” What France needed most of all, he reasoned, was a citizen army 
ready to defend the territorial integrity of the nation just as they had done at the Battle of Valmy 
in 1792 against an invading Prussian army. Whereas critics of the government’s actions in 
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Algeria would draw from the Revolution in order to critique the actions of the nation from 
within, Lejeune continued to see the Revolution by way of France’s civilizing mission, directing 
Republican values at the unruly “nationalists who aspire to an unrealisable independence.”35   
One of the first forms of intellectual engagement during the war was the formation of the 
Committee Against the Pursuit of the War in North Africa (Comité d’Action des intellectuels 
contre la Poursuite de la Guerre en Afrique du Nord), formed 5 November 1955, just a year after 
the FLN’s first attacks.36 A small group of intellectuals formed around Gallimard writer and 
editor Dionys Mascolo and sociologist Edgar Morin. Mascolo and Morin had known each other 
since their days in the World War II resistance and many who joined their group came from the 
same circle. They founded the committee out of the conviction that wars in North Africa 
represented a fundamental threat to the ideals of the French Republic, and these ideals were 
firmly rooted in the French Revolution.37 By January of 1956, the group had collected signatures 
from hundreds of intellectuals who agreed with their cause. The Committee’s early heated 
exchanges with the new Governor General of Algiers, Jacques Soustelle, set the Committee’s 
initial public image. Soustelle characterized the Committee as out of touch, and he claimed there 
was no actual war in Algeria, just a series of attacks carried out by fanatics. In turn, the 
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Committee countered that their members were specialists who were not only qualified to discuss 
the situation but also bound as citizens of the Republic to diagnose the ills of French rule in 
Algeria and suggest steps forward. 38   
The Committee’s sheer size and the fact it united persons from such diverse positions 
attests to the concern events in Algeria caused, and perhaps not since the anti-fascist committees 
of the 1930s had there been such a large umbrella organization. 39  However, such a large 
umbrella also caused a good deal of dissension. On the one hand, radical anticolonialists like 
Jean-Paul Sartre and André Mandouze saw the goal of a completely independent Algeria as a 
foregone conclusion while the majority of members were not willing to go so far early in the 
war. Even with the staunch decolonizing bloc, some members like Edgar Morin and Daniel 
Guérin balked at the Committee’s support for the FLN over its rival MNA. On the other hand, 
with the Soviet Invasion of Hungary in 1956 and the Suez Crisis, it was unclear whether the 
Committee should be defined by broader international goals or if it should keep its focus 
squarely on North Africa. Even in the case of the latter option, the Committee could not agree 
whether crisis in Algeria was part of a broader universal struggle for emancipation or limited, 
particular conflict. After the Soviet Union invaded Hungary as a way to reign in anti-Soviet 
reforms, the Committee became even more divided. Those critical of the Soviet Union such as 
Edgar Morin and Dionys Mascolo thought it would be impossible to remain quiet about Soviet 
oppression and denounce oppression in Algeria. Mascolo initially asked Communist supporters 
in the Committee to leave. When it became clear they would not, he resigned from the 
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Committee in November 1956.40 Amidst this dissension, however, the Committee did clearly 
assert the status quo of Algeria’s relationship to France was inadequate and a risk to the ideals of 
the nation. What the Committee wanted through the end of its activity in mid-1958 was an end to 
the war, an end to repression in Algeria and France, and a negotiated peace between the FLN and 
the government.41 
The constellation of ideas linking the French Revolution to fears of fascism and the aims 
of Algerian nationalists were apparent as early as the beginning of the Committee. A number of 
the adherents to the Committee expressed their fears of the threat colonial wars presented to the 
existence of the Republic and the contradictions between the war and French universalist 
ideals.42 The historian Maurice Vaussard agreed to support the Committee, but noted his unease 
with certain aspects of the Algerian nationalists’ actions. He explained to Marguerite Duras that 
he “felt solidarity with the legislative work of the French Revolution, but not with the Terror, nor 
even the execution of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette,” adding, “I feel the same faced with the 
situation in North Africa.”43 Revolution in North Africa was a worthy cause, but as the French 
Revolution illustrated, there were real dangers associated even with the most noble of causes. 
Others on the Committee were less measured in their appreciation of the Revolutionary verve of 
the moment. Dionys Mascolo, for example, referred to the atmosphere of the first meeting of the 
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Action Committee against the Pursuit of the War in North Africa as “very 1793,” likening the 
Committee to the Revolutionary Committees of the First Republic. 44  Such a comparison is 
perhaps not surprising coming from Mascolo given his favorable treatment of the writings of 
Saint Just he published just after the liberation.45 
Other members of the Committee also continued to refer to the Revolution over the next 
two years. Among them was Committee Member and anticolonialist lawyer Pierre Stibbe. In a 
meeting at the Centre du Landy in Paris in 1957, he declared that in the postwar Algeria had 
entered the same position as France in 1789. Like France before the Revolution, Algeria had 
always been ruled by decree. The contradictions between the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and Citizen and Algeria’s governance were proof that Algeria was a nation unto itself and 
deserved its freedom.46  
Few members of the Committee were as provocative in the early years of the war as 
Claude Bourdet, former member of the maquis and editor of the political journal France-
Observateur. Before the beginning of the war, he was already quick to draw connections 
between colonial administrators and the Nazis. Following the 1951 arrest of Algerian nationalist 
leader Messali Hadj, who would within the next four years form the MNA, Bourdet wrote an 
editorial in his paper openly asking “Is there an Algerian Gestapo?” Bourdet claimed the anti-
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nationalist sweeps made by colonial police and the military as well as the torture and beatings of 
prisoners were all-too reminiscent of the Gestapo’s tactics. Though he thought these Messaliste 
militants were only signs of a nascent uprising, the courts made much of their possession of 
weapons and short history books on the French Revolution.47 By January 1955 Bourdet argued 
the answer to this question was regrettably in the affirmative. Authorities in Algeria kidnapped, 
tortured, and assassinated members of the insurrection as well as those suspected of supporting 
them. Following a barrage of articles that hammered home this stance, Paris authorities arrested 
Bourdet for “demoralizing the army” and raided the offices of France-Observateur. Bourdet’s 
lawyer noted in one newspaper account that it was poor timing on the part of the government, 
since it was nearly exactly 12 years since the German Gestapo had thrown Bourdet in jail during 
the Occupation.48  
Directly following Bourdet’s arrest, Henri Marrou, the chair of Christian History at the 
Sorbonne, wrote an extended editorial in Le Monde addressing the French government’s reaction 
to rebellion in Algeria. Marrou was one of the few professors at the Sorbonne sympathetic to 
prospects of North African reform and later decolonization amidst a highly conservative faculty. 
Though he was normally not as publicly vocal as some other intellectuals, within academic 
circles he was resolute in his anticolonialism.49 In the newspaper article Marrou intervened by 
speaking in multiple registers: as a man of faith, as an ancien résistant, as a citizen of secular 
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France. The very existence of rebellion in the Maghreb meant that France had failed, at least 
partially, to fulfill its moral duty to work for the improvement of its colonized. Asking if the 
French presence in North Africa “had been, is today, an authentically French presence,” Marrou 
claimed it did not appear France was living up to its ideal image. No Manichean classification of 
peoples could ever capture reality because, as the “Berber” Saint Augustine had noted, all 
civilizations are a mélange of the City of Good and the City of Evil. As the gap widens between 
the ideals these civilizations proclaim and the actual measures these civilizations take to realize 
them, the closer these civilizations move to their death. Marrou echoed the provocative early 
analyses of Bourdet, by making a direct connection between the extraordinary renditions, torture, 
and concentration camps of the Nazis and their correlates in Algeria. The “laboratories of 
torture” and “electric shock baths” were a “disgrace to the country of the French Revolution and 
the Dreyfus Affair.” Quoting Péguy’s dictum that France is “the patron, witness (often the 
martyr) of freedom in the world,” Marrou concluded with a warning: “Before we are further 
committed to the infernal cycle of terrorism and reprisals, each of us must understand the most 
profound, most sincerely heartfelt cry of our fathers: ‘The patrie is in danger!’”50 
Bourdet and Marrou’s statements were prescient in many ways. They not only indicted 
the French government and military’s willingness to resort to state terror tactics, even before the 
later cause scandals surrounding Henri Alleg and Maurice Audin,51 they also connected the 
anticolonial cause to the maquis’ resistance to the German Occupation and accused the militant 
pro-colonialist supporters of being fascist, of working against the tide of history, and of being 
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antithetical to the values of the French Revolution. These arguments would continue throughout 
the end of the war, if anything only increasing in intensity.  
The government’s reaction to Marrou’s article was swift—and perhaps unwittingly lent 
even more support to Marrou’s claim that France was looking more and more like a police state. 
Police raided Marrou’s home after the article appeared, looking for any evidence that he was 
provided direct support to anticolonialists in North Africa. Unfortunately for them, the only 
references to North Africa they found amongst his personal papers were references to Saint 
Augustine. Police also interrupted Marrou’s lectures at the Sorbonne and searched his office. The 
Minister of Defense, Bourgès-Manoury, responded to the article in the National Assembly, 
decrying the lack of support being offered to the young French troops fighting in the war.52 
Despite the government pushback, Marrou stood by his opinions. Three days after the article 
appeared, amidst a “respectful and apprehensive silence” in Parisian university circles, Marrou 
explained to a student, “I had to say it. I said it. That’s all there is to it.”53  
By the end of the year Marrou would give a talk explaining that one could not understand 
the situation in Algeria without first of all understanding the history of Europe since the 
beginning of the age of expansion. Marrou’s text exhibits all of the features of a well-intentioned 
colonial humanism that marked many members of the French left through most of the war. 
Though one could be against the war, this did not necessarily mean one was against the civilizing 
mission tout court. 54  Yet coinciding with the often patronizing and orientalist tone of its 
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observations of Muslim Algerians, Marrou’s views also illustrated the belief that these Algerians 
were on the verge of a political-historical equivalence with modern France.  
Marrou argued that over the last five centuries, France, like other European countries, 
was marked by technical and industrial innovations at the same time it advanced outwards 
beyond its native continent. The French presence in Algeria became an amalgam of all of the 
best and worst aspects of this expansion. While the French presence included the export of 
French citizens to the colony and a desire to improve the land and infrastructure, French Algeria 
was also a colony of exploitation whose Muslim populations resisted assimilation. Marrou 
maintained that despite France’s inability to go beyond its civilizing ideals and put them into 
perfect practice, the colonial venture in Algeria was not a total failure—“the colonial universe 
was not a concentration camp universe.” 55  Of colonialism’s successes, perhaps the most 
instructive for Marrou was the transplantation of French Revolutionary ideals: “From this infant 
we have made read and asked to admire the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and we wish that 
he could not remember these prestigious words… ‘Men are born and remain free and equal 
under the law.’”56 Given the wave of countries throughout the world that were newly-formed out 
of former colonies, the desire to end the war in Algeria is not simply a sign of French decadence. 
“Why not see,” reasoned Marrou, “that on the contrary [Algerian insurrection] consummates the 
very mission that we gave to ourselves, and constitutes its justification.”57 Algerian nationalism 
was the logical result of colonialism. 
Marrou displayed the same sense of decisive duty displayed in his Le Monde article 
amidst revelations of the torture and the 21 June 1957 disappearance of the Algerian 
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mathematics professor Maurice Audin. Pierre Vidal-Nacquet, a former student of Marrou’s and 
one of the most important figures in the investigation into Audin’s disappearance, noted that 
Marrou joined the Maurice Audin Committee immediately, attending each meeting and 
supporting their cause with “an unfailing solidarity.”58  
 The publication of Henri Alleg’s story of imprisonment and torture in Algeria followed 
quickly on the heels of Audin’s disappearance. Alleg, editor of the nationalist Alger Républicain 
newspaper, had been arrested and detained in Algiers on 12 June 1957 in Maurice Audin’s home. 
Audin and Alleg were friends, and Audin had just been taken the day before. For a month the 
French Army tortured and interrogated Alleg without ever bringing former charges. After it was 
determined he would not break, Alleg was transferred to a military hospital where he began 
composing the account of his treatment. When Alleg’s story was published in February 1958 it 
was certainly not the first accusation that the government tortured its prisoners, nor was it the 
first time such accusations made the comparison between government tactics and those of the 
Nazis. It did, however, have perhaps the biggest impact on the French public. Even though 
copies of the book were seized and its publication was banned, numerous copies were purchased 
before the seizures and its contents were summarized and excerpted in the French press, 
including an essay written by Sartre, which would eventually serve as preface for later editions 
of the book.59 
 At the beginning of the war, the French Revolution as the idealized version of France was 
a privileged vehicle for highlighting the inconsistencies and limitations of actual French practices 
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in Algeria. The stability of the Republic was in danger, but whereas procolonial advocates saw 
suppressing the FLN as key to keeping the integrity of the Republic intact, those against the war 
took the opposite position. Anticolonialist and pro-reform intellectuals feared that the 
continuation of a repressive French presence in Algeria was a sign of the worst episodes in recent 
French memory. On one side stood the ideals of the French Revolution and on the other counter-
revolutionary fascism. By 1958, however, both fears—of republican crisis and the specter of 
fascism—would only intensify. These heightened experiences of crisis pushed the French 





Judging by military and police statistics, 1958 would seem to mark a temporary de-
escalation of the war. After all, the anti-terrorist offensive in Algiers (1956-October 1957) 
immortalized by Gillo Pontecorvo’s film, The Battle of Algiers, concluded with the dismantling 
of the FLN’s network in Algiers and the death and capture of multiple FLN leaders. The military 
offensive in Algiers and a similar one in Constantine caused a decrease in the FLN’s presence in 
urban centers, while incidences of terrorism also dropped by the beginning of 1958 and remained 
low through 1960.60 The 1959 Challe offensive, too, all but neutralized the power of the ALN 
(the FLN’s military wing) in the countryside.61 However, the battle was a turning point in the 
FLN’s favor in a number of other ways. First, the special powers act of 1956 not only legitimized 
prison camps and emergency measures, it also formally transferred power to combat terrorism 
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from the urban police to the military.62 Secondly, a number of causes célèbres resulted from the 
capture of FLN militants involved in the battle, such as the trial of Djamila Bouhired, accused of 
detonating a bomb in the Milk Bar restaurant in Algiers. Trials such as this one gave the FLN 
and its supporters a very public and largely uncensored platform to expose military atrocities.63 
Despite military success, by 1958 for these two reasons the public focused a great deal of its 
attention on Algeria, and this attention had already eroded confidence in the government’s ability 
to find a solution to the conflict. By May 13, the government of the Fourth Republic had lost the 
confidence of the military. Generals Raoul Salan and Jacques Massu took power of Algiers and 
formed Committees of Public Safety while openly declaring their support for Charles de Gaulle. 
Within the next two days de Gaulle publicly affirmed he was willing to take control of the 
government. De Gaulle promised a referendum on his presidency and the formation of a new 
republic, which eventually took place in September. The referendum confirmed popular support 
for his leadership and gave hope to many that the only person capable of resolving the situation 
in Algeria was in power. The return of de Gaulle, however, did not automatically gain the 
universal confidence of intellectuals or the far left; for reasons discussed below his return 
potentially symbolized a terrifying right-wing escalation in the war’s prosecution.   
By spring 1958 the effects of three years fighting Algerian nationalists and the critiques 
of the French government’s handling of the situation fed into an overall climate of national crisis. 
The happenstance alignment of government crisis with Revolutionary commemoration only 
furthered the entanglement of the French and Algerian Revolutions. 6 May 1958 was the bi-
centennial anniversary of Maximilien Robespierre’s birth. The chance alignment of this 
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anniversary with governmental crises only encouraged the public to think the two phenomena in 
common. By 1957 leftist members of the National Assembly moved to publicly celebrate 
Robespierre’s 200th birthday in order “to organize, in his honor, a solemn homage.” Explaining 
their reasoning, the group of Assembly members who proposed the celebration explained that 
“Whether we wish it or not, we agree to see Robespierre as the most important man of the 
Revolution.” According to these members of the Assembly, Robespierre as man and as myth was 
of national importance and a man on whom the people of France could model their actions: “At a 
moment when the country has such a need for its youth to be or to become patriotic, idealist, 
enthusiastic for the public good, it seems to us that Robespierre might be a hero from whom we 
can gain knowledge and respect.” Not only was the hero of the Revolution seen as a beacon for 
France, Robespierre was also viewed as a reference point for the rest of the world. The proposal 
explained, “At a time when men of all countries question their fate, question the value, the 
meaning, the content of the word Revolution, when they reclassify their feelings and admiration 
for France, it seems that the French could remind the world that when Revolution had a French 
face it should remain moral and that the military and political necessities of the Terror, with 
Robespierre, never [sic] violated the rights of man.”64 Though this image of Robespierre as an 
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unvarnished hero might appear strange, it was not abnormal to the left in 1950s France. In a 1956 
study of Robespierre’s journalism, for example, Michel Eude portrayed him as a political 
pragmatist and staunch defender of the French constitution in the face of overwhelming 
adversity. 65  Jean Ratinaud’s 1960 popular biography of Robespierre came to a similar 
conclusion. What remained of Robespierre was above all “an image, an example,” of the “virtue” 
of a man who held to his beliefs even though “the times were tough.”66 The motion in the 
Assembly was voted down, though the Assembly did agree to put Robespierre’s image on a 
postage stamp.67 An independent committee that included historians Albert Soboul, Georges 
Lefebvre, and Marc Bouloiseau coordinated and promoted unofficial celebrations.  
The celebrations of Robespierre lasted from May to July of 1958, including academic 
conferences, radio broadcasts, television documentaries and docudramas, special museum 
exhibits, and newspaper and magazine editorials reflecting on the importance the man and the 
myth held for France. Tributes appeared in academic journals like the Annales historiques de la 
Révolution Française (AHRF)—itself run by the Society of Robespierrist Studies— and the 
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Bulletin of the Society of Modern History.68  At the Society of Robespierrist Studies’ 1958 
commemoration, Maurice Dommanget, declared that “the cause of Robespierre… is tied to the 
causes of all other great revolutionary figures… the cause of the French Revolution in particular 
and all other revolutions in general which are embodied in the persona of Maximilien.”69 On 
television, special broadcasts aired during prime time spots in May in commemoration of 
Robespierre (followed by one on Saint-Just, for which Dionys Mascolo provided commentary). 
These broadcasts were in addition to the usual celebratory emissions aired on the 14 July for the 
fête nationale as well as the popular Le procès de Marie-Antoinette and retelling of the diamond 
necklace affair.70 The print coverage of the bicentennial was no less exhaustive, with essays and 
editorials detailing Robespierre’s life and legacy. 71  The overwhelming consensus in these 
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commemorations was that Robespierre was an exceptional figure who was responsible for 
defending the Rights of Man and Citizen as well as opposing war, and when the war came 
anyways, he did what was necessary to save the Republic. As Robert Escarpit wrote on the front 
page of Le Monde, despite admitting being more of a Girondin and admirer of Danton: “But 
Robespierre is Robespierre. It is only of the rarest of men in our history who we might say that 
for a brief instant he was France, and, perhaps even more difficult yet, he was the French 
people.” If there was a fault with Robespierre’s history, it was with the Republic itself—only 
mediocre men get to live on to old age, the Republic is destined to devour great men.72  
These celebrations did not go uncontested, however. Robespierre’s image as an 
indomitable French hero quickly combined with contemporary political concerns, including the 
French Algerian War and the coup that brought down the Fourth Republic just a week after 
Robespierre’s anniversary.  
From the very beginning, the celebration of Robespierre was entangled with 
contemporary concerns. The National Assembly’s proposed celebrations, for example, seemed 
dead on arrival precisely because of worries that fêting Robespierre might be interpreted as more 
than nationalist pride. It was rumored that then-Prime Minister Guy Mollet felt uneasy about 
supporting the celebrations since he, like Robespierre, was also a deputy from Arras 
(Robespierre’s birthplace and government constituency) and in the current political climate he 
did not want to associate himself with the man of the Terror.73 While members of the MRP, the 
PCF, and Radical Party supported the proposal, independents and conservatives decried a motion 
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devoting the nation’s energy to celebrating Robespierre. Georges Bidault, a resistance hero and 
eventual OAS supporter, was confounded by what he saw as the audacity of such a proposal. 
Aside from his indignation at the suggestion that Robespierre was a defender of the Rights of 
Man and not its ultimate enemy, Bidault thought celebrating Robespierre was merely a coded 
way of defending contemporary terrorists. Among those who wanted to celebrate Robespierre, 
Bidault surmised, were also those who criticized military and police operations in Algeria for 
mistreating the terrorist rebels. Bidault claimed Robespierre was a force that weakened the 
Republic, his antiwar stance betrayed the Revolution’s true glories. The Revolution’s high point 
came in its military successes, particularly those that followed Robespierre’s downfall.74  
Historical and contemporary events merged even closer, however, when on May 13 
colonial generals seized governmental control of Algiers, forming their own committee of public 
safety, and backed Charles De Gaulle’s return as the President of a new Republic. Maurice 
Duverger quickly noted the strange perversion of a military putsch on the 200th anniversary of 
Robespierre’s birth, claiming the mantle of a committee of public safety. This had to it “the bitter 
taste of a mockery, because the true Committee of Public safety did not trifle with the 
subordination of military to civil power and knew how to maintain the discipline of its generals 
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with the most energetic means.” Duverger’s analysis moved between ancient, contemporary and 
Revolutionary historical registers: the generals had crossed the Rubicon like Caesar’s legions 
marching towards Rome; the generals represented a fascist menace reminiscent of the fascist 
demonstrations of February 1934; and the crisis meant the nation had entered into a 
“revolutionary phase, where events occur rapidly and according to a relentless logic”—a coming 
civil war threatened the existence of the Republic.75 Duverger’s fears were not extraordinary, nor 
was his linkage with the ideals of the early Republic of the French Revolution.76 Similarly, 
militant Communist Roger Garaudy described the political crisis and colonial wars as part of a 
long chain of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary moments since the Revolution of 1789.77 
The May 29 cover (the day following President René Coty’s abdication to De Gaulle) of the 
magazine L’Express carried a cartoon of a Marianne in a Phrygian bonnet guillotining herself. 
(See figure 1.) Over the coming months many on the left occupied positions between 
apprehension at the prospect that France could once again fall into the grip of fascism and 
revolutionary expectations of reprising maquisard and sans-culottist identities. 
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Figure 1. Cover. L’Express (29 May 1958). 
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By the time of the fête nationale, two months after the putsch, associations between the 
French Revolution and contemporary events had only increased. On the one hand, pro-gaullists 
wished to cast events as the road toward preserving the ideals of the immortal Republic. On the 
eve of 14 July, De Gaulle declared in a radio broadcast destined to the overseas territories that 
“never before had the men who live in these territories and those who live in the metropole been 
as morally close to each other. Distance, climate, racial diversity, differences of condition, so 
many causes of separation which are each day reduced.” De Gaulle’s proclamation of a “vast and 
free community” likely convinced very few that everything would be fine. Writing, in 
L’Humanité, Yves Moreau bridled at such statements, which were to him so clearly “denied by 
the facts.” There was only one way forward that would guarantee any measure of hope along the 
lines De Gaulle described: “that which, condemning the Bastilles of the colonies, would comply 
with the nation’s aspirations.” Just as Robespierre had denounced the moneyed interests behind 
the Club Massiac during the French Revolution, what was needed was a challenge to French 
Algerian colons and their spokesperson in De Gaulle. Moreau reasoned that De Gaulle’s actions, 
despite his address, were in fact the exact opposite of the National Convention’s 17 December 
1792 declaration that proclaimed the nation’s duty toward the defense and support of all people 
looking to recover their freedom. The fact that this declaration also coincided with the beginning 
of the trial of Louis XVI is not likely to have escaped Moreau, nor perhaps his readership. What 
clearly needed to happen in the wake of the May 13 coup was to realize the nation’s new 
symbols of despotic oppression were in the colonies. The way forward involved razing these new 
Bastilles, and perhaps a new regicide as well.78  
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During the official celebrations, a demonstration of 6,000 French ancien combattants de 
la Résistance marched to the Hôtel de Ville in Paris. The demonstration’s goal was to persuade 
public opinion that de Gaulle in fact did not represent a return to fascism and that brotherhood 
could exist between all members of the French nation. Muslim and colonial soldiers were 
therefore prominently on display for the television cameras. As André Malraux declared in his 
address to the veterans present, eulogizing the soldiers of the Revolutionary battle of Fleurus,  
“those who believed in defending the Republic of Year 2 know that since then no one has fought 
for France without fighting for the people of France.”79  The event wished to reinforce the 
themes in De Gaulle’s radio address and tie De Gaulle’s return to a renewal of the French 
Republic, not its demise. A near-mirror-image of the event was held at the Place Forum in 
Algiers, with Generals Salan and Jouhaud presiding.80 Yet an editorial in L’Express was left to 
conclude that Malraux was nothing more than the regime’s cutout man, and it lamented that even 
conservative British publications like The Sunday Times were taken aback by the contradictions 
between recent events and the ideals of the fête nationale.81  
In the wake of the putsch, former members of the Committee Against the Pursuit of the 
War in North Africa drew from the confluence between Republican history and upheaval to 
present a political position amalgamating the two. The writers Dionys Mascolo, Marguerite 
Duras, and Jean Schuster formed 14 juillet, named after the date of the storming of the Bastille in 
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1789. Its first issue appeared in time for the fête nationale on 14 July 1958.82  While left-
republican imagery that referred to the French Revolution had been merely an undercurrent of 
the earlier Committee, in 14 juillet it was placed front and center. Prominently displayed in the 
margins of each issue of the magazine were quotes by philosophes and Revolutionary icons such 
as Saint-Just and Robespierre.  
At points, contributors to the magazine went beyond symbolic affinity and made direct 
comparisons between the Algerian crisis, De Gaulle, and the French Revolution. The first issue’s 
cover explained that “We are the inheritors of a people who held regicide in honor when they 
acted to establish liberty.” Later, Jean Schuster elaborated on this sentiment, claiming phantoms 
from the past were haunting France. He explained, “The head that had been cut January 21, 1793 
was nothing more than the head of a man [Louis XVI]. There had been neither victim, nor 
executioner, but a monstrous and absurd edifice that collapsed because the [national] spirit had 
taken conscience of the fact that such a power was no longer real. This fall was definitive and 
perfect; similarly, all subsequent attempts at restoration of the throne were only caricatures… de 
Gaulle’s attempt is the same.”83 Gérard Legrand echoed Schuster’s analysis of De Gaulle as 
reincarnation of absolute despot. According to him, “France had never been forgiven for 
guillotining Louis XVI. In a tour of religious legerdemain, the King simply picks his head up and 
walks away.” Though De Gaulle’s return seemed to have been far from anyone’s mind two years 
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earlier, “Again such a symbol leads the nation, and what a symbol at that!”84 By contrast, Edgar 
Morin surmised that rather than being a counterrevolutionary force, or the ghost of regicide, De 
Gaulle was emblematic of French conservative reaction. Recent French history differed from 
Great Britain’s tradition of slow reform: “Since 1789 France has evolved much more through 
swift mutations.” “The heritage of bonapartism” holds sway over France and any revolutionary 
potential to counteract De Gaulle qua Napoleon “is completely blocked by Stalinist 
mythification.”85 In his own journal, Arguments, Morin offered an expanded version of this 
analysis. French history since the Revolution was dominated by the two leitmotifs of a weak 
parliamentary system and the real dangers of a military coup. Since the end of the Second World 
War, France began to face two antagonistic forces—prospects for greater European integration 
and neo-nationalist regeneration. Put otherwise, “the Algerian War tends to regress the French 
political situation to the classic models of French political struggle and class struggle.” 86 
Whether it was the perpetual presence of French Republican symbolism or the regression of 
fundamental tensions within modern French history, the war in Algeria and the May coup were 
viewed through late eighteenth-century lenses. 
The journal 14 juillet also gave further voice to the earlier fears of fascism’s creeping 
influence in France as well. According to Jean-François Revel, France was paying for its failure 
to fully purge all fascist elements from its society after World War II. An increasingly fascist 
Republic had turned into a fascist dictatorship.87 Mascolo and Schuster agreed, claiming De 
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Gaulle’s military supporters had corrupted him and a fascist government in Paris was the next 
step.88 Claude Lefort’s assessment differed slightly, denying the weight that the French distant 
and recent past had on the present, but maintained that fascism was the threat of the day.89  
In advance of the September referendum on the new constitution, 14 juillet published a 
special issue that affirmed, “France is openly violating the fundamental principle of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, which postulates that men are born free and 
remain free and equal under the laws.” The journal declared de Gaulle’s government illegal and 
recognized “the combat of the Algerian people for their independence and freedom” as a just 
war. In the hexagon, the only thing to do was repeat the same resistance that was carried out 
under Vichy. For contributors of 14 juillet the way forward following De Gaulle’s return was 
clear: speak out against the new republic, encourage revolutionary action, and end the war in 
Algeria.90 
Even critics of the tendency of anticolonialists to project false referents onto the French 
Algerian War were readily afraid of De Gaulle’s return and feared the resurgence of fascist 
elements in French society that had either lay dormant since Vichy or had found ways of 
sneaking in under alternative guises such as the military. Guy Debord of the new Situationist 
International, for example, characterized the group 14 juillet as “lunatics” for being out of touch 
with political realities.91 Yet from the beginning of De Gaulle’s return, Debord agreed with the 
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group: De Gaulle and his supporters represented a real and credible fascist threat and the proper 
remedy was revolutionary insurrection: “Here we are in a battle against military fascism. Its 
chief is de Gaulle [sic], who has the army with him, not only in Algeria, but in France, Germany, 
and the Mediterranean… Only revolutionary war could destroy the power of French fascism.”92  
 By the end of 1959, most on the left seemed to reach the consensus that De Gaulle’s 
government did not in itself represent a fascist threat. In response to a questionnaire distributed 
by 14 juillet for what would be its final issue, many contributors, even those who had originally 
believed France was in the grip of a fascist coup, had moderated their opinions on the matter. 
According to Daniel Guérin, the events of 13 May had not been under estimated, but rather they 
had been over-estimated. De Gaulle’s return was nothing more than “a banal palace revolution.” 
The situation was politically serious, for sure, but the government was not fascist. As Guérin 
clarified elsewhere, “there had neither been a spontaneous movement of rebellion nor a 
‘Revolution’ of the fascist type.” Guy Mollet’s lack of response had been as influential in the fall 
of the Fourth Republic and mollification of the left as had been De Gaulle’s return.93 Maurice 
Blanchot conceded that “the colonial reaction is a movement of despair… a collective despair 
brought together in collective unrest giving rise to movements of agitation that one could at 
times call racist, at others fascist.” However, despite all appearances, De Gaulle’s reign was no 
dictatorship, and there was nothing behind his symbolic presence as messianic leader of the 
republic. De Gaulle’s leadership was by definition inactive and empty symbolism.94 By 1963, a 
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study of the history of fascism in France could even conclude that antifascism was a much more 
real phenomenon in France than fascism itself. Despite having certain affinities with fascist 
ideology, neither De Gaulle’s return nor his military or paramilitary backers could be interpreted 
as fascist.95  
As the war entered its final years the emergence of the clandestine, far right terrorist cell 
the Organisation armée sécrète (OAS, founded January 1961) appeared as the precipitate of the 
most fascistic military elements backing De Gaulle. The subsequent OAS putsch attempts and 
attempted assassinations of De Gaulle and left-wing intellectuals kept the feeling of existential 
danger ever present, but at least this fascist threat could be distinguished from the new 
government. As the fears of general fascist takeover subsided, so too did many of the invocations 
of the ideals of 1789 as corrective for a broken Republic or call to revolutionary insurrection. 
Supporters of French Algeria, however, also continued to use their understanding of the 
Revolution’s legacy to argue their cause. At one meeting in Algiers in September 1958 a pro-
French attendee declared that they needed a new Charlotte Corday (the person who assassinated 
sans-culotte revolutionary Jean-Paul Marat in the midst of the Federalist Revolts in 1793).96 
From 13 May 1958 to the end of war, if the ideals of the Republic were invoked, they were just 
as likely to be invoked from an OAS member or supporter of French Algeria.97 In contrast to the 
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Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen invoked in the metropole, pro-French 
Algerian militants invoked Committees of Public Safety and the revolutionary citizen army. In 
some instances, however, writers transferred to the OAS the fear of a fascist government, or a 
despotic monarch. De Gaulle was no longer the reincarnation of Louis XVI, but the King’s 
counterrevolutionary supporters still existed.98   
 
Revolutionary Confraternity 
In March of 1958, Maurice Papon, a former Vichy administrator who had overseen 
elements of anti-rebellion programs in Constantine, was appointed head of the Paris Police 
Prefecture. Papon’s direction of the Paris Police resulted in the importation of repressive colonial 
measures that culminated in the massacre of protesters on 17 October 1961. While many of the 
police tactics used were not new, the scale to which they were used and the media coverage of 
the outcomes visibly brought the war to the metropole.99 As the prospects of an independent 
Algeria increased, the OAS launched numerous high profile attacks in France. From January to 
February 1962 alone there were over 50 OAS bombings in France. The Foreign Office, President 
De Gaulle, and many supporters of Algerian independence were prime targets. Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
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home was bombed twice, on July 19, 1961 and January 7, 1962. The offices for France 
Observateur and Les temps modernes were also targeted. When, on February 7, 1962, the bomb 
targeting André Malraux’s home disfigured his four-year-old neighbor, Delphine Renard, the 
PCF, Unified Socialist Party (PSU), and trade unions protested at the Bastille. Eight people 
caught inside the nearby Charonne metro station died from police beatings.100 For those on the 
anticolonial left, the OAS represented a clear enemy to both a newly-formed Fifth Republic and 
soon-to-be formed Algerian Republic.   
In the midst of the May 58 crisis and through the end of the war more and more 
anticolonialists began to see the struggle for Algerian independence not only in terms of a 
relationship between the metropole and the French Revolution. Associations between the ideals 
of Algerian independence and the French Revolution of 1789 also grew into a revolutionary 
confraternity. Like other historical moments presented as the analog of the French Revolution 
(like the Russian Revolution), the growth of a new national consciousness in Algeria was at 
times modeled on the French Republic’s foundational moments. In the final years of the war the 
alignment between France’s Revolutionary heritage and the revolutionary ideals of Algerian 
rebels became the most pronounced.  
Even before the beginning of the war, many anticolonialists, particularly of Marxist and 
syndicalist leanings, had been engaged in debates on the nature of Algerian worker- and class-
consciousness. Some, following Lenin’s analyses, stressed the importance of seeing the Algerian 
struggle as part of an international struggle of an underdeveloped proletariat (or 
lumpenproletariat). 101  Others, such as the group Socialisme ou barbarie, saw the workers’ 
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consciousness in Algeria as part of a distinct and newly-formed national consciousness that 
needed to be thought on its own terms (though for Socialisme ou barbarie these new terms often 
went hand in hand with a critique of bureaucracy and desire for workers’ self-management).102 
However, the sort of revolutionary confraternity that made the French Revolution its point of 
reference went beyond the general third-worldist framework where the industrialized proletariat 
of Europe was replaced by the struggles of the underdeveloped sub-proletariat.  
The demographer Alfred Sauvy’s invention of the term “third world” in 1952 to describe 
the position of underdeveloped countries vis-à-vis Cold War geopolitics was an influential 
moment in the rewriting of hitherto “backward” territories into a narrative of political progress. 
A wide range of developmental theorists including Georges Balandier, Kingsley Davis, and 
Simon Kuznets echoed Sauvy’s analyses.103 But Sauvy also meant the new term to evoke the 
historical situation of the third estate in pre-revolutionary France. 104  Other historians, labor 
organizers, and sociologists of North Africa had noted the ways in which a new political 
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consciousness appeared between the two world wars, amounting to what has been described as a 
peuple-classe populism that supported assimilationist politics in the interwar. 105  From the 
twenties through to the fifties though it became possible to imagine an Algerian future analogous 
to the trajectory of the French Republic, the momentum of this narrative still remained on the 
side of fully incorporating Algeria into the French Republic and not on the side of divorcing 
Algeria from France and forming its own state. Yet by the crisis of May 1958 the momentum 
clearly seems to have shifted to the latter proposition amongst anticolonial intellectuals. 
Greater geopolitical factors involving the rise of decolonized and decolonizing nations 
throughout the world certainly played a part in this political imaginary as well. According to 
testimony in the French journal Présence Africaine, after the April 1955 Bandung summit (at 
which unofficial Algerian representatives were present) it was no longer tenable to caste a blind 
eye to the world-historical potential of these developing nations: “Though imperialism had 
denied it, Asia and Africa are coming to reestablish themselves amongst civilization: the creative 
vitality of peoples, without which there is no real progress. Yesterday’s ‘mutes’ are now going to 
assume the march of history.” 106  Subsequent international conferences at Accra (1958) and 
Rome (1959) only reinforced this point, as did the fact that 13 African nations gained 
independence in 1960 and the United Nations issued their Declaration on the Granting of 
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Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in December of that year.107 As the Manifesto 
of the 121 declared, “The cause of the Algerian people, which is decisively contributing to the 
destruction of the colonial system, is the cause of all free men.”108 By the end of 1960 the “sense 
of history” seemed to be not just anticolonial, but in step with decolonization; even De Gaulle 
openly spoke of the twentieth century as the one where empires would vanish.109    
Even within this shift, however, what may appear as provincial references to the French 
Revolution were not jettisoned. Rather, they shifted registers: from invoking the pure standards 
of the French Republic and summoning a revolutionary identity to portraying the FLN as 
conducting a French Revolution of their own.  
If there in fact was a discrepancy between the ideals of the French nation, as many had 
argued, then support for Algeria was a way of rehabilitating this tarnished image. For instance, 
the Algerian-born poet Jean Daniel explained in 1961, “it is through a uniquely French culture, 
the teaching of French masters, and in the name of French values that I have discovered the 
misfortune of the people amongst whom I was born.” Gathering support for Algerian nationalism 
provided “the best means of being faithful to the French heritage.” Daniel’s friend and fellow 
French-Algerian writer Jules Roy agreed, adding, “This is why I will use all of my powers to 
campaign for fraternity between the two independent states.” 110  According to Jean-Marie 
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Domenach, France had for too long defined its relationship to developing nations in terms of 
“assistance.” Now was the time to move toward “solidarity.”111 
 This emphasis on revolutionary confraternity was apparent in Frantz Fanon’s and Jean 
Amrouche’s views on colonial identity and Paris courtroom proceedings of metropolitan FLN 
supporters. Fanon’s writings on colonial identity and the double standards of French 
universalism have in many ways stood in as an avatar for the struggle for Algerian independence. 
Though FLN leaders were wary of many of Fanon’s formulations and it would be wrong to 
automatically associate his writings for the FLN’s journal El Moudjahid or his book The 
Wretched of the Earth with the FLN’s views, his work is an interesting limit-case for 
interrogating French anticolonial thought. Though Fanon was interested in destroying the French 
colonial system and in the ways in which French colonialism failed to live up to its own self-
proclaimed values, his own thinking was firmly rooted in mid-twentieth-century French 
intellectual currents. The French Revolution appears fleetingly in Fanon’s published and 
unpublished writings, in references and asides easily missed, but the references point to the shift 
in thinking about different postcolonial futures, from one where continued association with 
France was assumed to one that demanded a radical break. Amrouche, too, is an interesting 
figure in this regard. Like Fanon, he would die before peace in Algeria. And, as in Fanon’s work, 
questions of cultural identity are a running theme throughout his poetry and prose writings. As a 
Catholic Kabyle who had been fully “assimilated” to French culture, Amrouche was ideally 
positioned to interrogate the relationship between French and Algerian identities. Neither French 
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de souche nor an Algerian willing to distance France completely, he embodied a site of 
translation between the two diverging worlds. 
 In his 1952 book, Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon analyzed the double identity created 
by the French colonial system. Growing up on Martinique Fanon believed his identity to be 
French, but when confronted with metropolitan racism in France he had to come to terms with 
his social status as a racialized other. The power of European racism was such that even a black 
man in a European society could run the risk of internalizing its racism. The ultimate goal 
presented in the book was to throw off such chains of the past in order to view people from an 
ungrounded universal humanity—whether those chains are past wrongs of exploitation or other 
foundational moments in the formation of a culture’s collective unconscious. Fanon did “not 
want to exalt the past at the expense of my present and my future… And it is going beyond the 
historical instrumental hypothesis that I will initiate the cycle of my freedom.”112 Hence, Fanon 
fiercely criticized other colonial writers, such as Alioune Diop, looking for an essentialized or 
authentic indigenous identity to combat colonial exploitation.113  
However, the universal future for which Fanon hopes at times seems at odds with his 
admission of his own historical particularity and the possible horizons of that present.114 In 
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response to the myth of a singular black nation, Fanon’s indignation caused by this racism did 
not amount to a wholesale repudiation of the French Union. Rather, the political goal was a more 
equal and consistent integration. Fanon insisted,  
I am a Frenchman. I am interested in French culture, French civilization, the French 
people. We [Martiniquais] refuse to be considered ‘outsiders,’ we have full part in the 
French drama. When men who were not basically bad, only deluded, invaded France in 
order to subjugate her, my position as a Frenchman made it plain to me that my place was 
not outside but in the very heart of the problem. I am personally interested in the future of 
France, in French values, in the French nation.115  
 
The desire for Republican inclusion and making France live up to its universalist claims was not 
unique to Fanon—other colonial leaders and politicians like Leopold Senghor professed similar 
political visions throughout the end of the French Union of the Fourth Republic.116 Before armed 
conflict in Algeria began, the majority of metropolitan anticolonialist intellectuals felt the ideals 
of 1789 needed only be applied more consistently.  
Yet even after the turning point of 1958, when Fanon was undercover working alongside 
the FLN in Algeria’s struggle for independence from France, these earlier sentiments concerning 
the relevance of French history remained. What had changed was the shift from believing the 
French Republic needed to re-embrace its own heritage to viewing Algerian nationalists as 
taking that heritage into their own hands. The title of his collection of El Moudjahid essays from 
the first half of the French Algerian War, Year 5 of the Algerian Revolution, purposefully drew 
on this legacy of “French history and its drama” by mirroring the French Revolution’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
country, my existence. In no fashion should I undertake to prepare the world that will come later. 
I belong irreducibly to my time.” Ibid., 12-13. 
115 Fanon, Ibid., 202-3. 
116 Gary Wilder, The French Imperial Nation State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism 
Between the Two World Wars (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), especially Chapter 
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calendrical system that reset time at the beginning of the first French Republic.117 The title might 
seem innocuous; however Fanon intended it to be a highly-charged political statement, and that 
was how it was received. Though Fanon’s publisher, François Maspero, had “nothing against the 
title in principle,” he thought it was too radical and would only lead to faster censure by the 
government the way other books like La Question were immediately censored. Fanon, however, 
insisted the title remain unchanged. (The book was censored following its publication in 
1959.) 118  The following year, Fanon again described to Maspero the relevance the French 
Revolution carried for thinking through events in Algeria. Referring to critiques of his writings, 
Fanon wrote that “the same way [Georges] Lefebvre has shown in his study of the French 
Revolution, … the fear, the inferiority complex, the resentment, sometimes imparts to events an 
orientation and form not predicted by a ‘dialectical’ study.”119 Thinking the scope and scale of 
the French Algerian War from within risked a similar sort of intellectual paralysis.  
This tension of uncertainty amidst the scope of potentially-world-historical processes also 
carried through the work that most defined Fanon’s legacy, The Wretched of the Earth. Critics of 
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the book took special exception to the first chapter, “On Violence,” which ruled out the 
possibility of a non-violent process of decolonization. Since violence was constitutive of the 
colonial encounter, its inception and the maintenance of its relations, decolonization could only 
be achieved through an equal or greater measure of violence. Jean-Paul Sartre’s bombastic 
preface certainly amplified the shock of the first chapter’s claim for the necessity of violence 
since it refused to let readers imagine decolonization’s violence could be confined to the 
colony.120 But if Fanon seemed certain about his eschatology of decolonizing violence, the rest 
of the book makes it clear that for a newly-decolonized nation, little else could be certain. 
Revolutionary violence does not act as a panacea, and violence remains in independent regions, 
especially as these new nations find their places within the framework of the Cold War. The 
examples of decolonized nations in Latin America, for example, showed the apparent ease with 
which a colonial oppressor could be replaced by former nationalist leaders seduced by western 
bourgeois trappings. The people, the vital source of decolonizing energy, could thus be shut out 
of the revolutionary process. 121 “In 1789,” Fanon noted, “after the bourgeois French Revolution, 
the humblest French peasant gained substantially from the upheaval. But it is common 
knowledge that for 95 percent of the population in developing countries, independence has not 
brought any immediate change.”122 As for Algeria, Fanon remained hopeful of the potential for 
popular action, especially in the Algerian countryside, though the danger of an aborted 
revolution is ever-present in the text. “Only underdeveloped countries led by a revolutionary elite 
                                                 
120 “Europe leaks like a sieve. What then has happened? Quite simply this: we were the 
subjects of history, and now we are the objects. The power struggle has been reversed, 
decolonization is in progress; all our mercenaries can try and do is delay the completion,” and 
even worse, “Terror has left Africa to settle here…” Jean-Paul Sartre, “Preface,” The Wretched 
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121 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 118-119. 
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emanating from the people can today empower the masses to step onto the stage of history. But 
once again on the condition that we vigorously and decisively reject the formation of a national 
bourgeoisie, a caste of privileged individuals.”123  
The broad outlines of Fanon’s fear of how easily the revolutionary process could be 
perverted certainly resonate with the dynamics of revolution outlined one year earlier by Sartre’s 
Critique of Dialectical Reason, with which Fanon was familiar, and which also relied heavily on 
analyses of the French Revolution’s events.124 But it also fits a familiar narrative of the French 
Revolution (going back at least as far as Michelet) in which le peuple, the driving force behind 
the Revolution, are betrayed by the Revolution’s leaders.125 Danton’s plea, “let us be terrible to 
relieve the people of being terrible themselves,” ends in a new form of tyranny under the 
Committee of Public Safety.126 The role the French Revolution played in Sartre’s own theory 
was crucial, and given that Fanon read Lefebvre and Sartre at the time he wrote Wretched of the 
Earth, the similarity in the contours between French Revolutionary and decolonizing narratives 
is hardly surprising.127  
Fanon was certainly aware of the ways in which colonial domination sought to control 
the whole of a colonized society’s history, past, present, and future. The result is a “cultural 
alienation” that needs to be supplanted by the retrieval of indigenous cultures. The “bards of 
negritude,” for example, in contrasting “old Europe versus young Africa” reached beyond 
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combatting one nationalism with another. 128  But Fanon also saw that so-called colonized 
intellectuals are in many ways trapped. Having “thrown himself headlong into Western culture,” 
it is nearly impossible to be rid of western points of reference after the colonial relationship 
ends.129 Though the contents of the French Algerian War were different, and though the struggle 
pointed to the foundation of a new national consciousness, the contours of French history 
remained. 
Those who criticized Fanon’s political analyses as not revolutionary enough, certainly 
saw much in his continued interest in the French Revolution to dislike. The FLN member and 
historian Mostefa Lacheraf claimed that even in the early years of the French Algerian War 
(between 1955 and 1956), Fanon remained an “assimilated” intellectual. As Fanon’s biographer 
David Macey notes, Fanon’s idea of a free and independent Algeria was substantively different 
from Lacheraf’s vision, though both Lacheraf and Fanon were products of French higher 
education. 130 Lacheraf was a graduate of Louis-le-Grand in Paris and afterward worked at the 
Institute of Oriental Languages. He, too, also saw the cause of Algerian nationalism as tied to the 
legacy of the French Revolution. Certainly, by the time Year 5 was published Fanon’s position 
had changed and the charge of assimilationism would have been a hard one to make in earnest. 
Fanon’s insistence on the analogy between the Algerian and French Revolutions suggests that 
the spirit of the French Revolution continued to hover in the background of Fanon’s work. This 
orientation in political theory no doubt lent much to such differences between Fanon and 
Algerian FLN supporters.   
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Jean El-Mouhoub Amrouche embodied similar tensions. He was born to Christian Berber 
parents in Soummam, Algeria in 1906, but eventually the family settled in Tunisia and 
Amrouche attended French schools. By the end of World War II he had made a successful career 
as a poet, helped found the literary journal L’Arche and regularly appeared on French radio 
programs commenting on great literary figures like Mallarmé. He was thus as assimilated—or in 
the language of the time, évolué—as a North African with indigène status could be. In his iconic 
formulation, “France is the spirit of my soul, but Algeria is the soul of this spirit.”131  
 Amrouche was in Tunis for most of World War II and during this time he frequently 
referred to the French Revolution as a guide for worldwide political renewal. During the Axis 
powers’ occupation of Tunis, it was difficult for Amrouche and his friends to “maintain and 
affirm French values.” Nonetheless, he believed the Free French would overcome the Italians 
and Germans and would be the leaders in a postwar world.132 According to his hopeful outlook, 
France was the “spiritual reserve” of the entire world, and 
For a country whose destiny is to create exemplars in all aspects of human activity, a 
national revolution is nonsense. The principles of 89 have fertilized the world, and it is 
not possible to conceive of a political order outside of their application imposing a 
revolution on the planetary level.133 
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French civilization was the key to a future universal civilization. This civilization to come, one 
of which other anticolonialist intellectuals spoke in the postwar, would move beyond current 
political oppression, including that of the colonial variety.134 
 From the end of World War II through the beginning of the French-Algerian War, 
Amrouche remained hopeful of the prospects for this universal French project, but thought the 
realty of modern France grew ever-increasingly distant from its ideal image. In the colonial 
world, then, Amrouche thought the universal principles of 1789 would be realized by the various 
anticolonial actors arguing for a separation from France. In 1948, he described France’s relation 
to North Africa as an “initiator who has lost the sense of its true mission… The North African 
peoples do not exist. But they are gaining consciousness—class consciousness—national 
consciousness—moral and psychological consciousness.” 135  The May 1945 revolts against 
French rule in Algeria and then the beginning of the FLN’s armed struggle confirmed that 
Algerians had rejected the French with whom they interacted in their everyday lives. But in so 
doing, they embraced another France. At an early meeting of the Committee Against the Pursuit 
of War in North Africa in January 1956, Amrouche explained, 
For me it is thus not a question of rejecting and still less of hating France, the country of 
my spirit and at least part of my soul. But there was France, the France of Europe, the 
France full stop, and the other—the one out of which colonialism had made a simulacra 
that is properly the negation of France.136   
 
Earl in the War, Amrouche still believed in the possibility of a reconciliation that would allow 
Algerian autonomy without a complete break from France, but by 1957 this was no longer a 
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possibility.137 By refusing the false image of France, it was Algerians’ job to fulfil the ideals of 
the true image of France. 
 As Amrouche’s support for the FLN grew, so did his critiques of other intellectuals who 
failed to lend their support. Amrouche took extreme exception to ethnologist Germaine Tillion’s 
study Algeria in 1957.138 Tillion, in Amrouche’s reading, had reduced the French Algerian War 
to questions of underdevelopment and poverty, with the implication that economic amelioration 
would solve France’s crisis. Tillion could only see the Berbers of Kabylia as ancient and a 
counterpoint to the modern world. This blind spot meant she fundamentally misunderstood the 
war:  
It is true that one can hardly recognize these hungry souls demanding the destiny of free 
men and being inhabited by spiritual needs. ‘Liberty or death’: it was good and true for 
the great ancestors of 1793 and the barefoot of Year II. Who could imagine the fellagha 
of the Aurès, Oranie, Soummam, or the clandestine actors from the towns or villages of 
Algeria, have discovered in their desperation the only path towards the light by 
proclaiming themselves free and sovereign over the land of their forefathers?139 
 
Amrouche found it tragically ironic that Tillion could not see the same political dynamics at 
work in Algeria that were essential to the core of the French Revolution. He repeated similar 
sentiments in the pages of Le Monde in early 1958. French universalism ran the risk of denying 
Algerian particularity. Because the only true patriotism for many French was French patriotism, 
they were blinded to Algerians’ claims to their own sense of national identity.140  
 Like Fanon, Amrouche saw the legitimacy of the Algerian nationalist cause through the 
prism of the French Revolutionary ideals he had come to embrace. The ultimate end of this 
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journey was a divorce from France. But the actual distancing from France happened at the same 
time Algeria dealt with the revolutionary dynamics of French history. Also like Fanon (as well as 
Mouloud Feraoun and Albert Camus), Amrouche died before Algerian independence was 
realized. Both Fanon’s and Amrouche’s deaths leave the question of whether in their eyes 
postwar Algeria would be a realization of the idealized versions of France or ultimately a total 
renunciation of French civilization.141    
The very visible presence of the French Revolution in the French Algerian War even 
beyond the far left shows that the meaning of the Revolution was far from stable, but also that it 
held a great deal of import for what was to be done in relation to Algeria.  While some on the left 
felt the French government’s use of police oppression, state terror, and torture were a betrayal of 
the ideals of 1789, others went as far as to see the Revolution as a means of rationalizing and 
even defending Algerian terrorism. The analogy between an Algerian Revolution and the French 
Revolution of 1789 had perhaps its most public incarnation when such radicalized French 
supporters of the FLN were brought to trial in 1960.  
The trial of French métropole and colonial supporters of the Jeanson network from 5 
September to 1 October 1960 highlighted the ways in which French and Algerian national 
identities were aligned over the course of previous years. Trials of Algerian militants and 
draftees who had refused to fight in the war had been common in the years preceding the trial, 
with capsule summaries presented in the newspapers and longer court testimonies covered by 
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intellectual journals like Les Temps modernes.142 However, the Jeanson network had gone further 
than mere civil disobedience by aiding the FLN in France through the laundering of money and 
goods and by helping FLN members stay clandestine.143 Furthermore, of the various court trials 
and legal scandals publicized, the Jeanson trial most directly invoked the French Revolution 
when positing that aiding Algerians was not a betrayal of France, but rather the best way to 
remain faithful to both. 
The network’s leader, Francis Jeanson, was one of postwar France’s models of a 
politically-engaged intellectual. After gaining his baccalaureate in philosophy in 1940, Jeanson 
taught philosophy and became involved in the resistance, eventually making his way to North 
Africa—via a series of Spanish prison camps—to join the Free French Forces in 1944. 
According to his biographer, Marie-Pierre Ulloa, for Jeanson, “Resistance appeared to be a 
categorical imperative” in the Kantian sense. After being refused to take exams for his 
agrégation in philosophy after the war, Jeanson wrote a number of articles popularizing the 
philosophies of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre. Jeanson’s 1947 study, The Moral 
Problem and the Philosophy of Sartre, elevated him to the top rank of existentialist intellectuals 
and gained him entry to the journals Esprit and Les Temps modernes. 144 In 1952, Jeanson played 
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a pivotal role in Sartre’s break with Camus over the latter’s critique of revolutionary violence in 
The Rebel by staging a full personal and ideological attack in Les Temps modernes.145    
For Jeanson’s 1948 honeymoon he and his wife, Collette, stayed in Algiers. While his 
time in North Africa was dominated by the concerns of World War II, his postwar return 
highlighted the extreme racism and extreme impoverishment present in Algeria. The result was a 
series of articles in Express and Les Temps modernes from 1949 to 1952. After the French 
Algerian War began he connected with nationalists associated with the FLN. In 1955, Francis 
and Collette published Outlaw Algeria, one of the first books to come out in support of Algerian 
independence.146 After Guy Mollet’s government passed special police powers to fight the FLN 
in 1956, Jeanson concluded that intellectual engagement in the form of books and articles was 
not enough: direct action in coordination with Algerians was necessary.147 What began as acting 
as a taxi driver for Algerian nationalists in 1956 soon expanded into a network of money 
laundering, transport of weapons, and manufacture of falsified documents, lasting until the 
majority of the network were arrested in coordinated police operations in February 1960. 
While Francis Jeanson himself had opposed any attacks on French civilians in the 
métropole, not all members of his network shared his reservations. In the public’s eye, at least, 
the relationship between his network and the FLN was one of absolute commitment. For 
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example, after the police arrested members of the network, the newspaper Paris-Presse 
l’Intransigeant covered the story with a headline purportedly from one of the Algerian members 
of the network, Haddad Hamada: “The French You Have Arrested Are More FLN than I.”148  Le 
Monde’s trial correspondent, Jean-Marc Théolleyre also noted the Muslim defendants’ 
willingness to “‘fraternally’ salute [French network members] as men and women who ‘are not 
of the FLN but are of the French who know how to put into action their ideas of peoples’ 
liberties.’”149  Members of the non-Communist left were also quick to see the cause of the 
Jeanson network as a surrogate for Algerian solidarity and the right to refuse military enlistment. 
Intellectuals such as André Mandouze and Claude Bourdet publicly declared solidarity with the 
accused and some gave testimony in the courtroom. Even though Sartre was away in Brazil 
during the trial, he gave his editorial team at Les Temps modernes full rights to draft a statement 
in his name, knowing the amount of media attention his name would enlist.150  
Though Jeanson himself was absent from the proceedings he was nonetheless tried with 
25 other members of his network. Fourteen of those tried, including Jeanson, received the 
maximum penalty of ten years in prison, three received lesser sentences, and nine were acquitted.  
In the trial, the most vocal of the accused used the trial to explicitly state the ties behind French 
Revolutionary identity and the imperatives of Algerian anti-colonial terror.   
Jeanson’s published writings on Algeria interestingly steer clear of any reference to the 
French Revolution. While many of the members in his network had a strained relationship with 
the Communist Party and were suspicious of its dogmatic Stalinism, Jeanson remained uncritical 
of the party and even tried courting direct PCF support after the party recognized the FLN as 
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Algeria’s legitimate representatives in 1958. 151  So while his analyses of the war portrayed 
Algerians as a legitimate proletarian force, his analyses displayed a Marxism not concerned with 
the French Revolutionary tradition. It was everyday workers’ (French and Algerian) experience 
that pointed towards the right socialist action, not analysis of ideology or previous revolutionary 
struggles.152 Jeanson’s stance, however, was quite different from that of those members of his 
network who were placed on trial. All of the members, including Jeanson, did see the struggle of 
the FLN as analogous to the French maquis resistance against the Nazis in World War II, a claim 
frequently made in the courtroom proceedings.  
Appeals to France’s Revolutionary past were in part a key piece of the strategy designed 
by the French and Algerian legal defense teams. As Mourad Oussedik, lawyer for the Algerian 
defendants, later explained, French defendants were encouraged to focus their testimony on 
appeals to “the defense of the principles of 1789,” appeals to “the honor of France,” and 
“common combat with the French.”153 Instead of being viewed as domestic outlaws, the goal of 
the French defendants was to present themselves as defenders of an idealized France associated 
with the French Revolution and anti-Nazi resistance. Algerian defendants were likewise 
portrayed, in their own testimonies and through their lawyers’ arguments, as representatives of a 
separate Algerian nation in the midst of a revolution worthy of comparison to the French 
Revolution.   
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 Among the most controversial of the defense team’s lawyers was Jacques Vergès, who 
three years earlier had defended Djamila Bouhired. Vergès’ hallmark trial strategy throughout 
his career was one of legal rupture.154 Rather than find a legal means for proving the innocence 
of his clients, Vergès’ method was to put the government itself on trial. For Vergès, a 
revolutionary trial politics based on rupture had important historical precedents, such as Louis 
XVI’s trial in the French Revolution.155 Indictments of France and its leaders were not meant to 
be a wholesale critique of the French nation, but rather were designed to hold up an idealized 
version of the French Republic against current deviations from that ideal. In his explanation of 
his defense of Djamila Bouhired in 1957, Vergès claimed Bouhired’s actions belonged “to the 
tradition of Abd-el-Kader,” but that this “is by no means an anti-French tradition.”156  This 
method of defending Algerian militants was meant to deflect any possible guilt of the accused 
onto France itself, making the trial more about France’s public image than legal culpability of the 
defendants. Thus, on multiple occasions in the Jeanson network trial, Vergès questioned to what 
extent André Malraux, then Minister of Culture, had any contact with Francis Jeanson. Surely, he 
speculated, the author of The Human Condition could sympathize with the efforts the accused 
made in the service of French values. The novel, after all, dramatized Cambodian 
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revolutionaries’ efforts against Imperial China. After the President of the court reproached 
Vergès for referring to Malraux as “an old terrorist,” Vergès explained that as a child raised in a 
French colony he admired the protagonist of the novel, Kyo, since “having to choose between his 
European parents and his colonial parents, he, for the sake of dignity, chose the latter and the 
Revolution.”157 According to Vergès’ logic, it was out of respect that Malraux was referred to as 
a terrorist.  However, despite numerous pleas on the part of the defense, Malraux never appeared 
in court to state his position on the case. And throughout the war, though he denounced the use 
of torture, Malraux never made any public overtures in support of Algerian independence.158 As 
Vergès concluded after the trial, though Malraux had once been an opponent of Chiang Kai-Shek 
and Franco, since he was a government minister he was now those dictators’ de facto ally. His 
absence from the trial was a refusal to confront the ideals of his youth and the distance between 
the ideals of France and the French government.159 
Though Vergès’ antics in the courtroom drew a good deal of the press’ attention, he was 
not the only one to directly link French identity with Algerian terrorism. During defendant Jean-
Claude Paupert’s interrogation and closing declaration he tied both current existentialist anti-
colonial discourse and his understanding of the Revolution’s legacy to the Algerian 
independence movement. When Paupert was called up to fight in Algeria in April 1956, he made 
a conscious decision not to desert or resist his duties. This, however, was despite his personal 
reservations toward French colonialism and his participation, first in the Nouvelle Gauche, and 
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then the PSU (the newly-formed Unified Socialist Party). Once back in France Paupert’s views 
and actions grew increasingly radical as the French military intensified their campaigns in 
Algeria and police in France increased repressive tactics as well. He and fellow soldier Claude 
Jouannais publicized their military experiences for the journal Esprit just before the May 1958 
crisis.160 
The return of De Gaulle and continued military intensification only radicalized Paupert 
further. Claiming, “I’m no revolutionary hothead… I always incline towards reform,” Paupert 
contemplated joining the Jeanson network for months before actively participating in clandestine 
activity in 1959. According to his much later interview with historian Martin Evans, Paupert 
never saw himself as a member of the FLN, but rather a defender of French values.161 Despite his 
insistence that he was not prone to extremism, Paupert went perhaps further than any of the other 
accused members of the Jeanson network in justifying Algerians’ use of violence via reference to 
French national identity. 
Under examination, Paupert defined the “colonial regime as a form of terrorism,” and this 
terrorism caused the Algerians to “live in violence”; violence “is their memory and their destiny. 
They may not leave it—they may only blow it up.”162 On the one hand, Paupert’s analysis of the 
colonial world as imbued with violence mirrored elements of Sartre’s essay “Colonialism is a 
System” and Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth. As a friend of Claude Lanzmann, one of the 
editorial directors of Les Temps modernes, Paupert would have no doubt been familiar with these 
formulations. Colonialism, being an inherently violent process from its beginning and 
propagated through psychological domination and institutional coercion, could only be rectified 
                                                 
160 Jean-Claude Paupert and Claude Jouannais, “Une jeunesse en guerre,” Esprit 26, no 5 
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through other violent processes. On the other hand, his solidarity with the FLN went beyond 
sympathy for colonial suffering. In his final declaration before the court, Paupert explained, “I 
have not chosen to help the Algerians because of their mistreatment, but because the struggle of 
the Algerian people is a just struggle, and I have not chosen to aid Algerian militants in spite of 
their terrorism, but because terrorism is their destiny.” For Paupert, terrorism was not a pitfall, 
but rather part and parcel of Algerian national identity, the same as it was of French identity. 
“Being French,” he continued, “is not a virtue stored in a refrigerator, it is a fidelity one invents. 
To be French today is to be Algerian… We know well, for both princes and for valets, that 
fraternity is a terrorist act. My itinerary is clear: from the Algerian army to the Algerians, from 
the colonizer to the colonized, from the system [of oppression] to hope. I was a torturer. 
Liberated, I am a terrorist.”163 Algerian independence was part of the same universal history 
inaugurated by the rise of the modern French nation. 
Even though most of the other defendants’ rhetoric did not go as far in the courtroom as 
Paupert’s, many did make an explicit connection between the Algerian independence movement 
and the French Revolution. Algerian defendant Haddad Hamada invoked the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen, and French defendant Micheline Pouteau testified to “a certain 
revolutionary dynamism which has been a part of France,” and described her acts as “the gesture 
of a French revolutionary.”164 In the memoir of the war written by Pouteau and fellow network 
member Janine Cahen, they explained that each of them wanted to find “the element in the 
Algerian Revolution that would facilitate a revolutionary movement in France.”165 When making 
his case for his client, Maurice Gautherat claimed that people had a moral obligation to act 
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outside of established laws when the course of history demanded. After first referring to Charles 
de Gaulle’s improvised French government in exile during World War II, he claimed such a 
scenario had roots in the French Revolution. “Had not the French Revolution,” he explained, 
“applied to the monarchy these principles of legitimate action? A king rules legally since he 
himself provided the basis for his rule. He was still guilty, Saint-Just said, for having ruled in the 
first place.” The French government’s rule in Algeria was, according to its own laws, legal. 
However, it was still guilty for having ruled. As a result, “One must purify France in order to 
found a new power on more innocent and humane principles. And, if this is what one calls a 
Revolution, then so be it, one must make the Revolution [faire la Révolution].”166 Similarly, 
during her final statement, Hélène Cuénat explained that she never really understood how 1789 
could have been a bourgeois revolution. Nonetheless, even if the French Revolution was a 
victory for the bourgeoisie, “we all know that Algerian independence will not be a victory for the 
bourgeoisie.”167 The French and Algerian Revolutions were likely as radical as one another; in 
the event they were not, the Algerian Revolution at least held the promise of surpassing the 
French Revolution’s bourgeois outcome. 
Interviews with members of the Jeanson network demonstrate that the intellectual climate 
of the war did matter greatly as political motivators. Members of the network were regular 
readers of journals like Les Temps modernes, France-Observateur, and Esprit, and were familiar 
with Albert Memmi’s and Frantz Fanon’s analyses of colonialism.168 The courtroom testimony 
of the Jeanson network shows that the French Revolution’s legacy did matter when justifying 
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support for an independent Algeria. Further, those who most strongly identified themselves in 
court with a French Revolutionary motivation found themselves at odds with moderate leftist 
platforms on Algeria, such as the official stance of the PCF.169  
The revolutionary confraternity expressed in the courtroom also perplexed supporters of 
French Algeria for the same reasons it made sense for anticolonialists. The network and its 
defenders had portrayed themselves as defenders of the French Republic and their enemies as the 
avatars of totalitarian fascism. The prosecution and its supporters did not merely deny the terms, 
but reversed them. Writing in Carrefour, Jacques Soustelle asked “why the regime that emerged 
from May 13th’s patriotic uprising has not more successfully enforced the politics expected of 
it?” The closer the government came to recognizing Algerian independence the more 
contradictory such courtroom proceedings would become. 170  In its closing arguments, the 
prosecution not only claimed the French invasion of Algeria was sanctioned and ushered in an 
era of unity and progress, it also claimed “the FLN has followed the totalitarian methods of 
Nazism.”171 
In February of 1962 members of the Algerian Provisional Government met with French 
government officials and laid the groundwork for the coming March ceasefire and Evian 
Accords that ended the war and formalized Algerian independence. De Gaulle characterized the 
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task at hand as “marching together fraternally on the path to civilization.”172 Jean-Paul Sartre 
also saw this as a possibility for a new beginning for both the French and Algerian peoples, but 
one towards which the French had only sleepwalked. If there were any revolutionary fervor in 
the aftermath of 1958, it was certainly not apparent at the end of the war: “the Algerians have 
retained their revolutionary strength. Where is ours?” French “defeat” in Algeria, Sartre 
contended, was not the result of Algerian independence, but rather the inability of the French 
people to recognize “the most glorious, the most sombre of adventures without ever attempting 
to take part in it.”173 While the French Revolution was invoked at the beginning of the war as a 
standard for actions of the French nation, by the end of the war any revolutionary identity 
belonged to now independent Algerians. 
 
The different modes linking the French Revolution with Algeria highlight the dynamic of self-
understanding and recognition of an independent colonial other, and these invocations reveal the 
extent to which understanding an independent Algerian “other” was part of a process of self-
recognition. One set of standards against which contemporary French actions and the possibility 
of Algerian independence could be measured was the perceived inheritance of the French 
Revolution. In this sense, then, the more nationalists in Algeria looked like citizens of the first 
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Debating the Revolution’s Legacy 
 The French Revolution of 1789, and particularly its pro-Jacobin social interpretation, was 
a prominent touchstone during the French-Algerian War. Intellectuals and activists invoked the 
Revolution when expressing fears that the Fourth Republic was in danger of losing sight of its 
republican heritage, dedication to preserving the rights of man, and succumbing to a resurgent 
fascism in both the colonies and in the metropole. Using the heritage of the Revolution as part of 
a living tradition was also a way to explain one’s support of Algerian nationalist claims. For 
some, this eventually amounted to embracing a wholesale Algerian Revolution that meant the 
end of French Algeria. The third world writ large had inherited the mantle of the ancien régime’s 
third estate. The memory of fascism’s ability to destroy the French Republic and the heritage of 
the French Revolution weighed heavily in the French-Algerian War. But these associations are 
by no means self-explanatory. If the French Revolution could act as such a pliable indexical 
marker, then it bears examining what historians thought of this promiscuous anachronism. For 
both those historians most closely associated with upholding the Jacobin interpretation as well as 
historians critical of it there was no denying the political relevance of the Revolution in the 
postwar.  
 From the late 1930s to the 1960s the study of history in France was pulled in two 
different directions. On the one hand the Annales School gained prominence for studies of long-
term diachronic change, leaving history based on studies of political events behind. They held 
that only through the study of such longue-durée phenomena, such as economic patterns, popular 
mentalities, or negotiations of local geography, could short-term synchronic analysis be 
achieved. On the other hand, this period also saw the emergence of the so-called social 
interpretation of the French Revolution, often sarcastically termed “the Vulgate.” While the 
 76 
former form of history could seem impersonal and detached from contemporary preoccupations, 
the latter was invariably wed to fundamental questions of French national identity.174 Though the 
social interpretation was based primarily on social and economic analysis, these histories were 
always and already tied to politics since these historical analyses seemed to touch on the very 
essence of Frenchness.   
Beyond the content of the past’s connection to the present, historians of all stripes 
engaged with the French-Algerian War. The conservative historian of the Old Regime, Philippe 
Ariès, covered Algerian politics for the rightwing journal La nation française; a young François 
Furet, a decade before his fame as historical provocateur, covered politics and history for the 
leftwing France-Observateur.175 Other historians engaged with the war more directly. Pierre 
Vidal-Nacquet’s exposés of torture and the government’s responsibility for the murder and cover 
up of Maurice Audin were some of the most important public interventions to sway opinion 
against the government’s colonial brutality. 176  Some, like Marc Ferro and Henri Marrou, 
participated in clandestine political resistance during the Nazi Occupation and reprised political 
agitation during the French Algerian War.177 But perhaps most interesting were the ways in 
which historians engaged with the standards and practices of their own profession in addressing 
political action in Algeria. 
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 The French-Algerian War and the proliferation of anachronistic analogies between 
revolutionary France and revolutionary Algeria provide a way into how historians of the French 
Revolution negotiated the proper role of historical distance and the relationship between the 
French Revolution and modern France. Throughout the 1930s and 40s intellectuals of the left 
drew on the French Revolution as a way to anchor a sense of French national identity during the 
upheaval caused by the rise of fascism and the German occupation. While anyone who felt 
antipathy towards a perceived fascist menace could rely on the image of the Revolution in the 
face of national defeat from the outside, the problem posed by colonialism was that of an 
adversary within the nation, or perhaps even the nation itself. If the Revolution could hold 
importance for understanding French national identity then to what extent could it help decipher 
the growth of a national independence movement from within its empire? While French 
historians prized the recul of their profession—the emphasis on historical distance from their 
subjects—to what extent could this distance be applied to a subject that was part of a living 
tradition? Teaching manuals during the French-Algerian War simultaneously reinforced the need 
to avoid anachronism in the classroom and the invaluable insights into the contemporary world 
that history could offer students.178 If the Revolution was the birth of the modern political era, 
then what was the relationship between the need to focus on the historical particularity of the 
Revolution and the universal nature of its claims and legacy?   
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Georges Lefebvre, Daniel Guérin, and Albert Soboul were three of the most influential 
and popular authors of the French Revolution in France from the Occupation through the French 
Algerian War; each staked out different positions on the appropriate uses of the French 
Revolution in contemporary French politics and illustrated both the temptation to make 
anachronistic claims about the Revolution and the potential pitfalls of doing so. Although the 
historical profession prized the historical distance between researchers and their subjects, the 
experience of World War II led to politically-charged interpretations of the Revolution. Georges 
Lefebvre, the head of the Society of Robespierrist Studies and Chair of the History of the French 
Revolution at the Sorbonne, for example, wrote politicized essays on the Revolution’s relevance 
for the French nation faced with Nazism. In the aftermath of the war, however, it was activist and 
writer Daniel Guérin who published thoroughly politicized interpretations of the Revolution, 
ones that met with harsh criticism for, among other things, not respecting historical distance. 
Though begun in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the debates concerning Guérin’s 
interpretation of the Revolution highlighted the tension between historical distance and historical 
politicization present during the French Algerian War. In the postwar, Albert Soboul, George 
Lefebvre’s intellectual heir apparent, was Guérin’s main critic. While the revisionist debates of 
the 1970s and 80s would paint Soboul as a vulgar Marxist whose politics had warped his 
historical work, in the 1950s and 60s Soboul was adamant about constructing barriers between 
the study of the past and anachronistic analogies with the present. Daniel Guérin, however, 
argued for the need to interpret the present in relation to the Revolution and the Revolution in 
relation to present political concerns. Soboul found himself outflanked on the Left. 
Debates among historians on the political relevance of the French Revolution provide one 
of the intellectual horizons for invocations of the French Revolution in favor of Algerian 
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independence for two reasons. These debates act as a limit-case for the political uses of the 
Revolution among scholars for whom historical distance was prized. Not only were Lefebvre, 
Guérin, and Soboul’s interpretations of the Revolution read by anticolonial writers such as Frantz 
Fanon, Dionys Mascolo, and Jean-Paul Sartre, but these historians’ views on the Revolution’s 
value coincided with claims for Algerian independence. While none of them took issue with 
bootstrapping the Revolution to anti-fascist causes, all three were preoccupied with determining 
which causes merited association with the Revolution; in the case of Albert Soboul, an historian 
for whom making the connection between the birth of the French nation and the birth of the 
Algerian nation seemed most likely, there was only silence. Examining the way in which 
specialists on the Revolution came to terms with claims for Algerian independence highlights the 
greater symbolic stakes of aligning the foundational myths of the French Republic with 
anticolonial politics. 
 
Georges Lefebvre and the Revolution in the wake of WWII 
World War Two transformed the study of the French Revolution in a number of respects. 
Pétain accorded history a special place in his plan of national rejuvenation as a way to reinforce 
national and regional pride and identity to a newly-defeated country. Under Vichy, the academy 
shifted emphases from the study of the virtues of the Republic to studies of regional identity.179  
As the Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg stated, “the French Revolution of 1789 has been buried 
under Vichy by the French themselves.”180 The Annales historiques de la Révolution française 
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[AHRF] ceased publication and its parent organization, the Société des études robespierristes 
[Society for Robespierrist Studies], suspended all other activities. After being placed on the liste 
Otto, the list comprising works deemed ideologically incompatible with National Socialism, 
copies of Georges Lefebvre’s Quatre-vingt neuf, published in 1939, the 150th Anniversary of the 
Revolution, were seized and destroyed by the Vichy government.  
If the Occupation meant hard times for the study of the French Revolution, after the 
Liberation interest in the French Revolution swung hard in the other direction. Among graduate 
studies, for instance, the popularity of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century history increased.181 
There were also a number of subversive works of history written during the dark years, even 
though they often had to discretely camouflage their intellectual resistance. For those historians 
involved in clandestine resistance activities, their understanding of the French Revolution 
informed their fidelity to the ideals of the French Republic.  
The Revolution had been politicized most in the early twentieth century by the work of 
historians like Jean Jaurès and Albert Mathiez, offering a way of seeing the French Revolution as 
part of a larger history of political developments. Though the accounts written by Jaurès and 
Mathiez differed on a number of points, both set the tone for academic study of the Revolution 
from the 1930s through the 1970s. Jaurès made social classes the determining interpretive lens 
for understanding the dynamics of the Revolution, and Mathiez rehabilitated the persona of 
Maximilien Robespierre and the political projects of the Jacobin club in general. Mathiez’s 
legacy was particularly important. Though many conservative historians continued to hold minor 
academic posts after World War Two, virtually all major historians of the Revolution were 
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members of the Society for Robespierrist Studies he founded in 1907 and contributed to the 
cultural rehabilitation of the Jacobins. Though the academic study of Robespierre’s biography 
became relegated to the margins after Mathiez, his stature as a positive figure within French 
Republican mythology only grew.182   
From the late thirties through the Occupation, the Revolution’s political uses on the left 
were directed against fascism with the goal of reinvigorating a sense of national pride and the 
formation of a resistance identity. Resistance pamphlets, public speeches by Free French leaders 
such as Charles de Gaulle, and even the official rebranding and unofficial silences of the 
Revolution’s commemoration under Vichy were occasions to reflect on the French Revolution 
and its relationship to the present. 183  The predominant narrative of these references was to 
analogize the threat that counter-revolutionaries and foreign (German) invasions posed to the 
French Republic in the early 1790s to the state of France under the Nazis. As one speech 
reasoned, “after Munich began a subterranean undertaking of men selling their Patrie in order to 
save their own privileges, just as in 1792.”184 If the threat of foreign invasion and betrayal from 
within was the same as in 1792, then the answer was a resistance led by a citizen army conducted 
against the enemy abroad and rooting out the Republic’s internal enemies, à la 1793. Beginning 
in 1942, Communist Resistance groups emphasized Republican imagery in their propaganda 
with a celebration of the Revolutionary citizen army that defeated Prussian forces at the Battle of 
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Valmy.185 A formal proposal for a levée en masse was addressed to the National Resistance 
Council in 1944 and the resistance pamphlet Après stated, “Justice will be served in full place of 
the Republic, to the tune of the Marseillaise. In each village, in each canton, citizens shall form a 
revolutionary tribunal of the Resistance and Liberation.”186 Even Albert Camus, who would 
come to be one of postwar France’s greatest critics of revolutionary violence, wrote in a 1944 
issue of Combat, France “does not need a Talleyrand… It needs a Saint-Just.”187  
From the eve of the War through to the Liberation, Georges Lefebvre’s writings show 
perhaps the most direct case made for the French Revolution’s relevance for understanding the 
present. Lefebvre’s initial title at the Sorbonne in 1935 was Chair of Contemporary History and 
in the periodization of professional history in France in the 1930s this period included everything 
from the French Revolution to the present. (He would be named to the Chair of the French 
Revolution in 1937.) Lefebvre embraced this temporalization and viewed his academic and 
public role as not only faithfully representing the ideas and motivations of philosophes and 
revolutionaries, but also putting them to use in contemporary debate. While not directly involved 
in any particular party of the Left, such as the SFIO or PCF, Lefebvre did consider a Left writ 
large to be the inheritors of the Revolution’s legacy.  
Lefebvre was born in 1874, the same year as Albert Mathiez, but lycée teaching and 
meticulous archival research, combined with finding time for his wife and children, meant that 
Lefebvre would not earn his doctorate or a university position until after Mathiez had already 
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became a well-known intellectual figure. However, once his dissertation on the peasantry in the 
Nord was completed and he gained a position at Strasbourg (working alongside founders of the 
Annales, Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre), when Mathiez died in 1932, Lefebvre was the obvious 
choice as his replacement at the head of the Society of Robespierrist Studies and journal AHRF. 
According to Jacques Godechot, Lefebvre presented himself as the living guardian of the 
Revolution’s popular legacy: “His manner of invoking Robespierre, his completely Jacobin 
combativeness, reassured us of the purity of his sans-cullottisme.” For the 150th Anniversary of 
the French Revolution in 1939, Georges Lefebvre played a key role in national festivities by 
giving radio addresses, publishing document collections, and acting as consultant for Jean 
Renoir’s film La Marseillaise.188  
As war approached in 1939, Lefebvre was convinced that the biggest threat to the 
principles of liberté, égalité, and fraternité was the European turn to authoritarian regimes, and 
specifically Fascism, which saw itself as the only authentic corrective to the French Revolution’s 
mistakes. Lefebvre was a member of the Comité de vigilance des intellectuels antifascistes 
(CVIA), the founder of the Cercle Descartes, and on the directorial committee of the magazine 
Races et racismes. The CVIA also included politically active historians Marc Bloch and Lucien 
Febvre. Its organ, Vigilance, was dedicated to informing the popular masses of the dangers of 
fascism and the threat it posed to France. However, due to a lack of unified leadership and 
disagreements on appeasement after the Munich conference, the group only lasted from 1934 to 
1938.189 Races et racismes dedicated each issue to investigating the racist claims and politics of 
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the Nazis. Along with exposés on the content of school lessons claiming to prove the racial 
superiority of Aryans, the magazine also contained essays on the feudal origins of racism and the 
racism of the German colonial program. 190  The Cercle Descartes consisted of a group of 
university and lycée instructors who met in the Sorbonne with the aim of disseminating academic 
ideas to a general public, from 1936 to 1939. The subject matter of the Cercle’s meetings and 
bulletins spanned a large range of topics, from interpretations of Cartesian philosophy to 
contemporary political debates. Before the beginning of the war, Lefebvre was even planning a 
conference on the political situation in North Africa, much to the dismay of the Sorbonne’s 
administration.191  
In January 1939 Lefebvre addressed the Cercle Descartes in the Descartes amphitheater 
of the Sorbonne to take account of “The Principles of 1789 in the Contemporary World.”192 
Lefebvre began his speech by proclaiming that the principles of the Revolution were not mere 
parochial concerns, but principles that had a global purchase: “it is not only for themselves that 
the revolutionaries affirmed the rights of man and citizen, but for all men, without distinction: 
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the value is thus universal.” Placed in a larger context, Lefebvre saw the Universal Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and Citizen as the “crowning achievement” of the evolution of western 
thought from ancient Greece through Christianity and the modern world. Its features are the 
balance between collective security and the maximum of individual freedom that work toward 
attaining universal human dignity. Far from being abstractions that are void of any real human 
meaning, they are always situational and act as “a spiritual ideal, a public moral guide” [règle]. 
While there may be times in which the balance might shift toward public security and limit 
individual freedoms, as in the case of, say, Napoleon, these moments should be seen as 
aberrations. After Napoleon’s rule, Lefebvre reasoned, “the French bourgeoisie returned to the 
principles of 89 which they had never forgotten, and later they forced the liberalization of the 
Second Empire.”193  
In the aftermath of the First World War, the Revolution’s principles were under serious 
attack. The material and destruction the war caused led people to favor a strong state at the 
expense of their political freedoms. However, what made the 1920s and 1930s different from 
previous eras where counter-revolutionary ideals flourished was their new incarnation in the 
guise of National Socialism, which has given the counter-revolution “a new life.” National 
Socialism’s corporatist view of society, its racist view of biology, and its hierarchy of 
civilizations threaten projects of universal freedom. According to Lefebvre, “Between these 
principles and those of 1789, this time the opposition is radical.” By taking advantage of the 
weakened state of European society after war, fascist leaders brainwashed middle-class men. 
Man becomes “a docile robot” [automat docile] whose “egoism permits his seduction through 
promises of material satisfaction and above all the mastery of fear.” The question, according to 
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Lefebvre, is whether this is merely a temporary problem or evidence of a “profound crisis of our 
civilization.” He concluded that it was such a crisis and that its roots were economic and 
social.194 
Since the economic crisis of the 1930s was not simply limited to “our civilization,” that 
of the west, but was global in nature, it was also necessary to examine global relationships. 
Offering a modified version of Lenin’s formulation that imperialism was another stage in the 
history of class struggle, Lefebvre identified the racist competition between competing European 
nations as the cause of imperial expansion. The bourgeoisie inaugurated imperialist policies for 
precisely the same reasons National Socialism threatened to dominate Europe. If imperialist 
projects were allowed to continue, the result would be a state of total war that will leave 
humanity in a state of “animal naturalism.”195  
Of course, one of the other main targets of National Socialism, aside from the bourgeois 
liberalism inspired by the French Revolution, was the threat of global Marxist revolution that 
seemed all the more real after Russia’s dual revolutions in 1917. In Russia, the class struggle 
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat “terminated at the total reversal of the social 
organization that the revolutionaries of 1789 believed to conform with the state of nature.” 
Russia, according to Georges Lefebvre, substituted the French Revolution’s program with 
communism. Furthermore, Russia’s ability to last 20 years and its continued projects at social 
reform, like Stalin’s 1936 constitution granting universal suffrage, meant that the Soviet state 
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“threatens to remain a long time.” Given that the bourgeoisie is Marxism’s explicit target, 
Lefebvre thought it hardly surprising middle classes would support authoritarian reaction.196   
Although Lefebvre was optimistic about Russia’s future given their new constitution, he 
nonetheless thought communist and national socialist states governed under the same terrorizing 
methods and placed too much emphasis on a strong state over individual freedoms. In this way 
he agreed with many early anti-totalitarian thinkers. After hearing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
agreement, Lefebvre would describe it as “the horrible treason of so-called Communist 
Russia.”197 In his view, “the social problem remains, and if freedom might be saved, it will be 
because a third solution is found.” This “third solution” had to be grounded in the principles of 
1789. Closing his address, Lefebvre reminded “those who call themselves the partisans of 
freedom” that “freedom must be earned, freedom must be defended.”198 In the midst of his 
address, Lefebvre was repeatedly interrupted by rightwing demonstrators. The summary of the 
event in Action française’s newspaper, L’étudiant français, happily reported the jeers of the 
crowd that interrupted the man for whom “the French Revolution was most evidently his 
property.” According to the reporter, the demonstrators facetiously sang the Carmagnole and 
“clearly manifested their intention to not sit idly by while someone defended the principles 
responsible for the ruin of the nation.” Not only did these demonstrators defend their political 
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principles, but they were also able to ruin the good spirits of an historian of the Revolution 
basking in its sesquicentennial celebrations.199 
Lefebvre reiterated the necessity of upholding the ideals of 1789 in the contemporary 
world in the concluding chapter of The Coming of the French Revolution, published at the same 
time as his Sorbonne speech.200 The ideals of 1789 were so powerful they could inspire heroic 
action.  
Freedom is by no means an invitation to indifference or to irresponsible power; nor is it 
the promise of unlimited well being without a counterpart of toil and effort. It supposes 
application, perpetual effort, strict government of self, sacrifice in contingencies, civic 
and private virtues. It is therefore more difficult to live as a free man than to live as a 
slave, and that is why men so often renounce their freedom; for freedom is in its way an 
invitation to a life of courage, and sometimes of heroism, as the freedom of the Christian 
is an invitation to a life of sainthood. 
 Youth of 1939! The Declaration [of the Rights of Man and Citizen] is also a 
tradition and a glorious thing. When reading it, listen to the voices of your ancestors who 
speak to you—those who fought at Valmy, at Jemappes, at Fleurus, to the cry, “Long live 
the nation.” They made the nation free. Appreciate the noble duty of the present: in all the 
universe mankind alone may fulfill it. Your ancestors repeat that your fate is in your own 
hands and that you, you alone determine the fate of society. Be aware of the risk: since it 
attracts you, it will not recede. Measure the grandeur of your task as well as the dignity it 
requires. Will you renounce it? Your ancestors have confidence in you. You will soon be 
the Nation: “Long live the Nation!”201  
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Lefebvre’s call to the youth of 1939 to seize the patriotic legacy of the Republic’s martyrs who 
died at Valmy was a more than adequate reason for its placement on the liste Otto.202 The 
language of the passage is anything but passive and the call to do honor to the citizen armies who 
repelled German invaders in 1792 was made with one eye towards an increasingly belligerent 
Nazi Germany (and perhaps another towards homegrown fascist sympathizers). The book was 
out a year before being seized, and through the end of the phony war and France’s defeat in June 
of 1940, the Société d’études robespierristes continued to meet and publish the AHRF. As late as 
April 1940 Lefebvre seemed optimistic that the French nation and its allies were up to the task of 
defending themselves against Nazi advances. When defeat did come it must have shocked 
Lefebvre at least as much as other French citizens hopeful for the prospects of defending the 
nation.203 
 During the Occupation, Lefebvre was due to retire from the Sorbonne, but for fear of the 
Germans either removing the post of Chair of the Revolution or filling it with a fascist ideologue 
Lefebvre remained until July 1945. Despite the stability of his academic post, keeping residence 
in Paris meant being under continued threat from Allied bombs. The AHRF discontinued their 
publications during the Occupation, as did the Commission on Economic and Social History of 
the Revolution. By the end of 1941 Lefebvre’s wife died and two years later the Germans 
executed his brother, Théodore, a geographer who was active in the Resistance in Poitiers. The 
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deaths of Théodore and his friend Marc Bloch seemed to mark Lefebvre profoundly. He 
commemorated their patriotic sacrifice by placing their portraits alongside a portrait of 
Robespierre in his home kitchen.204 Perhaps spurred to action because of the deaths of his brother 
and friend, or perhaps encouraged by Allied landings in June 1944, during the last two years of 
the war Lefebvre composed essays that drew political lessons from the French Revolution in 
order to direct the actions of the liberation of France. 
The first of Lefebvre’s wartime essays, “D’Elle,” discussed the “collective psychology” 
of the French and its effect on their continued romance with images of revolution. When the 
historian looks at the Resistance prepare for popular insurrection against the Germans, Lefebvre 
stated, “Everywhere, imagery floods in” [“De toutes parts les réflexions se pressent”]. The 
imagery is that “of Her,” the Revolution, the “catalyst” that still animates the French people and 
forms the basis of the nation’s “mythic power in the sorélian sense of the term.” The main image 
on which Lefebvre focused in this essay was that of the Parisian barricade. At least as far back as 
the insurrection of 1588, Parisian masses have been able to make use of this tactic to surprising 
effect. “What is above all striking to the historian,” according to Lefebvre, “is that the Parisian 
people, upon deciding on insurrection, resort to the same tactic throughout the ages.” And while 
it is true that the barricade is only thinkable in a large city, what defies sociological explanation 
is the fact that “out of all of the large cities throughout the world, Paris is the only one we might 
call the city of barricades.”205  
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A popular mentalité saved the Republic from itself in 1793, and Lefebvre reasoned that 
this same mentality animated the spirit of all French men and women.206 After all, “whoever 
assembles a barricade is resolved to defend it, and therefore offers to sacrifice his life for a cause 
he finds just and beautiful.” In this sense, Lefebvre reasoned that all who took up arms against 
counter-revolutionaries were “barricade combatants and the ancient children of the Republic.” 
Insurrection was part of a French national essence. Just as it had moved the nation against its 
enemies in the past, so too would this barricade spirit help drive out the German occupiers.   
He extended his readings of the Revolution to offer guidance to the transition from a 
clandestine insurrection to a formal battle for France involving volunteer and regular armed 
combatants. The source of the popular enthusiasm that always renewed the French 
insurrectionary spirit was the subject of his essay, “Le Ressort.”207 Though the exact ideas that 
animated the Revolutionary masses of the eighteenth century were lost—either because they 
were never written down by an illiterate populace or because those who would have written them 
were killed before they could have done so—what is evident is that the spontaneous and 
unwritten motivations of the masses have been the driving force behind France’s previous 
revolutions. The unpredictable and therefore unwieldy nature of popular enthusiasm was also its 
downfall. Centralization of power in the Committee of Public Safety was followed by the 
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liquidation of its enemies and the backlash of the Parisian sections: “By compressing the spring 
of the Revolution, they [sans culottes] broke it.” This demise was, however, not inevitable; the 
Resistance could learn from the mistakes of the past. The main lesson to be drawn, according to 
Lefebvre, was that “The division of Republicans has been the only thing to cause the Republic to 
perish.”208 In an early 1945 essay for La Pensée, Lefebvre argued the clandestine resistance 
movement should be combined with the Free French Forces that had been active in North Africa. 
Just as the French Revolution had been able to use an amalgamation of volunteer and 
professional troops, so too should France unite the elements of its forces in the fight to win back 
their country. Though the details of the two disparate armed conflicts were certainly different in 
important respects, Lefebvre thought the former offered necessary lessons for the latter.209 
 Lefebvre also warned against dividing the Resistance and Free French forces from their 
popular support. The essay was a direct response to calls for moderation and amnesty during the 
beginning of the purges in France following its liberation from Germany. Intellectuals like 
François Mauriac urged for amnesty when dealing with potential collaborators. The risk of 
hastily condemning innocents was great enough to moderate the urge for reprisals and social 
purges, Mauriac argued. But for Lefebvre, this urge risked destabilizing the revolutionary force 
of the liberation. “In order for the war to remain national in the full sense of the term, which is to 
say popular,” Lefebvre reasoned, “its social ideal must not be separated from its conduct since in 
the eyes of the people this ideal is inseparable, just as it was during the First Republic.” Just as 
Clemenceau declared the Revolution had to be taken en bloc, so too did “The Revolution and its 
army form a bloc.” The program of national defense was inseparable from the national politics of 
the Committee of Public Safety. Those who wanted a post-Thermidorean Carnot should be 
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reminded that Carnot’s name and not Robespierre’s was on Danton’s death warrant. And even if 
the Revolution’s internal purges were mired in fears of Catholic plots and personal grudges, this 
was surely not the case in the purges of 1944.210  
 This essay was the most radical of the three Lefebvre wrote and both tone and content 
were quite different from his address to the Cercle Descartes. Instead of the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen, it was the necessary bloodshed of the Revolutionary tribunals that 
needed to be remembered. Lefebvre was perhaps naïve to think the purges could be saved from 
the petty politics of interpersonal quarrels. The main point of the piece, however, remained 
consistent with the rest of his writings going back to 1939—though aspects of the Revolution 
may have been imperfect, the Revolution itself remained of the utmost relevance for 
contemporary France. What remained was to learn from the Revolution’s successes and mistakes 
and to apply those lessons to the political present. 
 In the postwar, Lefebvre did not write anything politically comparable to the essays on 
the Revolution’s bearing on present-day politics. Concerning the major political crises of the last 
15 years of his life—the Indo-Chinese War, the Suez Crisis, the first half of the French Algerian 
War—Lefebvre was publicly silent. This is not to say he was unaware of these political crises or 
indifferent to them. His letters to his Swiss friend Alfred Rufer and the American historian R. R. 
Palmer contain moments of exasperation about the direction of French politics, and his working 
notes from after the war bear traces of the fact he was aware of the various manifestations of 
student and academic activism surrounding military action in North Africa.211 Lefebvre wrote to 
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Palmer in 1952, “...restlessness has become general regarding the war in Indochina and the 
rearmament of Germany, without mentioning the financial situation” in France. Four years later, 
he claimed “Nothing good will come of this war in Algeria, neither for France’s international 
standing, nor for the republican regime. What is there to do? Only those who survive will find 
out.”212 Postwar colonial conflicts clearly exasperated Lefebvre, though he never marshalled the 
lessons and image of the French Revolution in response to them the way that he had done against 
fascism in the 1930s and 40s.  
The war and Occupation, however, did have transformative effects on Lefebvre’s 
scholarship and political affiliations. Lefebvre continued to see the history of Revolution as 
something with pressing importance for France, but the best way to understand this history 
changed. While Lefebvre’s earlier studies were much closer to strands in early Annales 
scholarship, with its focus on sociological explanations and reconstructions of Revolutionary 
mentalités, after the war his work was increasingly marked by the use of Marxist explanatory 
frameworks. For example, whereas before the war he spoke of mentalités, after the war he was 
much more likely to refer to class consciousness; instead of the former descriptive sociological 
characterizations, he opted to speak in terms of economically-driven interests and identities.213 
Furthermore, while Lefebvre had considered himself an independent socialist in the 1930s, the 
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experience of the Occupation and the image of Communist resisters as the saviors of the nation 
persuaded him of the virtues of the PCF, though he never formally joined the party. Lefebvre 
was by no means exceptional in this turnabout in his own political leanings. Beginning in 1944, 
however, he became a member of the patron’s committee of the party’s journal, La Pensée.214 
At the moment when Lefebvre moved closer to Marxism he also became critical of 
attempts to tie the Revolution to contemporary events. The earliest example was his review of 
Daniel Guérin’s 1946 anti-Jacobin interpretation of the Revolution, and similar criticisms carried 
through the first wave of the revisionist history of the Revolution begun by Alfred Cobban. After 
Lefebvre read John Hall Stewart’s review of the English translation of Quatre-vingt neuf, he 
wrote to R. R. Palmer that it was emblematic of the “reactionary thought that nourishes the 
contemporary preoccupation.”  Lefebvre continued, “Evidently, the author caught a whiff of 
Marxism and I was really furious—not at having been added to the list of people who should be 
refused entry to the United States, because I am too old to make such a voyage—but to learn that 
one would make you [Palmer] responsible for my own opinions.”215 His reaction to the review is 
striking on a number of counts. First, Stewart’s review was largely positive, and if anything 
Lefebvre’s previous work had set a high standard in Stewart’s estimation that Quatre-vingt neuf 
could not quite reach. Second, while Stewart did make the rather striking observation that any 
number of American historians of France (not including Palmer) could have written the same 
book, only better, Lefebvre’s politics were never mentioned in the review. Instead, Stewart 
complained that Lefebvre paid too much attention to detail and the book suffered from a lack of 
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synthetic interpretation. By the time of Alfred Cobban’s attack on the social interpretation of the 
Revolution in the 1954 lecture “The Myth of the French Revolution,” Lefebvre bristled at any 
Cold War politicization of the French Revolution, particularly if that politicization tried to 
connect the foundational events of the French nation to totalitarian regimes of Hitler and Stalin 
and not the bedrock of modern democracy.216  
Lefebvre continued to press the relevance of the study of the Revolution on the French 
public in the memory and commemoration of Maximilien Robespierre. If there were one popular 
figure upon whom the French could lean while attempting to recover from the war, it was 
Robespierre. As early as his 1930 synthesis of La Révolution française, Lefebvre described 
Robespierre as a defender of democracy, someone who was a pragmatic anti-war figure who did 
his best in the tumult of the Revolution.217 He repeated these sympathies in 1932 at a public 
commemoration of Robespierre in the latter’s hometown of Arras. This admiration for 
Robespierre only intensified during the 1930s and Nazi Occupation. Madeleine Rebérioux, for 
example, noted that following the death of his brother, Théodore, Lefebvre lectured the students 
at the École Normale, Supérieure de Sèvres even more passionately about Robespierre’s 
virtues.218  
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For the two-hundred-year anniversary of Robespierre’s birth, Lefebvre threw his support 
behind the initiatives of the National Assembly to make the event a national celebration. While 
the Assembly’s resolution failed to pass, Lefebvre defended the image of Robespierre in the 
press and coordinated radio, television, and film productions in honor of the Incorruptible as well 
as museum exhibits.219 In June of 1958, the Society of Robespierrist Studies held a day-long 
convocation celebrating both the bicentennial of Robespierre’s birth and the fiftieth anniversary 
of the AHRF. Lefebvre presided over the event, held in the Amphithéâtre Michelet of the 
Sorbonne, the very place Albert Mathiez had died mid-lecture. He closed the ceremonies with 
the same salute to Robespierre he voiced in Arras in 1933: “Health and fraternity, Citizen 
Robespierre. Long live the Republic, one and indivisible.”220 Such a proclamation was bound to 
lead audience members to reflect upon current events—just one month earlier the Fourth 
Republic had fallen to de Gaulle’s coup. While there are some biographical coincidences to 
suggest why Lefebvre might have been drawn to see Robespierre as an heroic figure, it would be 
mistaken to think his sentiments were anomalous, especially amongst historians on the left since 
the era of Mathiez and Jaurès.221 After the experiences of foreign occupation and a liberation that 
entailed purges of the populace deemed traitors to the values of the French nation, if someone 
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were already sympathetic with Robespierre, then these experiences would have only reinforced 
these sentiments.222  
Though Lefebvre used the past to explain and argue the present, he did stress limits on 
the professional and public roles of history. Reviewing Louis Halphen’s Introduction to History, 
Lefebvre noted the distinction between historical writing and moralist literature. Though 
distinguished from the experimental sciences, history was bound by its datum. This did not 
disqualify history from playing a didactic role, but it also was not capable of providing abstract 
moral principles on its own. According to Lefebvre, “Human dignity is not solely based on 
conceiving and proclaiming abstract principles; it is also about making them a reality.” While 
Halphen warned against the urge to see a valuable future lesson in every moment in the past, 
Lefebvre was much more open to seeing the possibilities of a future history that was “most 
intimately related to life.” Such was a task of a future history, one in which historians “must 
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principally rely on themselves.”223 It is not too much of a stretch to agree that “Lefebvre, at heart 
a positivist of the nineteenth century variety, sought the rational in a world that had ceased to be 
so.”224 Yet the point at which making sense of the past in order to make sense of the future 
sacrificed the former for the latter was a threshold that Lefebvre believed it imperative to respect. 
As he wrote to R. R. Palmer in 1957, “the role of history is to search out fact. The physicist who 
studies nuclear phenomena does not have to ask if his discoveries produce bombs!”225 Even if 
the results were ugly, historical analysis was possible and should not be merely a matter of 
sophistry. At the same time, however, Lefebvre repeatedly concluded the facts of the Revolution 
coincided with his present moment. 
 The standards to which Lefebvre held historical scholarship were not simply a matter of 
scholarly dispute given the immense institutional power and authority he held in the postwar. 
Though he stopped teaching regularly, until his death in 1959 Lefebvre continued to lead the 
Society of Robespierrist Studies, give occasional lectures, organize public events relating to 
French history (including the mainly aborted festivities for the anniversary of Robespierre’s birth 
in 1958), edit document collections relating to the Revolution (such as Robespierre’s collected 
works), and mentor student researchers. 226  Lefebvre’s intellectual and institutional output 
represented the sine qua non of what it meant to be an historian of the French Revolution in 
postwar France. Though it would be tempting to draw a sharp divide between the institutional 
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weight held by Lefebvre in the postwar and his scholarship, noting the inherently political nature 
of the former while keeping the latter clear of politics, this separation is difficult to maintain.227 
Getting the scholarship on the Revolution correct for Lefebvre—despite his apparently objective 
and positivist posturing—were not simply matters of historical science. The French Revolution 
mattered because of its place as a foundational myth for the French nation and modern politics.   
 
Daniel Guérin’s Anti-Jacobin Revolutions 
Alongside politicized accounts of the French Revolution offered by establishment 
historians like Georges Lefebvre, Daniel Guérin’s 1946 Class Struggle under the First Republic: 
Bourgeois and ‘bras nus’ (1793-1797) presented perhaps the most radical version of a leftist 
interpretation of the Revolution. While Guérin’s argument for the contemporary relevance of the 
French Revolution of 1789 in this two-volume synthesis as well as in later essays fit well with 
the majority of leftist French historians’ desire to keep the ideals of 1789 alive, his resolutely 
anti-Jacobin message put him squarely at odds with most professional historians’ interpretations 
of the Revolution and its legacy. The twenty-year attacks on and engagement with Guérin’s 
interpretation not only offer an interpretive contrast to Lefebvre’s story, they also highlight the 
importance of the Revolution’s legacy in the wake of World War Two and throughout the French 
Algerian War, utilizing France’s political past to navigate an uncertain future. In both phases the 
importance of Occupied France and the confrontation between the Left’s political ideals and 
seemingly fascist reactionaries set the context.   
Guérin was born into a wealthy bourgeois family that owned the publishing house 
Hachette and was connected to other notable firms of French high finance and industry. Yet, for 
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much of his life he seemed to defy the social conventions associated with his given social place. 
Early in life he was associated with the radical syndicalist and then Trotskyist strands of the 
Popular Front. From 1927-1929 he toured the French colonies in North Africa and Asia working 
as a librarian. After finishing the library work he scraped by earning a meagre living organizing 
factory workers in Paris. He lived in the impoverished 20th arrondissement while other members 
of his family resided in luxurious homes on the left bank and in the countryside.  
Guérin claimed he had thought about becoming a professional historian in the early 
1930s, and had even planned to write a study of nineteenth-century railroad magnates. According 
to him, this study on the capitalist world from which he descended would have been an ideal way 
to “settle the score with my ancestors.”228  He never wrote this book; instead he turned his 
attention toward analyzing the rise and foundations of Nazism in Germany. The former book was 
an ethnography of the changes instituted in Germany at Hitler’s ascendance and their effect on 
everyday German citizens. His argument in the latter book, that fascism in Germany and Italy 
lent overwhelming support to heavy industry and was fundamentally tied to capitalism, carried a 
great deal of influence for decades.229 Both studies treated the threat of fascism as not merely a 
reactionary incident, but as a real threat to modern societies, and which needed to be countered 
as a matter of everyday class struggle. 
By the time the International Workers’ Front [Front Ouvrier International] sent Guérin to 
Oslo, Norway in 1939 in order to organize anti-war efforts, he had already established himself as 
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one of the leading French theorists of Nazism. Guérin quickly found himself in a detention camp 
in Norway where he was detained from April to December 1940. Only after German authorities 
allowed select repatriation in 1942 did Guérin return to France and focus his efforts on historical 
study.  
The Trotskyist and syndicalist tendencies of Guérin’s early political life were apparent in 
his interpretation of the French Revolution. Class Struggle under the First Republic maintained 
that at the heart of the Revolution was the emergence of a working-class movement that would 
set the stage for all socialist-oriented revolutions of the future. For Guérin, though the objective 
result of the revolution may have been bourgeois, as most historians asserted, its subjective 
orientation, represented by the “bras nus,” or working class, was proletarian avant la lettre.  By 
drawing on Leon Trotsky’s theory of combined development, and Karl Kautsky’s belief that the 
French Revolution represented the base line for all modern materialist history,230 Guérin argued 
that the victory of the bourgeoisie over the first and second estates coincided with the birth of an 
“embryonic” proletariat.  While even Robespierre’s direction of the Committee of Public Safety 
protected what Guérin saw as bourgeois interests (private property and secure trade policies), the 
revolution’s motor force was the peasants, manual laborers, and radical politicians like Babeuf 
and Hébert whose goals were purely communist. To see the Revolution as only the culmination 
of the Jacobin state was to miss its anarchist orientation towards the elimination of such a 
                                                 
230 Leon Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, translated by Max Eastman (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1932); Karl Kautsky, La lutte des classes en France en 1789 [1889], 
translated by Edouard Berth (Paris: G. Jacques & Company, 1901). On the prevalence of 
Kautsky’s interpretation of the French Revolution, as well as the variety of uses to which it has 
been put, see Jean-Numa Ducange, “Un moment méconnu de l’historiographie: l’introduction et 
la diffusion en France de l’ouvrage de Karl Kautsky, La lutte des classes en France en 1789,” 
Annales historiques de la Révolution française 354 (October-December 2008), 105-130. 
 103 
state.231  By associating the heart of the revolution as proletarian, oriented towards a diminished 
state and not towards Jacobinism, Guérin indicted the tradition of the leftist Republican view of 
the revolution enshrined by previous historians and currently defended by the Society of 
Robespierrist Studies.   
Alongside his interpretation of the Revolution, Guérin also polemicized against what he 
viewed were the limitations and blind spots of the Revolution’s historiography. According to 
Guérin, any book about the French Revolution needed to account for the historiography of the 
Revolution, which he saw as belonging to two major camps. On the one hand there existed a 
clerical and counter-revolutionary account of the Revolution that still found support among the 
upper bourgeoisie and high functionaries. In France, this history of the Revolution saw 1789 as 
the beginning of the downfall of the French nation; abroad, dictators and fascist propaganda 
indicted the Revolution for the world’s problems.  At the other end of the spectrum were the 
“moderate democrat” historians of the nineteenth century like Michelet, Quinet, and Aulard, as 
well as the more “advanced democrats” like Jaurès and Mathiez. Whereas Aulard idolized 
Danton, Mathiez created a veritable “cult” around Robespierre. 232  Since the choice of 
revolutionary heroes was not simply “a matter of taste,” these preferences “correspond to a 
political position, a class attitude.” Citing Raymond Aron’s Introduction to the Philosophy of 
History, Guérin claimed there was no such thing as historical impartiality. By extension, Guérin 
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argued, all history was political; the proper history needed the right politics. 233  While both 
moderate and advanced democratic historians had “the merit of not presenting the Revolution as 
the work of Satan,” 234  both—even the most Marxist and scientifically-oriented historians—
defended positions that reinforced class domination in France. By defending the bourgeois 
Jacobin Club’s direction of the Revolution and emphasizing the collaboration between the 
bourgeoisie and sans-culottes, Marxist historians missed the truly radical elements of the 
Revolution; their dedication to the Jacobin state only reinforced an historical narrative that kept 
the working masses subordinate to the bourgeoisie and corporate bureaucracy. According to 
Guérin, “Only proletarian historians, with the help of the dialectical materialist conception of 
history, are capable of understanding the objective necessity” of each stage in the evolution of 
class struggle.235   
Guérin’s distinction between subjective and objective perspectives in history provided the 
backbone to his arguments about the true direction of the Revolution’s historical potential 
development as well as his indictments of other historians. This distinction is perhaps best 
accounted for as a creative misreading of Raymond Aron’s theory of history. While Aron did 
believe that the world of the historian necessarily becomes inscribed in her object of research, the 
subjective-objective distinction out of which Guérin formed his historical theory is not readily 
apparent in Aron’s book. Aron did think that historical inquiry was bound by “a decision with a 
view to the future and understands others only with reference to the subject,” but this was a 
decisionism that had to necessarily bracket questions of an absolute historical truth. The historian 
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“does not know the goal or goals of history.”236 Guérin, by contrast, had no doubt the truth of 
history’s movement lay with lower classes’ struggles for emancipation. The bras nus were 
evidence of future class struggles to come. By describing the political projects of the bras nus in 
antibourgeois and antistatist terms Guérin could dismiss the “objective” end of the Revolution in 
the Jacobin dictatorship and directory as a deformation of the Revolution’s truth.237 
Throughout his Introduction and Conclusion, Guérin hedged against criticisms that he 
created an anachronistic portrait of the Revolution by reading nineteenth and twentieth-century 
class concerns into the past. He maintained that the present had legitimate bearing on the past, 
and not simply because historical objectivity was a chimera. Even though the past could not be 
mechanically transposed to the future, present and future events could verify the historical 
processes at work in the past.238 Modern Marxist class struggle was a vindication of a bras nus 
proletariat in formation. 
Since Guérin’s assessments of the historiography of the Revolution emphasized the 
personal commitments of historians, it should come as no surprise that Guérin undertook his 
study of the Revolution as a very personal venture. Upon his release from the Norwegian prison 
camp, Guérin began his study of the French Revolution, first in the Norwegian National Library, 
then, after Germany allowed the repatriation of French civilians, he finished it in France from 
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1942 to 1946. The reasons for choosing to write on the French Revolution which Guérin gave 
throughout his life varied, but they all centered on the needs of the present.  In his autobiography, 
Guérin stated that “In 1941 the Revolution had haunted me for a very long time,” and at least as 
far back as his trips to the Middle East and Asia in the late 1920s when Guérin witnessed 
firsthand France’s overseas empire and the contradictions of universal French values. Even 
though he categorized his wartime studies as a way to “turn my back” on the War, Guérin 
withheld the original preface to the book from publication, written in 1944, precisely because he 
felt it was not balanced enough and strayed too far from the historical particulars of the 
Revolution. Like many others, Guérin was caught up in what he saw as the “pre-revolutionary 
atmosphere” of the resistance and this attitude showed in the original preface.239 In 1947 he 
confessed to Marceau Pivert that his study of the Revolution “is an introduction to a synthesis of 
anarchism and Marxism that I would like to write one day.”240  Though Guérin may have felt the 
particulars of the war loomed too large in his original preface, it is clear that for him the 
Revolution held key insights for contemporary politics. As it did for Georges Lefebvre, the 
French Revolution provided a source of political stability at a time when the future of France was 
anything but stable. 
Despite the fact that Guérin’s book only received a second edition in 1968, it received a 
wide range of sustained critical attention over the next decade. Given the at-times mocking tone 
of the discussion of the Revolution’s historiography, it should come as no surprise that the 
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majority of the attention received from the historical profession was critical.241 Not only did 
Guérin reproach the most celebrated recent historians of the French Revolution, he did so from 
outside the established historical profession. On the more generous side of the reviews, Henri 
Calvet noted that with the intensity of its documentation and liveliness of the book’s arguments, 
“One might, one should, discuss it, but one should not neglect it.” 242  Still, Calvet was an 
economic historian of the Terror, author of a study of Robespierre, and collaborator on 
Robespierre’s Collected Works, i.e., exactly the type of historian against whom Guérin directed 
his critiques.243 Calvet thought Guérin’s polemic against the French historiographical tradition 
from Mathiez onwards was composed mainly of conjectures and false dichotomies. Even if the 
goal of complete historical objectivity was impossible, why should one automatically embrace 
complete subjectivity? Though it is true some politicians on the left and the right have distorted 
the Revolution, why is a position somewhere in the middle out of the question? And most 
importantly, Calvet thought Guérin’s indictment of the politics of historians was misplaced.  
Calvet believed the examples of Jaurès, Aulard, Mathiez, and Georges Lefebvre displayed the 
ability to be politically-active historians without conflating the two separate roles. On matters of 
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historical accuracy, Calvet thought Guérin mischaracterized the level of a unified class-
consciousness among the working classes in France and above all distorted the image of 
Robespierre. By denying the circumstances under which Robespierre conducted the Terror, 
Guérin completely misunderstood the reasons for the halt to social reform: “All of those who, 
from 1793 to the present, have denounced Robespierre as the most dangerous of revolutionaries 
(for the adversaries of political and social democracy), they have judged better than D. 
Guérin.”244 Other reviewers echoed Calvet’s criticisms and added to the list. Georges Lefebvre 
noted that although Guérin was careful to call the working classes “bras nus” or “plebeians,” 
recognizing there was nothing like a Marxist proletariat at the time, he nonetheless still spoke of 
a proletariat and even labeled the Commune of Paris “proletarian.” Since Guérin examined 
neither the economic structure of France during the Revolution nor the viewpoint of the peasants, 
he had no grounds for describing the Revolution as proletarian in any sense of the term.245 In 
private, Lefebvre expressed his opinions of Guérin’s scholarship more directly, explaining in 
passing that, “in order to properly understand” Bras Nus, “one must always read Stalin where he 
writes Robespierre.”246 For Lefebvre, it wasn’t that the Revolution could not be political. Rather, 
the wrong politics were driving Guérin’s interpretation of the Revolution. 
Other reviews were less sympathetic and outright publicly polemical. Lucien Febvre’s 
review in Annales was incredibly scathing; he took the attack on the Jacobin interpretation 
personally and openly lampooned the idea one should trust an amateur historian, whose book 
was “champing at the bit” [“un livre piaffant”] to make a political point, rather than engaging the 
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professional work of Jaurès, Mathiez, or Lefebvre. Like Calvet, Febvre rhetorically asked “And 
what if I am a Trotskyist, or Stalinist, or Papist, or Buddhist?… When I write history I am an 
historian.” At the end of his review, Febvre begged the pardon of his readers, suggesting that 
perhaps Guérin’s mode of historical writing was the way of the future: “I am an old ridiculous 
historian.  Good luck to our successors if this sort of tone should become the rule.”247   
The PCF’s journal La Pensée also carried criticisms of Guérin’s Trotskyist version of the 
Revolution. Georges Rudé and Albert Soboul, still at work on his dissertation on the sans-
culottes of Paris in 1793, wrote extended essays on the true nature of class struggle and the 
workers movement during the Revolution. Soboul, in particular, echoed Lefebvre’s critique in an 
essay on the history of the term class struggle. “Rarely are social classes, even dominant ones, 
homogeneous,” Soboul claimed. For Guérin to “make the sans-culottes a proletariat” misses the 
fact that many sans-culottes actually defended traditional economic positions and much of the 
rest supported the bourgeois policies of the government.248     
 The nearly-universally negative professional reviews of Guérin’s book would seem to 
have destined it to the dustbin of history. For Guérin’s reviewers, he had committed four cardinal 
sins: he had questioned the legitimacy and worth of the Jacobin state, he had denied the 
separation between the academic process and contemporary politics (indicting some of France’s 
                                                 
247 Lucien Febvre, “Un livre sur la révolution,” Annales, Histoire, Sciences Sociales 3, no 
2 (April-June 1948), 167-170, republished in Combats pour l’histoire (Paris: Armand Colin, 
1953), 109-113. 
248 Albert Soboul, “Karl Marx et l’expérience Révolutionnaire française,” La Pensée 36 
(May-June 1951): 61-69; Georges Rudé, “Les ouvriers parisiens dans la Révolution française,” 
La Pensée 48-49 (May-June-July-August 1953): 108-128; Albert Soboul, “Classes et luttes de 
classes sur la Révolution française,” La Pensée 53 (January-February 1954): 39-62; 55, 61. 
Soboul also mentioned the dangers of Guérin’s anachronisms during the question and answer 
portion of a talk given by André Aymard on historical methodology. The lecture and audience 
discussion were reprinted in André Aymard, “La méthode de la recherche historique,” Revue de 
l’enseignement philosophique 3, nos. 5-6 (July-September 1953), 10-16. 
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most celebrated recent historians in the process), he had seen a revolutionary proletariat where 
there was none, and he had questioned the viability of the historians’ critical distance from the 
Revolution.   
It was on this last count that at once made Guérin’s arguments upsetting to professional 
historians and dovetailed with the invocation of 1789 during the French Algerian War. The 
conjuncture of the war and the publication of Albert Soboul’s thesis on the Parisian sans-culottes 
kept Guérin’s controversial interpretation of the Revolution alive and highlighted the continued 
relevance of the image of the Revolution had for postwar France. Guérin’s insistence on the 
relationship between academics and politics was not wholly out of joint with postwar concerns. 
The work of Lefebvre clearly demonstrated that politics and the history of the Revolution were 
not separated by an ekphratic caesura, and yet Guérin’s version of history had certainly crossed a 
line. The history of the Revolution was not deforming contemporary politics. Contemporary 
politics, in the eyes of Guérin’s critics, risked deforming the Revolution.   
 During the French Algerian War, Guérin’s insistence on the contemporary relevance of 
the Revolution appeared most visibly in the months following De Gaulle’s return to power in 
May 1958 and les visibly, perhaps, regarding his position on political allegiances to Algerian 
nationalists. Guérin’s anti-colonial activities had pre-dated the French Algerian War by decades, 
and they were largely inspired by the trip he took to the Middle East and Southeast Asia in 1927. 
During the Popular Front, Guérin became involved with North African labor and nationalist 
movements. Following a trip to North Africa in 1952, Guérin befriended a number of prominent 
nationalists, including the first president of Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba. 249  Guérin’s personal 
connections, his involvement with François Mauriac’s France-Maghreb Committee, and his 
                                                 
249 See the correspondence in Fonds Guérin, F delta 0721/91/1, F delta 0721/21/2, BDIC. 
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critical study of French colonialism, In the Service of the Colonized, published in 1954, made 
him one of the leading critics of France’s colonial system at the onset of the French Algerian 
War. During the War, Guérin was highly critical of French intellectuals’ partisan allegiances 
with the FLN. However, while his friendship with Messali Hadj, the leader of the FLN’s rival 
nationalist group, the Mouvement National Algérien (MNA), led him to support the MNA, he 
maintained a public stance in support of Algerian nationalism, no matter which party might win 
out over the other. Guérin also lent his support both to multiple committees of intellectuals and 
individual causes.250 Guérin joined the 1955 Committee against the Pursuit of the War in North 
Africa and at one of the Committee’s meetings, Guérin countered François Mitterand’s claim 
that Algeria was an integral part of France with a speech titled “Algeria has never been 
France.”251 He was also a signatory to the 1961 Manifesto of the 121, supporting the right of 
French men to refuse military conscription. 
 When pro-French Algerian generals restored de Gaulle to power in May 1958, Guérin’s 
anti-fascist, anti-colonialist, and pro-Revolutionary tendencies fused. Like many others at the 
time, Guérin saw de Gaulle’s return to power with the support of Poujadists and pro-colonial 
military leaders as signs of a re-emergent strand of French Fascism. Only two years earlier in 
                                                 
250 For example, Guérin corresponded with Frantz Fanon as early as 1955 and wrote to 
journals and newspapers on his behalf in order to get his articles published.  See the letters, 
Fanon to Guérin, 26 November 1955, Fonds Guérin F delta 0721/91/2, BDIC, and Fanon to 
France Observateur (delivered by Guérin), 26 February 1956, Fonds Guérin F delta 0721/90/2, 
BDIC. Guérin and Fanon parted ways in 1957 after, while in the course of a conversation, Fanon 
said he wanted “Messali [Hadj] to burn in hell.” Daniel Guérin, Quand l’Algérie s’insurgeait, 
1954-1962 (Claix: Pensée Sauvage, 1979), 106-107.  
251 Guérin, L’Algérie n’a jamais été la France, self-published pamphlet (Paris, 1956). 
Copy found in Fonds Guérin, F delta 0721/91/2, BDIC. The thesis that Algeria was in fact not 
French might seem to run counter to the importance of understanding the French Revolution in 
order to properly assess Algeria.  However, inasmuch as Guérin viewed the dynamics within the 
French Revolution as archetypal, the Revolution’s lessons applied to the whole world, and not 
just France. 
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March of 1956 he had given a talk to 800 people for the Union des étudiants juifs de France on 
the fascist elements of Poujade’s supporters. A group of Poujadist supporters interrupted the talk 
by shouting “To Moscow! We already have enough communists here,” as well as the colon chant 
“Algérie française!”252 The next month “fascist bandits” repeated their interruptions at a meeting 
where Guérin and other intellectuals discussed media censorship and Claude Bourdet’s recent 
arrest for articles published in France Observateur.253  
Fascism appeared alarmingly alive and well in France at the beginning of the Algerian 
War and its supporters’ interests appeared to be directly aligned with those of supporters of 
French Algeria. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that in the first months of de Gaulle’s return 
Guérin viewed the situation through the lens of the Nazi Occupation. On May 26, 1958, Guérin 
wrote an open letter to the director of the newspaper Le Monde, Hubert Beuve-Méry, predicting 
what would happen should fascism actually return to power in France. He assured Beuve-Méry, 
“The day would not be far away when the people would enter into a new Resistance, when the 
best of her sons would once more take to the underground… when, for all republicans, according 
to the formula of 1793, insurrection would be the most sacred of duties.” The inflammatory letter 
was never published, nor was Guérin’s similar, shorter telegram to President René Coty. 
However, the letters do not appear to merely be moments of political posturing, either, but rather 
                                                 
252  France-Observateur (29 March 1956); Midi Libre (22 March 1956). See also 
“Communiqué du conseil d’Administration de l’Union des Étudiants Juifs de France sur les 
événements du 21 Mars à Montpellier,” Fonds Guérin F delta 0721/53/1, BDIC. In this statement 
the Union claimed that the same tactic was used on that night during a talk at the Sociétés 
Savantes in Paris. 
253 Guérin, Quand l’Algérie s’insurgeait, 94-95. 
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attest to his state of mind in general. In a letter to his mother on June 2, Guérin felt the need to 
use the Revolutionary calendar system in the letter’s heading.254  
 Like many others, after de Gaulle’s referendum at the end of 1958, Guérin revised his 
fears that de Gaulle’s return was a definite sign of fascism back in power. Instead of under-
estimating the power of de Gaulle, in 1959 Guérin argued that his power had perhaps been 
“over-estimated. Instead of a major regime change, I see in it a banal palace revolution.”255 
However, at the height of OAS rebellion and the attempts on de Gaulle’s life, with no definite 
end to the war in Algeria in sight, he doubted whether de Gaulle, though not a fascist himself, 
could in fact regain control over those who brought him back to power in the first place.256  
 In the midst of Guérin’s personal invocations of the spirit of the Revolution he returned 
to arguing that the Revolution was important for understanding contemporary politics. For the 
inaugural issue of 14 Juillet, Guérin contributed an essay titled “Parachronism” that brought his 
historical presentism directly to bear on the crisis posed by de Gaulle’s return to power. Contrary 
to modern usage, Guérin argued that there were two sides to anachronism. Anachronism proper 
was the importation of something of the present into the past. Parachronism, by contrast, was the 
persistence of something from the past in a non-synchronous present. The supporters of French 
                                                 
254 Letter, Guérin to Hubert Beuve-Méry, 24 May 1958, emphasis Guérin’s; subfolder 
“telegrammes”; and letter, Guérin to “chère pétite maman,” 19 Brumaire (2 June) 1958, Fonds 
Guérin F delta 0721/91/4, BDIC. Also compare to Guérin’s message registered with the BBC as 
well as this message’s handwritten draft with references to the Terror, the Revolution of 1848, 
and the Paris Commune of 1871 crossed out. Fonds Guérin F delta 0721/90/2, BDIC. Guérin 
helpfully transcribed the Revolutionary calendar system into the standard one for his mother.  
Whereas Guérin tended to sign political statements “Daniel Guérin, écrivain,” in his 
telegram to President Coty he chose “Daniel Guérin, Historien.”  
255 Daniel Guérin, “Reponse de Daniel Guérin,” 14 juillet no. 3 (18 June 1959), 4. 
256  Guérin to [Mc]George Bundy, 4 August 1961, Fonds Guérin, F delta 0721/91/1, 
BDIC. McGeorge Bundy was National Security Advisor to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. 
Guérin’s letter was meant to convince Bundy that De Gaulle was not in control of the situation in 
Algeria and that America should intervene.  
 114 
Algeria and the military were, above all, parachronic: they represented not only the torture and 
fascist violence of decades earlier, but also Old Régime despotism. The way to rid France of 
these parachronisms was to remember that France in 1958 was still a republic and its future was 
“revolutionary and libertarian socialism.”257  The kernel of this libertarian socialism was, of 
course, to be found first in the French Revolution.  
  Even looking back on the French Algerian War some 15 years after it ended, Guérin 
drew on the French Revolution. Boumedienne’s 1965 coup and the failed promises of socialist 
revolution in Algeria did not necessarily mean the French Algerian War was a failure. Even 
though the French Revolution ended in the Directory and Napoleon it still transformed the entire 
world. Likewise, Algeria was still free, socialist in orientation, and anticolonialist.258  
Although Guérin was decidedly anti-colonialist, it would be wrong to see him as a simple 
apologist for violence, let alone terrorism. From a relatively early age Guérin was suspicious of 
violent forms of radicalism, though he was not pollyannaish about the ways in which 
revolutionaries effected change. Guérin’s stance on violence appeared to follow a formula from 
his personal notes: “If one hates war and imperialism, then one also knows to only use violence 
appropriately.”259 And importantly, by attacking the Jacobin narrative of the French Revolution 
he had also suggested that Robespierre’s political terror was at the very least far from 
necessary—at most it was a betrayal of the Revolution itself. Yet during the crises of 1958 
surrounding De Gaulle’s return, Guérin’s invocations of the French Revolution’s continuing 
legacy relied on a violent rhetoric found elsewhere among the radical left. 
                                                 
257 Daniel Guérin, “Parachronisme” 14 Juillet 1 (14 July 1958), 12-13. 
258 Daniel Guérin, Quand l’Algérie s’insurgeait, 186-187. 
259 Fonds Guérin, F delta 0721/22/5, BDIC. Guérin’s notes in the same folder dated 
December 1929-February 1930 also criticized the revolutionary theorist Georges Sorel for 
“placing syndicalism in the service of violence and not violence in the service of syndicalism.”   
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Guérin’s anti-fascist reaction to May 1958 was certainly not out of the ordinary. 
However, when it came to the Algerian nationalist groups whom he supported during the 
Algerian War, he was in the minority among the anticolonial left. While the majority of main 
anticolonial figures lent their open support to the FLN as the true organ of the Algerian nation, 
Guérin supported the minority MNA. The MNA was a reincarnation of Messali Hadj’s earlier 
organizations—including the Étoile Nord-Africaine (ENA), the Parti Populaire Algérien (PPA), 
and its successor Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques (MTLD)—formed in 
response to the creation of the FLN and beginning of the Algerian Rebellion in November 
1954.260 Whereas the FLN believed the MTLD’s moderate nationalism and reformist goals were 
insufficient when confronted with France’s control over Algeria, the MNA claimed to be the true 
representatives of Algerian nationalism, the inheritors of the struggle begun by Abd el-Kader’s 
nineteenth-century rebellion. Since Guérin’s exposure to North African anticolonial movements 
stretched back to the late 1920s, he was first of all exposed to the older Algerian nationalist 
groups.261 He first met Messali Hadj in Paris in 1934, during Popular Front and anti-fascist 
demonstrations. Guérin met ENA activists and demonstrators throughout the thirties and claimed 
that they were present not only at demonstrations in favor of North African workers’ rights and 
colonial equality, but also at all of the major anti-fascist demonstrations, including the Bastille 
Day rallies of 1935 and 1936.262 In the postwar Guérin strengthened his ties with Messali’s 
                                                 
260 At the very beginning of the war, the government and press even assumed that the 1 
November attacks had to be the work of Messali Hadj and his supporters, and not the actions of 
an autonomous nationalist group.   
261 On Guérin’s ship voyage from Marseille to Beirut in 1927 he met Emir Khaled, 
grandson of Abd el-Khader and himself a prominent interwar Algerian nationalist leader.  
262 Guérin, Au service des colonisés, 1930-1953 (Paris: Minuit, 1954), 14, 110, Quand 
l’Algérie s’insurgeait, 26-27.  
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movement in a 1952 trip to North Africa. His support of the movement was clear even before 
open rebellion in Algeria began.263  
  By early 1956, Guérin’s public stance was to remain neutral between the two competing 
nationalist groups, and encouraged other intellectuals to do the same, for fear of weakening the 
Algerian cause by dividing opinion. This appeal, however, seemed to have little real effect 
amongst Guérin’s peers.264 It was also clear two years into the war that reconciliation between 
the FLN and MNA was not going to come easily, if at all: agents from both groups brought the 
fight against each other to France, killing the other side’s representatives and coercing Algerian 
laborers to choose allegiances. To Guérin this had all the makings of a repetition of the 
revolutionary deviations begun initially in 1793. While the MNA represented the interests of 
Algerian workers and a true revolution from below, the FLN were no more than bourgeois 
nationalists. Guérin’s descriptions of the factional conflict between the MNA and FLN read like 
a repetition of his theses on the divisions between the “bras nus” and the Jacobin leaders under 
the First Republic: “As with the Great French Revolution, the Algerian Revolution turned the 
arm of terror on its own people and devoured itself.”265 The FLN was unable to discern the 
                                                 
263  Guérin, Au service des colonisés, 230: Messali Hadj is “the leader of Algerian 
nationalism.” Guérin also participated in the Comité France-Maghreb from 1953-1955, but left 
because he felt they were not active enough. David Berry, “‘Un contradicteur permanent’: The 
Ideological and Political Itinerary of Daniel Guérin,” in After the Deluge: New Perspectives on 
the Intellectual and Cultural History of Postwar France, edited by Julian Bourg (Lexington, KY: 
Lexington Books, 2004), 160-161. By 1955 François Mauriac also shared in this sentiment. 
Mauriac to Guérin, 18 May 1955, Fonds Guérin, F delta 0721/91/1, BDIC. 
264  Berry, “‘Un contradicteur permanent’,” 161; Daniel Guérin, “Lettre ouverte aux 
membres du Comité d’action contre la poursuite de la guerre en Afrique du Nord,” 29 January 
1956, Dionys Mascolo to Daniel Guérin, 3 February 1956, and Daniel Guérin to Dionys 
Mascolo, 6 February 1956, Fonds Guérin, F delta 0721/91/3, BDIC.  
265 Guérin, Quand l’Algérie s’insurgeait, 99. Compare to the 1956 MNA tract signed by 
André Breton that claimed “the actions of the pseudo-patriots called the ‘FLN’ are anti-national. 
Their ranks weaken the Algerian resistance through terror, bloodletting, and killings.” MNA, “Le 
peuple algérien se souviendra. Les exactions abominales des pseudo-patriotes dits ‘Front 
 117 
appropriate use of anticolonial violence and repeated the mistakes of revolutionary dictatorships 
from Robespierre to Lenin and Stalin. 
 
The Strange Silence of Albert Marius Soboul, soi-disant “Africanus” 
The polemics surrounding Guérin’s interpretation of the French Revolution also 
continued throughout the French Algerian War, coinciding with his anticolonial efforts, with 
responses to his critics in Les Temps modernes.266  In 1957 the journal Arguments organized a 
roundtable between the sociologist and philosopher Edgar Morin, Daniel Guérin, and Albert 
Soboul that highlighted the criticisms the left leveled against Guérin’s attack on the French 
Jacobin legacy. At the outset, however, the introduction to the exchange affirmed one of 
Guérin’s basic positions:  
Whether we like it or not, we project ourselves into the history of the French Revolution. 
However lightened, these are our current concerns, which attach themselves to the great 
ghosts of the first revolution. In one sense or the other, our current experiences, as do the 
experiences of the 19th Century and the first half of the 20th, enrich our vision of the 
Revolution. With each new historical experience the history of the Revolution gains more 
depth and flesh.267    
 
Much like theological positions regarding continuous revelation, the historical canon remained 
an open and living entity whose character more fully emerged in subsequent historical moments. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Libération Nationale’ [sic] ne resteront pas impunis,” in Engagements et déchirements: les 
intellectuels et la guerre d’Algérie, edited by Catherine Brun and Olivier Penot-Lacassagne 
(Paris: Gallimard, Éditions IMEC, 2012), 66. 
266 Daniel Guérin, “La Révolution déjacobinisée,” Les Temps modernes 134 (April 1957), 
1519-1546; Daniel Guérin, “Sartre, Lukacs et la Gironde,” Les Temps modernes 142 (December 
1957), 1132-1137. These essays were republished two years later in Daniel Guérin, Jeunesse du 
socialisme libertaire (Paris: Librairie Marcel Rivière, 1959). The latter of these essays responded 
to what Guérin thought were Sartre’s attacks on his interpretation of the Revolution.  Sartre 
responded to Guérin claiming that Class Struggle was “an excellent book.  His best, by far.”  “En 
voici la réponse de Jean-Paul Sartre,” Les Temps modernes 142 (December 1957), 1137. Sartre’s 
reading of Guérin as well as his use of Lefebvre is discussed in Chapter 4. 
267 Arguments 5 (December 1957), 9. 
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Guérin’s position in the debate remained the same as it had since his publication of Class 
Struggle. Historians like Mathiez and Lefebvre had “beatified” Robespierre beyond all reproach. 
Furthermore, Guérin claimed, the “cult of Robespierre” had gone hand in hand with support for 
Leninism and Stalinism, and Robespierre’s vision of the purified state still infected present-day 
politics. Soboul, however, countered by saying that transhistorical comparisons between the 
French Revolution and other revolutions, such as the Russian Revolution, could be useful and 
help to clarify aspects of the former. The problem, Soboul claimed, was that Guérin had not 
compared the two, but transposed them, and in doing so he risked “a false perspective.”268 
Morin’s contribution staked out a position between Soboul and Guérin. While Soboul may have 
been correct to reproach Guérin for seeing too much of the Russian Revolution in the French 
Revolution, he did not think the problem of Robespierre was the false conundrum that Soboul 
claimed it was. The figure of Robespierre presented one with political and psychological internal 
contradictions that could not be dissolved by going back to their historical context.269 The French 
Revolution contained an essential dynamic present in all subsequent revolutions. 
Soboul concluded the roundtable by suggesting Guérin and Morin “lift the veil” and 
recognize that, “for some, behind Robespierrism it is Stalinism that is at work… the problem of 
revolutionary power is not posed in the same terms for the bourgeois revolution of the 18th 
century, supported and driven by the sans-culottes, and for the proletarian revolution of the 20th 
century. To negate the specificity of historical facts is to falsify, to deform reality.”270 Soboul 
reiterated this position in the introduction to his 1958 thesis, The Parisian Sans-Culottes in the 
                                                 
268  Daniel Guérin, “Comment interpréter le Robespierrisme,” and Albert Soboul, 
“Robespierrisme ou Antirobespierrisme?” Arguments 5 (December 1957), 9-11, 11-16. 
269  Edgar Morin, “Robespierre, est-il seulement un cas dialectique?” Arguments 5 
(December 1957), 16. 
270 Albert Soboul, “Pour Conclure?” Arguments 5 (December 1957), 16-17. 
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Year II. In an overview of the Terror’s principal historians that mirrored aspects of Guérin’s 
positions, Soboul argued that, yes, the French Revolution set in motion a long series of processes 
that brought the bourgeoisie to power in the modern world. And yes, the working classes—
particularly the sans-culottes of Paris—had not been properly understood in the Revolution’s 
historiography. However, to see them as a unified proletariat would miss the specificity of the 
different working-class groups, and would “transpose to the eighteenth century the problems of 
our time… it is to take away from the popular movement under the Revolution all of its 
specificity.”271 Far from being either the slaves to bourgeois Jacobin policy or the beginnings of 
an industrial proletariat, the sans-culottes’ policies followed their own logic, which at times 
could even defend pre-Revolutionary feudal practices. 
By the mid-1950s, Soboul had become one of Lefebvre’s heirs apparent as gatekeeper of 
the social interpretation of the Revolution, in both scholarly practice and institutional presence. 
Of the man Soboul addressed as “My Dear Master,” Soboul thought he was the consummate 
model historian.272 Soboul’s revised short précis of the French Revolution followed the general 
narrative of Lefebvre’s Quatre-vingt neuf; and his dissertation’s project of viewing the 
Revolution from the neglected vantage point of the sans-culottes was a continuation of 
Lefebvre’s approach to the revolution from below begun with his study of the peasantry of the 
Nord and the dynamics of the Great Fear. Upon Lefebvre’s death, Soboul assumed the role of 
copresident of the Société d’études robespierristes and made certain to publish Lefebvre’s last 
work, Études orléanaises as well as continue the production of Robespierre’s complete works. 
                                                 
271 Albert Soboul, Les sans-culottes parisiens en l’an II (Paris: Librairie Clavreuil, 1958), 
10. 
272 For example, see the undated notes from Soboul to Lefebvre, Fonds Soboul, Le centre 
de documentation-bibliothèque Albert Soboul, Musée de la Révolution française, Domaine de 
Vizille; Albert Soboul, “Georges Lefebve: historien de la Révolution française, 1874-1959,” La 
Pensée no 88 (November-December 1959), 7-19. 
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Despite the differences in historical interpretation between Soboul and Guérin, it would 
still have been conceivable in the intellectual climate of 1950s France for Soboul to draw lessons 
or comparisons between the Revolution and contemporary politics. This, however, he did not 
do—at least not publicly. Even though Soboul was born in Algeria to a pied-noir family, and 
showed interest in both Algerian political history and support for the Algerian cause, he did not 
enlist the French Revolution to either support or justify these positions, despite personal 
connections to Algeria.  
Soboul was born in Ammi Moussa in 1914 and lived in Algeria until 1922 when his 
mother died and he moved to Nîmes to live with his aunt.273 His early years in Algeria left an 
imprint on the rest of his life. In letters to friends, Soboul often used his middle name, Marius. At 
times he would portray himself as a Roman, adding “Africanus” to his signature.274  
Like Lefebvre, Soboul was also a scholarship student, attending the Lycée Louis-le-
Grand and then the Sorbonne where he passed the agrégation in history in 1938. His first book 
was a short study of Saint-Just’s political and social ideas and at the time of the events marking 
the 150th anniversary of the Revolution he was beginning doctoral research, following PCF 
activities, and working at the Museum of History at Montreuil. When the war began, he was 
called to serve in the military, gaining the rank of military officer, but saw no real action. He 
taught at the lycée in Montpellier until involvement in an unauthorized Bastille Day celebration 
in 1942 briefly landed him in jail and barred him from teaching. He wrote tracts for the 
                                                 
273 Like Camus’s father, Soboul’s father, Lucien Soboul, died early in the First World 
War. Claude Mazauric, Un historien en son temps: Albert Soboul (1914-1982) (Aubenas: 
Éditions d’Albret, 2004), 12-15. Both Richard Cobb and Claude Mazauric view moving in with 
his Aunt, Marie Soboul, as one of the defining moments of Soboul’s life.  Marie was a militant 
communist, Professeur and then Directrice of the École Normale des jeunes filles, and wartime 
resistance organizer. 
274 Mazauric, Un historien en son temps, 138n.   
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Communist resistance in the Ardèche until the Liberation and said of the Bastille Day parade of 
1945, “that was truly my apogee.”275 At least when it came to the struggle against Nazi Germany 
and the Vichy regime, for Soboul there was no disentangling the French Revolution from 
political commitment.  
During the Algerian War, Soboul attended talks on Algerian political history given by the 
historian of North African politics Robert Ageron and was a signatory to the 1955 Action 
Committee against the Pursuit of War in North Africa.276 And Soboul’s surviving library attests 
to a continued interest in Algerian affairs after the war ended. 277  However, Soboul forbade 
marshalling the French Revolution in favor of Algerian independence on two fronts. First of all, 
while the study of the French Revolution and support for Algerian independence could coexist, 
the two could never interact. And second of all, outward support for the PCF required not 
publicly contradicting the party line on Algeria. By the beginning of the Algerian War, Soboul 
had removed himself from militant PCF activities, deciding he could not continue to be both a 
PCF militant and professor at the same time. Although he continued to write for La Pensée his 
whole life, and never renounced his PCF membership, in later interviews he noted that by the 
                                                 
275 Raymond Huard, Marie-Josèphe Naudin, Albert Soboul, “Entretiens, le 4 mars et 5 
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time the first draft of his dissertation was complete in 1956, the triple threat of destalinization, 
the invasion of Hungary, and the PCF’s reluctance to support Algerian independence caused him 
to remove himself from the militancy of his previous years.278   
Soboul’s reproach of Guérin was furthermore representative of his general distaste for 
future historians of the Revolution, like François Furet.279 Throughout Soboul’s career, he never 
hesitated to criticize historians whose work appeared amateurish as well as those whose success 
did not conform to the traditional career plan of French academia.280 However, even though by 
the 1970s revisionists like Furet would attack Soboul as the ultimate avatar of Marxist 
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Cobb, People and Places, 71. See also Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s memory of Soboul accusing 
Furet and Jean Poperen of using Guérin (“guériniser”) to attack Soboul from the left. Emmanuel 
LeRoy Ladurie, Paris-Montpellier: P.C.-P.S.U., 1945-1963 (Paris: Gallimard, 1982), 48; 
Michael Scott Christofferson, French Intellectuals Against the Left, 237, 261n44. A notable 
exception to this rule, however, was Soboul’s friend Madeleine-Anne Charmelot, a sometime 
contributor to the AHRF. Charmelot wrote a number of pieces on Saint Just but failed to secure 
book contracts with large publishers because of her lack of advanced degrees. Soboul, 
nonetheless, encouraged her independent research.  See Charmelot’s deposited correspondence 
and extracts of her work in Fonds Soboul, Le centre de documentation-bibliothèque Albert 
Soboul, Musée de la Révolution française, Domaine de Vizille. 
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historiography, during the 50s and 60s Soboul’s critics were to his ideological left. As Yannick 
Bosc and Marc Belissa have observed, the first (1948) edition of Soboul’s Révolution française 
gave a good deal more attention to the actions of the Hébertistes than the second edition of the 
work or his dissertation. The downplaying of their influence in the 1951 edition was a way of 
distancing himself from Guérin and possible accusations of gauchisme.281 Aside from Guérin’s 
critiques of Soboul, in 1952 Jean Poperen reviewed Soboul’s textbook La Révolution française 
in Les Cahiers du Communisme, accusing Soboul of being a “bourgeois” historian, instead of a 
practitioner of authentic proletarian science. The fact that this attack came in Les Cahiers du 
Communisme, a publication directed at everyday PCF members, and not La Pensée, a journal 
that focused on an intellectual audience, meant that the review was meant as a thoroughly 
political and ideological attack.282  In the 1950s, Soboul’s critics were from the left; they did not 
see his work as too far to the left, but rather not far enough.  
The position taken by Soboul, in effect, relegated the usefulness of analogy between the 
French Revolution and the present to a very minor position.  In order to save the historical 
integrity of the French Revolution, it was necessary to not invoke its name in the company of 
potentially suspect causes. According to Richard Cobb, a longtime friend of Soboul, “for him 
there had been only one Revolution, and that a French one.”283 More surprisingly, however, 
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Soboul’s position was one that tried to maintain a cordon sanitaire around the Revolution. If the 
historical legacy of the Revolution could be tied to contemporary debates and concerns, one 
would run the risk of deforming the historical record. Up through the 1950s apologists for the 
USSR had drawn on the Committee of Public Safety as a model showing the revolutionary 
necessity of centralized state violence. But by the time of Krushchev’s Party Speech and the 
1956 invasion of Hungary, such arguments quickly lost purchase in France. Better to divorce 
Stalinism from Jacobinism than risk losing both. The dangers, however, could run the opposite 
way as well. Insofar as Guérin’s attack on Jacobinism also acted as an attack on the French 
Communist Party, it is plausible that Soboul believed it was in the best interests of French 
Communism to renounce Guérin’s thesis in order to keep the image of international communist 
projects tied to the foundation of the modern French nation. The PCF may have been Stalinist, 
but to suggest a necessary connection between Robespierre and Stalin was unthinkable.284 
 
Despite other intellectuals’ invocations of the French Revolution in reference to Algeria, in the 
context of the historical profession in postwar France, the range of politicization of the 
Revolution from Guérin and Lefebvre to Soboul was part of a general ambivalence toward the 
treatment of historical subjects with seemingly obvious historical relevance.  
Professed emphasis on preserving historical distance was far from unusual among 
professional historians, but whether or not this was a viable position was another matter. 
Raymond Aron’s 1938 treatise on historical theory wagered that “The historian is to some extent 
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both a spectator and an actor,” and the historian’s very search for something in the past 
implicates his own motives in the study. When Aron illustrated the ways in which historians’ 
preferences ultimately influence the narratives they tell, he of course indicted the “so-called 
scientific historiography of the French Revolution,” whose operating principle was to oppose the 
author’s heroes against their enemies.285 
Questions of personal political engagement and historical interpretation in the wake of 
World War II were by no means restricted to the study of the French Revolution, either. Henri 
Michel, former member of the maquis and historian of the French Resistance, presided over the 
closing ceremony of the March 1961 International Historical Conference in Milan, “The Allies 
and the Resistance in Europe.” Michel argued the conference had shown that the extent to which 
resistance was carried out was directly related to the belief that fighting against the Nazis 
constituted a just war. And yet he found the discussion of just causes to be a potential pitfall 
when researching the resistance since it presupposed a moral value in the history that might not 
necessarily coincide with the motivations of the historical subjects. Was the just French struggle 
against the Nazis comparable to the Nazi-backed anticolonial rebellion of Rashid Ali al-Gaylani, 
for example? He concluded that in the end the conference participants were divided about the 
proper role of historical inquiry. On the one hand, participants thought history “is a living force 
integrated into the present, and which shapes the future.” Other participants, however, viewed 
history as “a conjectural science, which might only lead to modest results. The historian’s prime 
directive is to prevent the preoccupations of the present from entering into the past.” Though the 
two antithetical sides attempted to engage one another at the conference, no successful resolution 
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to the dilemma was agreed upon.286 Those historians and historical theorists who believed some 
form of objectivity was ensured by either recul or impartiality toward the subject at hand had to 
at least concede that the present inescapably interacted with the study of the past.287 Even though 
the success of political histories like Marc Bloch’s Strange Defeat would suggest certain current 
events could be covered successfully by the right historian, Bloch’s exhortation, “Robespierrists, 
anti-Robespierrists, we beg of you, for Pete’s sake, simply tell us who Robespierre was,” 
indicated the messiness of historical politics.288 
Despite attempts to distance the historical past from the present, the French Revolution’s 
presence was unshakeable during the French Algerian War. As vexing as the potential for 
corrupting the history of the Revolution by connecting it to present concerns may have been for 
the university establishment—even if these worries only appeared when the Revolution’s image 
as the forebear of socialist progress was questioned and not when used to rally the republic 
against fascism—others on the left were not as shy about casting the past into the present and 
future (and vice versa). As Georges Duveau noted, “Many men seem[ed] less pressed to cut the 
Gordian Knot than to revel in the internal tensions created by the responsibilities they 
assume.”289  
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The tensions within this possible catachresis—application of one set of criteria to an 
unrelated context—are certainly multiple. But most importantly, even if those tensions are set 
aside, an underlying question still remains. Even if the French Revolution were a living heritage 
for the French nation, what about its status for Algeria? Legally and symbolically Algeria was a 
part of the Republic: three metropolitan departments that happened to be across the 
Mediterranean. But in practice and prejudice Algeria was treated differently. It was politically 
and economically underdeveloped; the majority of its inhabitants, designated variously as 
indigenous or Muslim, were seen as non-modern. In order for intellectuals to claim the 

















Rewriting Algerian History 
History unfolds before our eyes… but we don’t 
understand it. We don’t know what it was all 
about, about the countries, towns, battles, 
resolutions, about the future so warmly 
discussed. 
Boualem Sansal. Petit éloge de la mémoire 
(2007).290  
 
 The French Revolution was used in myriad ways to argue about the present and future of 
metropolitan France and Algeria during the Algerian War. That intellectuals in the metropole 
referred to the birth of the French nation self-reflexively is perhaps not any stranger than other 
manifestations of national identity. Yet the act of bringing Algeria into these discussions as 
something more than the passive object of what the metropole was doing in relation to the 
heritage of the Revolution is of another order. The political language of modern France is in 
many ways the product of the Revolution, and only those areas deemed politically modern could 
be brought into the conversation. In order for Algeria to be connected to the French Revolution 
Algeria’s history had to be rethought and rewritten. 
Social scientists and historians began to use the French Revolution to talk about the social 
and political future of Algeria in the decades leading up to the Algerian War. While in the 
nineteenth century it was common for professionals to opine that North Africa was premodern, 
by the beginning of the Algerian War in 1954 it was possible to describe Algerian nationalist 
rebellion as analogous to the historical moment of 1789. This conceptual turn began in the early 
twentieth century with the writings of Charles André Julien. Julien’s work not only claimed 
North Africa had a history that was knowable; it also went hand in hand with an anti-imperial 
political program. Following in Julien’s footsteps, Jacques Berque’s historical sociology in the 
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1950s and 60s was committed to highlighting the long- and short-term changes in North African 
society. Berque, more deeply than any other professional social scientist during the Algerian 
War, interrogated the relationship between the Revolutionary heritage of the French imperial 
mission and the processes of rebellion against such a mission. Berque’s view of Arab history in 
general obeyed a metahistorical typology of world historical progress where North African 
modernization recapitulated the stages of the West’s development. In demographer Alfred 
Sauvy’s theories of development the French Revolution lurked in the background of 
demographic arguments about historical change. Sauvy’s institutional and public intellectual 
commitments put the language of demographic pressures as political problems in the mouths of 
French-Algeria’s critics. In all three of these thinkers, Algerian nationalism, born from the 
internal contradictions of French imperialism, became the vehicle through which Algeria entered 
an Arab modernity. 
This change in the narrative of Algeria’s past and future happened across a wide array of 
disciplines as well as within the rhetoric of anticolonial activists and Algerian nationalists. While 
it is important to recognize the latter’s agency, during the Algerian War the former shift 
informed the ways anticolonialists wrote and spoke about Algeria. Julien, Berque, and Sauvy 
widely influenced anticolonialists through the ways they constructed Algeria as an object of 
enquiry. While the facts of Algerian unrest, rebellion, and revolution were largely separate from 
the writings of these individuals, the new conceptual framework these thinkers provided gave 
consequential meanings to those facts. After all, resistance to French authority in Algeria existed 
from the beginning of France’s presence there. But there was no such thing as an Algerian 
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“nation,” either within or in contrast to the French imperial nation-state.291 It was only after 
World War II that anyone would refer to violent insurrection in Algeria as a revolution, either 
attempted or possibly successful. By the end of the Algerian War these thinkers had instigated a 
complete turn from orientalist views of Algeria as ahistorical and set the terms for 
conceptualizing a newly-independent nation in ways that were translatable to moments in 
modern French history the likes of which were discussed in Chapter 1.  
While the term anticolonialist fits Julien, Berque, and Sauvy to varying degrees, it would 
be wrong to assume their anticolonialism automatically led to the decolonization Algeria 
experienced. Even through the Algerian War, Julien did not think a complete break between 
France and Algeria was in the interests of either nation. And while Berque and Sauvy took a 
more extreme position in favor of separation, they only came to this position midway through the 
conflict. All three thought that twentieth-century nationalist movements in North Africa were at 
least partially due to the influence and importance of France’s own Revolutionary history. If 
French colonialism was the foundational cause of political trouble in Algeria, then the very same 
ideals that spurred French empire-building also provided a way out.292 In a certain sense, under 
French tutelage (to use Berque’s term) Algeria learned how to conduct a revolution. Julien saw 
the nationalism of North Africa as dependent upon a sense of North Africans’ “pride of the past 
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and their confidence in the future.”293  Julien’s transmission of this past similarly reoriented 
French consciousness about Algerian colonialism and the future beyond French Algeria, 
whatever that future would be. Berque explicitly made the development of North Africa an 
analog to western European historical development, but he was self-conscious of the perils of 
navigating the contingencies of the past, present, and future through such metahistorical 
narratives, trying to find a via media between what he called “the destiny of the gods” and “the 
freedom of men.”294 While intended to be colonial policy critique, Sauvy’s insistence on the 
importance of demographic changes in Algeria and the need to accommodate them led to two 
different and largely unintended directions: revolutionary third worldism and a concept of 
decolonization as a naturalized and historically necessary process.     
 
From Frozen to Fluid, Stillborn to Mature 
Throughout the nineteenth century, promoters of France’s empire in North Africa 
justified their expansionist policies in the name of a civilizing mission. In broad outlines, it was 
not only France’s right to conquer other parts of the world but also its duty to educate and elevate 
those areas that had yet to experience the universal splendor of French civilization. This 
remained true not only under the centralized authority of Emperor Louis Napoleon, but also 
under the auspices of the Third Republic. Despite differences in regimes, France was 
consistently an imperial nation state.295 Two views of history loomed in the background of this 
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imperial ideology: the belief that the French nation was at the vanguard of modern, universal 
history; and the belief that these conquered areas were either a-historical or non-modern. The 
light of modern world progress followed the French army into the dark, benighted African and 
Asian continents. As the height of French nationalism relied on what Benedict Anderson 
described as unified time common to the whole nation, the depletion of Algeria’s time acted as 
France’s counterpoint.296  
French imperialism was universal by way of exclusion, and so was the brand of history 
that accompanied it. In 1883 the great voice of spiritual nationalism Ernest Renan addressed an 
audience in the Sorbonne on the topic of Islam and Science. While just a year earlier he had 
presented his audacious and prescient thesis that ideas of national identity were historical fictions 
based largely on an ability to forget inconvenient facts, in this presentation he argued about the 
essence of Islam and its political incarnations. Moving between the terms Muslim, Islamic, and 
Arabic without distinction, Renan claimed that Islam was fundamentally opposed to scientific 
and philosophical thought. By extension, since philosophy and science were the keys to 
historical progress, Muslim societies were destined to remain in a pre-modern, backwards state. 
The great Arabic thinkers such as Averroës and Avicenna were only great insofar as they 
preserved the thought of the Greek and Latin civilizations that preceded them. Even later 
thinkers like historian Ibn Khaldun were important despite their religious and ethnic identities, 
not because of them. In Renan’s estimation, “Arabic, which conveys poetry and a certain 
eloquence so well, is an instrument poorly-suited to metaphysics. Arab philosophers and 
academics are in general very bad writers… Islam, in reality has always persecuted science and 
philosophy.” Progress was co-terminus with science, of which Islam and Arab peoples and their 
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language were incapable. France, on the other hand, had a spiritual project capable of embodying 
science and progress.297 
 Renan’s formulations on Muslim culture were by no means as provocative as his musings 
on nationalism (or Christianity). Most of France’s late-nineteenth-century specialists on North 
Africa, particularly those employed by the government-supported Arab Bureaus and other 
military and civilian colonial administrators agreed. The mountainous and desert regions of 
Algeria were many things—terrifyingly sublime, desolate, havens for brigands and nomadic 
raiders—but they were not modern. The most relevant North African history for the French was 
that of the Roman Empire’s presence there.298  Even the “Kabyle Myth,” which posited that the 
Berbers in Algeria’s mountains were Aryan descendants of Greeks and Romans (as opposed to 
Semitic Arabs), utilized a still-born historical framework. Though Berbers were supposedly more 
like their French conquerors than Algerian Arabs, they were still artifacts of a very distant 
past. 299  These elements in the Algerian colonial imaginary were still alive and well in the 
domains of geography, ethnography, sociology, and history of North Africa through the Algerian 
War, epitomized in the writings of the orientalists like Émile-Félix Gautier, Professor at the 
University of Algiers.300   
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If Algeria had a future, it was dependent upon France’s prospects for it. Numerous 
projects of agricultural reform and economic development would move Algeria in the right 
direction, and European settlers from the greater Mediterranean could hope to fulfill promises of 
work and independence that escaped them in other parts of the French Empire.301  Though 
promises of progress through assimilation and modernization were at least possible in theory, in 
practice they were far from realizable. So even if plans for agricultural modernization put 
Algerian geography on track to escape its supposed historical lapse, the “indigenous” peoples of 
Algeria and their history remained outside the scope of progress. 
  After World War II this prejudice began to lose its hegemonic hold. By the end of the 
French Algerian War, even an ethnologist like Germaine Tillion, interested in the mountain 
communities of Algeria precisely because of their supposed remove from Western civilization, 
would conclude that Algeria was “lurching towards the future.”302 
Invoking the French Revolution became one way in which this shift toward modernity 
was embodied. In 1947 philosopher Paul Ricœur, for instance, not only maintained colonial 
racism was wrong, but that rebellions in Sétif and Guélma had “the same passion that is at the 
origin of our 1789 and Valmy, of 1848 and 1940.” However “premature” one might judge 
colonial independence, it would always trump “paternalism.” At least since the end of World 
War I, critics of French imperialism had used French Revolutionary rhetoric alongside imperial 
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realities as a way of holding a mirror to French rule.303  However, statements like Ricœur’s 
beginning in the late 1930s were of a different sort. Instead of highlighting French inconsistency 
with a national past, these new statements claimed Algeria was in fact recommencing this French 
revolutionary past. The formation of an Algerian nationalist consciousness was akin to the birth 
of the modern French nation.  
Coding Algerian nationalist consciousness in French nationalist language happened 
amongst Algerian nationalists before metropolitan commentators joined the conversation. One 
possibility is that this was done as a strategy to reform the French presence in Algeria or as a 
rallying cry to divorce France from Algeria completely in the name of a separate Algerian nation 
or a greater Arab nation. The utopianism of the language often contradicted the strategic 
alignments of the various Algerian nationalist groups and the Communist Party with specific 
political possibilities and negotiating points. Contrasting the Algerian status quo as a 
deformation of the French Republic’s universalist promises was also a rhetorically strong 
practice. Another possibility is that the ownership of French Revolutionary ideals is part of the 
process of what Homi K. Bhabha has called “cultural hybridity,” a process through which a 
marginalized group reinterprets and restages the past.304 Jean El-Mouhoub Amrouche’s writings 
certainly reinforce this possibility.305 Many Algerian nationalist leaders were, after all, educated 
in France. Others were the product of the university system in Algeria, modeled on the 
metropolitan system. These intellectuals and activists usually qualified as evolved (évolués) or 
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assimilated (assimilés) in the eyes of their metropolitan peers. They had successfully 
incorporated the history and culture of the French nation and adopted its mores as their own.306 
Likewise, nationalist and Pan-Arab luminaries like Émir Khaled and Chekib Arslan spent a great 
deal of time in Europe, often as intellectuals in exile. (And these are points of which Charles-
André Julien and Jacques Berque were well aware.) While this development cannot be reduced 
to intellectual history alone—since the concerted efforts of colonial reformers and Algerian 
nationalists alike likely had as much, if not more, direct influence on attitudes towards possible 
Algerian futures—the major shifts in the ways French scholars conceptualized Algerian history 
from the 1930s to the 1960s are a necessary part of this story. 
 
Recognizing North African History 
 It would be hard to overestimate the influence Charles-André Julien’s work had on the 
study of North African history. While the search for origins is often a gamble, Julien posed 
serious challenges to the nineteenth-century historical tradition that robbed North Africa of 
agency decades before any other non-Muslim historian of the French Empire. Julien was born in 
Caen in 1891, but at age 15 his family moved to Oran where his father was to teach history in the 
lycée. There, Julien attended high school with Algerians of European descent and, according to 
his recollection, exactly one Muslim Algerian. His father was a dreyfusard and close friend of 
Jean Jaurès. In many ways, the way Julien fils looked up to Jaurès reverberated through his views 
on colonialism through the Algerian War. Like Jaurès, Julien thought colonialism was destined 
to end along the path toward human emancipation. But for the French colonies, the path toward 
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human emancipation ran through the enlightened ideals of French civilization, it did not 
renounce them.307  
Following his father’s sensibilities, in 1909 Julien joined the SFIO and the Algiers 
section of the Ligue des droits de l’homme (he would become the president of the section in 
1917). At the SFIO’s Tours Congress in 1920 he was named a permanent delegate for all of 
North Africa and was present at the Third Communist International Congress in 1921.308 At the 
International he advocated for a concerted effort to compile as much information as possible on 
the colonial world. Such information had dual purpose. Julien argued the propaganda value of 
compiling a list of imperialism’s crimes should not be underestimated. And in order to support 
nationalist movements in the colonial world (and eventually direct them toward international 
struggles) it was necessary to understand each colonial situation. Despite Lenin’s own claims for 
the importance of anti-imperial solidarity, French and Russian representatives voted down his 
motions at the Congress. Back in Algeria, Julien headed a Committee for Colonial Studies that 
focused on relaying information to the metropolitan press about colonial scandals, administrative 
repression, and cover-ups. Though there was some support for anticolonialism within the French 
Communist Party, its leaders were reluctant to embrace a meaningful anticolonial position and 
Julien distanced himself from the Communist movement in 1926. 309  However, Julien’s 
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intellectual pursuits from the 1920s onward followed in the belief that accurate knowledge of 
imperialism was one of the best means of combatting it.  
In the midst of his schooling, the death of his father compelled Julien to turn down a 
scholarship at Lycée Louis-le-Grand in Paris and work for the colonial administration to support 
himself, in the prefecture of Oran. While working as a colonial functionary he experienced first-
hand the colonial lobby and its maneuverings, both legal and extralegal.310 By 1921 he was 
elected Counselor General of Oran. As Counselor General he acted as a whistle-blower against 
workplace violations and racism. Alongside these political activities he also taught at the lycée in 
Algiers and studied history and geography at the University of Algiers where he was agregé in 
1920. While the Roman historian Jérôme Carcopino urged Julien to study the Roman history of 
North Africa, he instead chose the contemporary history of North Africa, earning him the 
nickname Julian “the Apostate.”311 Alongside his political activities Julien also taught in the 
lycée Janson de Sailly from 1926 to 1932 and then at the lycée Montaigne from 1932 to 1940. 
During his years teaching, Julien began publishing occasional articles on the history of 
Algeria and the Muslim world more broadly beginning with a brief note on the forms of 
sovereignty in the Muslim world.312 In the midst of the triumphalist celebrations of the one-
hundred-year anniversary of the French invasion of Algiers, he took aim at the French military’s 
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greatest colonial hero, Maréchal Bugeaud. Claiming there was a “singular amnesia” surrounding 
the military commander’s legacy, Julien argued that almost no one should in fact herald Bugeaud 
a hero. One might not be outraged over his costly pursuit of the rebel leader Abd el-Kader, but 
the brutal tactics Bugeaud honed in Algeria were subsequently put to use massacring Parisians in 
1848. This national hero was nothing more than a “sanguinary brute.” Julien claimed the rest of 
the commemorations were little more than a boondoggle, and the Historical Atlas of North 
Africa published for the occasion was “from a scientific point of view, a pile of junk,” the “most 
monstrous assemblage of errors, omissions, confusions that had ever been devoted to Algeria.”313  
The critiques of the 1930 anniversary displayed the seriousness with which Julien took 
the history of North Africa, but in no way did they accurately foreshadow the scope of his first 
historical project, The History of North Africa: Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, published in 1931. In 
over 800 pages Julien covered the history of the Maghreb from its pre-Roman origins to 1930, 
drawing on memoirs, archeological records, anthropology, literature, theology, and histories. 
And unlike previous histories that prejudiced either points of northern Mediterranean contact or 
brusque changes in military dominance as the only true historical moments, Julien’s study gave 
equal weight to periods of stability, internal reform, and development of non-European culture as 
the main points of rupture. Moreover, rather than portray the beginning of North African 
civilization as the moment of Roman conquest (as the Kabyle myth maintained), with subsequent 
cycles of non-European dark ages and European salvation, Julien presented the Maghreb as a 
unified social and historical totality. The Berber peoples, Julien claimed, were the original 
inhabitants and their culture was the canvas upon which subsequent conquests and migrations 
added their marks. Just as elements of ancient Berber culture remained through the Carthaginian 
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and Roman Empires, the Arab conquest neither halted North African political development nor 
completely erased what had come before.314 
The source base of the book was impressive in its scope, but it also set up an interesting 
dynamic. By relying on sources from the nineteenth and early twentieth century Julien pulled 
information from authors sympathetic and sometimes (in the case of Arab bureau writers and 
soldiers) complicit with French colonialism. He wrote gratefully of the work his predecessors 
had done, almost presenting himself as a mere bibliographer. In his Foreword Julien quoted 
Cicero’s adage, ne quid falsi audeat ne quid veri non audeat historia: Admit nothing false to the 
historical record and omit nothing true. 315  And in summarizing the contemporary literature 
available, Julien had to manœuver through some difficult territory. When discussing prehistoric 
North Africa, for example, Julien surveyed the then current theories of a Berber anatomical type 
as well as the findings of craniometrists and physical anthropologists that were so characteristic 
of the racism in early-twentieth-century anthropology.316 But Julien countered theorists such as 
Broca with works by Joseph Deniker and A. C. Haddon, noteworthy for their dismissive 
treatment of anything that could be called a unified racial type. After summarizing the various 
proposed components of Berber physiology, Julien sidestepped any of the racial implications for 
considering contemporary North Africans. He concluded that at the present time it would be 
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“presumptuous to do anything but register the measurements gathered.” If there were any sort of 
unity to the people of the Maghreb, it was a “social unity” or “a certain historical unity.”317 Race 
was something to be noted, but not something from which any meaningful conclusions could be 
drawn. 
Julien’s treatment of the pro-colonial political biases in his sources also demonstrates his 
important, if opaque, textual criticisms. Émile-Félix Gautier, Julien’s former teacher at the 
University of Algiers, is one of the most cited authors in the text, yet not without accompanying 
dismissals of Gautier’s pro-colonial biases. For example, to Gauthier’s claim that “Left to itself, 
the Maghreb could never afford” its own language, literature, state structure, or the luxuries 
associated with developed capital, Julien countered, 
Perhaps. But must we conclude from the failure of certain attempts the very necessity of 
their failure? And, in this case, in a logically determined fashion would we not have to 
condemn every foreign occupation to culminate in a catastrophe in the manner of all of 
its predecessors?... It seems that one would like to justify through science a situation from 
which one benefits. We must defy an historical metaphysics that seems to be all too 
easily reconciled with political realism.318 
 
Where Gauthier maintained the Arab conquest marked a deep historical chasm from whence any 
knowledge of North African history was irrevocably lost—“Compared to such a leap into the 
unknown, our French and Russian Revolutions appear petty,” Gautier claimed—Julien simply 
turned to the medieval Islamic historians themselves.319 By virtue of their Arab identity, these 
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historians did not count for Gautier, who the same year argued that “Oriental” history was unable 
to grasp universal history in Western terms since it was structured on a particularist, “tribal” 
level.320     
Also noteworthy was the accessible language Julien employed throughout the study. 
While Julien sought precision in his discussions of archeology and history, his main goal was to 
provide a book accessible to the non-specialist reader. In the first edition’s preface, Stéphane 
Gsell remarked that the book was eminently readable, partially on account of the syntax 
employed: “His style, which does not shy away from familiar expressions, foreign terms, or 
neologisms, will perhaps in some instances disturb purists.”321 Gsell was perhaps referring to the 
ease with which Julien characterized medieval and early modern Arab developments in modern 
European terms. For instance, he characterized the decentralization of power in late-sixteenth 
and seventeenth-century Tunisia as “a military revolution with a democratic spirit,” portraying in 
modern western terms a place and time usually deemed synonymous with despotic 
backwardness.322 Passages such as this one also broke the standards of orientalist history and 
philology that often left passages in Arabic to highlight their uniqueness and untranslatability as 
well as the author’s mastery of the foreign unknown.323 Julien did not shy away from presenting 
Arabic terms for accuracy, but he presented them briefly in order to translate them and then used 
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the translated equivalent afterwards.324 This practice was likely a product of Julien’s limited 
abilities in Arabic, but this limitation made the finished history more directly accessible to 
francophone audiences.  
 If Julien’s written style was reason to disturb specialists, his treatment of France’s North 
African Empire was reason to disturb many lay readers and specialists alike. Julien devoted the 
last fifth of the book to the French empire in North Africa, specifying the pretexts of French 
expansion and the relations between conquered and conqueror. Though the final chapter covered 
French expansion into Morocco and Tunisia, these two colonies were presented as afterthoughts 
to the three chapters covering Algeria. After outlining the flimsy pretext upon which Charles X 
decided to invade Algiers, Julien echoed his earlier criticism of Bugeaud’s cult by countering the 
nationalist myths that the first expeditions were driven by quests for prestige, that French 
commanders had outfoxed the rebel leader Abd el-Kader and that the civilian colons had 
corrected the violence of military rule. The main reason for the invasion, explained Julien, was to 
buttress support for Charles X’s failing rule. Abd el-Kader had been at least as successful a 
tactician as his French counterparts, if not better—the main reason for his defeat was tribal 
infighting. The most violent of the colonial soldiers were not the professionals, but rather “their 
colleagues from France and above all the militiamen, who, under the guise of their democratic 
and revolutionary professions of faith, manifested their pathological terror through useless acts 
of ferocity.” And those same colons who criticized military terror “in the name of democratic 
principles showed themselves to be even more ruthless than the generals in their repression.”325  
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Two equally shocking sets of doubles emerged from Julien’s telling: between the zeal of 
the French military and Algerian rebels, and the military and civilian rulers of Algeria. After 
noting the religious dimensions of anti-French rebellions, Julien claimed the French generals, 
too, “made war with a quasi-religious faith in the grandeur of their mission.” War and colonial 
administration were parallel “dramas,” the latter “just as tragic” as the former, and with brutal 
consequences. “The problem of government has for a long time been confused with the problem 
of domination,” Julien claimed. The result of such confusion is a “regime of administrative 
repression.”326  
Aside from putting the lie to the nobility of French expansion in North Africa, Julien also 
explained the very real political relevance for contemporary readers. French presence, just like 
the presence of previous conquerors, would have an impact on the indigenous inhabitants. The 
French conquest and colonial administration added to Arab “sentiments of dignity and 
independence, the sense of interests and rights,” grown from stays in the metropole, syndicalist 
movements, and revolutionary parties. These Arabs would therefore be “less inert and less 
malleable than they had been in the past.” Given the space Julien had just given to the numerous 
rebellions and resistance to the French presence, it is hard to believe the “malleability” he 
invoked was not at least partially done so tongue-in-cheek. Nevertheless, the result of these 
changes would in time lead to “problems difficult to resolve.” If these could be resolved, then 
perhaps only through processes of drastic reform in the manner of the concessions made to the 
Tunisian nationalist Destour Party.327 
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 Despite the overall indictment of a self-congratulating French empire appearing so close 
to the centenary of the Algiers invasion, when it was recognized, Julien’s history was generally 
well received. His dual titles as agregé in history and former colonial functionary no doubt 
contributed to his bona fides among reviewers. The reviewer at L’Echo d’Alger claimed the book 
was “a true book of art” and was impressed by Julien’s credentials as someone who had “lived 
sixteen consecutive years in Algeria,” participating in administrative as well as academic life.328 
Though Louis Halphen thought Julien’s own opinions on the errors of French imperialism may 
“go a little far in this direction” he was nonetheless impressed by Julien’s “original manner of 
posing problems” and the overall scope of the work.329 Far left commentaries thought Julien’s 
book served the propaganda purposes he had urged in the Third International ten years earlier.330 
André Reussner’s harsh words in La Quinzaine Critique were by and large the minority opinion 
amongst reviewers, and they are perhaps not surprising given his post as Professor at the Naval 
Academy and one of the historians involved with the 1931 Paris International Colonial 
Exposition.331 However, among most specialists in North African history, there was a lack of any 
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serious engagement with the work. Joannès Tramond, Reussner’s colleague and co-contributor to 
the Paris Exposition, dismissed the sections on French colonization. Julien was French and 
Algerian, but “like all functionaries was only part-time Algerian and unable to grasp the 
grandeur of the [imperial] work accomplished.”332 Given the fact Julien had spent the majority of 
his life in Algeria, one could quibble with Tramond’s “only part-time” accusation, but the fact he 
felt the need to dismiss Julien’s work ad hominem is itself evidence of Tramond’s wounded 
pride. 
 Among historians in the francophone world, those associated with the early Annales 
movement were methodologically most likely to show interest in Julien’s work. Annales 
d’histoire économique et sociale collaborators greeted Julien’s work with enthusiasm for its 
ability to combine geographical, archeological, anthropological and other fields to mark the long-
term changes and continuities in North African civilization. The economic historian Henri Sée 
gave a glowing review of the History and classical archaeologist Charles Saumagne cited it 
approvingly in an essay on medieval North African agricultural laborers. Henri Hauser agreed 
with Sée and Saumagne in approving the work, but was worried that Julien’s at-times polemical 
tone did him a disservice, however justified his opinions of French imperialism were. He should 
have aspired to a “sub specie aeternitatis tone” that would not be prone to the limits of his own 
historical moment. 333  Fernand Braudel, however, seemed unphased by the most politically 
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poignant aspects of the work. Julien personally knew Braudel, who at the time was still teaching 
at the lycée in Algiers and introduced him to the newly reformed Revue Historique where Julien 
would serve on the editorial board beginning in 1932. Both of them had also contributed to the 
Revue Africaine (Julien since 1919, Braudel since 1928).  
Braudel’s review was in-depth and covered all areas of the book, pointing to places 
where Julien might have expanded his research, but overall Braudel expressed his admiration. 
Where Braudel was most critical was Julien’s treatment of French Imperialism, but he did not 
see Julien’s criticisms as particularly convincing. “A great country such as ours,” Braudel 
claimed, “extends itself morally and financially in every dimension.” Much of France’s presence 
in North Africa was a matter of chance, but nonetheless “We have accomplished grand things 
over there. We think we should regard the past without remorse.”334 The first three decades of 
Annales’ existence were marked by a profound ethnocentrism that often went hand in hand with 
an apoliticism and tacit procolonialism. In this regard Braudel’s review is perhaps more 
emblematic than the others, though as the longest of these reviews, it did not appear in Annales, 
but in Revue Africaine.335 Though Julien’s claims about the illegitimacy of French imperialism 
and the possibility of Algerian nationalist and revolutionary movements tracked well with the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Les circoncellions d’Afrique,” Annales d’histoire économique et sociale 6, no 28 (July 1934), 
351-364; Henri Hauser, “Review of Histoire de l’Afrique du nord,” Revue Historique 169 
(1932), 665-669. Henri Sée specialized in medieval European economic history. Charles 
Saumagne was an archeologist and specialist in the Carthaginian Empire credited with 
discovering the presence of Roman centuration land subdivisions in Tunis. Henri Hauser was the 
first chair of economic history at the Sorbonne, from 1927 until 1936, when March Bloch 
succeeded him. 
334 Fernand Braudel, “A propos de l’ « Histoire de l’Afrique du Nord » de Ch. André 
Julien,” Revue Africaine 74 (1933), 37-53, 52, 53. It is worth noting, too, that Sée and Hauser 
died within years of their reviews and were of a different generation than the then-young 
Braudel. 
335 Carole Reynaud Paligot, “Les Annales de Lucien Febvre à Fernand Braudel: Entre 
épopée coloniale et opposition Orient/Occident,” French Historical Studies 32, no. 1 (Winter 
2009), 121-144.  
 148 
actual establishment of Algerian nationalist parties, he was decades out of joint with his fellow 
historians. The pro-imperialist studies of Émile-Félix Gautier, of which Julien had been so 
critical in his History, for instance, were just as likely to be cited through the 1950s as Julien’s 
History.  
 Julien’s status as an historical black sheep was confirmed in 1935 when the Collège de 
France sought a replacement for Alfred Martineau as the Chair of Colonial History. The Chair of 
Muslim Sociology and Sociography, Louis Massignon, attempted to place Julien in the colonial 
history chair. At a meeting of the Collège, Massignon rhetorically asked those present, “Why has 
Julien been criticized? It is because he has integrated the faults you have committed, into the 
general history of French colonization… we have no right to exclude the grey areas while only 
admiring the clear ones.” Massignon was unable to persuade the Collège of the merits of Julien’s 
candidacy.336 
 If Julien’s positions on the history of French colonialism enjoyed a somewhat muted 
initial reception, he was soon given an institutional chance to make a larger difference in French 
colonial politics than he had as Counselor General of Oran. In 1935 the High Committee on the 
Mediterranean and North Africa was created to manage North African and Middle Eastern 
colonial and mandate affairs. Julien was selected as the Committee’s secretary, serving from 
1937-1939 during the Popular Front administration. Though many in the Committee were 
dedicated to extending full rights to North African Muslims with hopes of successful 
assimilation, the Popular Front as a whole was never willing to throw all of its support for 
reforming the colonies. Only a handful of politicians and activists in France would have agreed 
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with Julien’s conviction that “The only moral justification of colonization is the sincere 
preparation of the native peoples for independence.” 337  The reform plan created by the 
Committee, known under the name Blum-Viollette, would have allowed between 20,000 and 
25,000 Algerian Muslims full rights as French citizens while also allowing them to maintain 
their civil privileges provided by previous statutes.338 In Julien’s eyes, what would start as reform 
would eventually lead to self-determination in some form or another. Whether at this point Julien 
thought this would mean a federated system of autonomous francophone territories or separate 
new nation states is not entirely clear; this vision of colonial reform was still nonetheless more 
radical than the more frequent and popular calls for Muslim assimilation.339 Pro-colonial groups 
also suspected the radical potential of the plan, and for this very reason they effectively sank the 
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Populaire et Politique Coloniale,” 101. See also Gary Wilder, Freedom Time: Negritude, 
Decolonization, and the Future of the World (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 2015); 
Frederick Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French 
Africa, 1945-1960 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014). 
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legislation before it was officially presented.340 What few reforms the Popular Front did manage 
for the colonies were reversed under the Daladier administration and subsequent Vichy rule. His 
last political statement over the next five years was an anonymously published tract on Italian 
claims to Tunisian territory. Julien examined Italian claims based on violations of previous 
treaties, but concluded that Mussolini’s desire for Tunisian territory had nothing to do with the 
rights of ethnic Italians in North Africa. Instead, it was simply a politics of force.341 Julien’s 
political sympathies and work on the Committee did him no favors after the installation of the 
Vichy regime and in December of 1940 the government removed him from his post at the Lycée 
Montaigne. His relationship with his former advisor, Jérôme Carcopino, the second Secretary of 
Education under Vichy, however, facilitated his placement at the Lycée Condorcet the following 
year.342   
 Like many other opponents of the Vichy regime, Julien’s research and political output 
dropped off during the war. However, after the liberation and with the socialist parties back in 
power, there was a renewed interest in both his historical arguments and his political expertise. 
The war was in many ways a crucial turning point in both the growth of nationalist anticolonial 
movements and the desire for historical expertise that could make sense of these developments. 
For these reasons, Julien’s earlier work was more fully embraced in the postwar as the standard, 
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rather than the outlier of North African history. His public and institutional presences reinforced 
his position as the premier specialist on North Africa. Most importantly, in North Africa on the 
Move, he quickly drew connections between the recent history of North Africa—from roughly 
where his History of North Africa left off to World War II—and its contemporary political 
situation, making a case for the existence of separate nationalist movements in Tunisia, Algeria, 
and Morocco. His basic argument formed the basis for claims about Algerian political maturity 
among Algerian nationalist supporters.   
 
From Pariah to Prophet: The coming of the Algerian Revolution 
Julien’s institutional involvement in the postwar helped shift momentum in favor of his 
historiographical and intellectual interventions. After the war, Julien gained a position on the 
Council of the French Union, which meant full and unrestricted access to government records. 
Using these archives, he wrote his doctoral thesis, The Beginnings of French Colonial Expansion 
(15th-16th Centuries), which he defended in 1946. The work, which had a generally favorable 
reception, also earned him the chair of the History of Colonization at the Sorbonne in 1948. 
There he oversaw the next generation of graduate students interested in North African history, 
many of whom, like Marc Ferro and Charles Robert Ageron, were also heavily involved in 
movements for Algerian independence. When Mohammad V founded the University of Rabat in 
1953, he chose Julien to be the first doyen of the Faculty of Letters, a position Julien held until 
1961. 
In 1946 Julien launched a general series on colonial history. The collection Colonies et 
Empires published by the Presses Universitaires de France provided a general survey of the most 
recent work on the colonial world. In the series’ general preface, Julien explained that “from the 
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moment when France regained its freedom, colonial questions moved to the forefront of 
international concerns.” It was therefore “useful to provide for everyone a sincere and exact 
depiction of French colonies and colonization, free of nationalist or xenophobic biases.”343 The 
series produced over twenty volumes from 1946 to 1958, covering French and British colonial 
expansion from the sixteenth through the twentieth centuries.344 In 1951 and 1952, his History of 
North Africa was revised and republished in two separate volumes. Though the second volume 
ended at 1830, the year of the French invasion of North Africa, his anti-orientalist interpretations 
of earlier periods of North African history were reinforced in this second edition.  
 His position on the Council of the French Union in some ways mirrored his earlier 
position in the Blum administration, but very quickly he realized that the moment of the Blum 
Viollette Plan “was perhaps a missed opportunity.”345 Though in the wake of World War II 
administrators were eager to implement the suggested reforms of the 1930s, to more honestly 
and fully politically integrate North Africa into the French Union, those reforms were no longer 
sufficient to present a real option to Moroccan, Tunisian, and Algerian nationalists. By 1951, 
Julien candidly speculated in an article in Foreign Affairs that political reforms granting greater 
                                                 
343  Julien, “Avant Propos,” Les Techniciens de la Colonisation (XIXe-XXe siècles), 
Colonies et Empires: Première Série: Études Coloniales 1 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1947), vii.  
344 The series had four sub-series: 1. Études Coloniales ; 2. Classiques de la colonisation; 
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345 Charles-André Julien, “La politique française en Tunisie,” Le Monde (19 April 1950). 
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autonomy in Tunisia would inevitably lead to greater autonomy in Algeria and Morocco as 
well.346 
With the establishment of the new daily newspaper Le Monde, Julien periodically wrote 
opinion pieces on North African politics. Whereas Julien’s newspaper pieces in the 20s and 30s 
appeared in far left periodicals such as Humanité and Le populaire he now had a much wider 
audience for his critical and at times radical commentaries on North Africa. He was, for instance, 
not afraid to compare the politics of the French Union to totalitarian characterizations of the 
Soviet Union. He argued France’s strong-arming of the Moroccan government made Morocco’s 
status as a protectorate seem like a weak cover for nothing more than a puppet regime. And 
Julien went as far as to publicly accuse the government of plotting to overthrow the Sultan.347   
  The commitment to criticizing the practices of the French Union’s politics mirrored 
Julien’s 1952 study of North African politics from World War I to World War II, North Africa 
on the Move. In the first edition of History of North Africa, Julien portrayed the dysfunction of 
the Algerian colons’ government and the inadequacies of the Moroccan and Tunisian 
protectorates. He had also portrayed rebellions as more complex than simple tribal or religious 
fanaticism. But it was only in the case of the Destour party’s programs in Tunisia that he had 
discussed an indigenous political challenge to the French state. Even then, his commentary was 
largely speculative. However, twenty years later Julien was willing and able to survey political 
developments among North African nationalists. His survey showed both the real influence of 
pan-Arab nationalist thought from the end of the nineteenth century to the postwar as well as the 
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viability of regional North African political groups to provide political programs motivating local 
autonomy from France. This local autonomy did not automatically mean a complete divorce 
from France, but the establishment of federated states that could more directly address local 
concerns in democratic processes not controlled by private interests. And on this score Julien 
was equally critical of nationalist movements calling for such a definitive break from France as 
he was of those colons trying to perpetuate old colonial relationships under new guises.   
 From the outset, Julien put to rest suspicions that political unrest in North Africa 
consisted merely of periodic instances of age-old “Muslim fanaticism.” For one, Julien held fast 
to his belief that a Berber constant provided the sociological basis for all North African society. 
Berber resistance to the systematic terror of early Arab rulers was akin to resistance to French 
colonialism. What was new about contemporary agitation were the negotiations of local and 
extra-local identity that comprised North Africa’s nascent nationalism. “Nationalism, pan-
Maghrebism, and pan-Arabism,” according to Julien, “were superimposed on each other without 
contradiction, each differently articulated according to the moment and location.” But this 
accretion was representative of the same problem that every nationalism tasks to resolve through 
local conditions.348  
 North African nationalism was even more recognizable since it was partially modeled on 
the French nationalism of the previous century and a half. It first began to coalesce in the late 
nineteenth century around the general Muslim renaissance, the nahda. The fall of the Ottoman 
Empire, the creation of the mid-east Mandates, and the first Arab Congress in Paris (1913) also 
put questions of regional and supra-regional Muslim identity into motion. Arab intellectuals like 
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Chekib Arslan had an international audience and established close ties with local leaders such as 
Messali Hadj in Algeria, Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia, and El-Hadj Abdessalam ben Nouma in 
Morocco. Central to their views of a pan-Arab community were the place of seventh to twelfth-
century Muslim civilization as a golden age to be reclaimed. But in each instance local 
movements prioritized regional histories and often pulled from pre-Islamic history to suit their 
needs. As the next generation of local political leaders gained in influence, they added French 
republican values to the equation.  
Julien stressed the hybridity of French and North African nationalisms by frequently 
referring to the foundational texts of North African nationalist movements—such as those from 
the emir Khaled and Ferhat Abbas, in the case of Algeria. The charter of the “Jeunesse nord-
africaine,” for instance, founded in 1936 by the Tunisian politician Djebari, self-consciously 
mirrored the French Constitution of 1793 and adopted communist Common Front platforms. 
According to Julien, “Paris, even more than Tunis, was the crucible that fused the Maghreb’s 
nationalisms.” Relations between French revolutionary and syndicalist groups and indigenous 
elites in Algeria, in particular, were a catalyst for Algerian nationalist action, creating an Arab 
“who was less inert and less malleable than in the past.” The French settler population, by 
contrast, had lost touch with its republican heritage. In the colonial crucible, those French who 
considered themselves “Democratic, even revolutionary in their own estimation, became 
conservative and traditionalist in the presence of the indigènes.” The takeover of North Africa, 
while leaving the stamp of French republicanism on the colonized, had reverted the colonizers to 
an ancien régime mentality: “From the moment [the French] crossed the water, they believed in 
their divine right. The palaces, the flamboyantly-dressed troops, the crowds gathered along their 
passages—all these facts led them to think of themselves as oriental sovereigns rather than 
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republican functionaries.” 349  As North Africans became more French, the French, in turn, 
reverted to Old Regime despotism. 
Beyond showing the reality of nationalisms in Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria, Julien also 
demonstrated the viability of their political claims by reinforcing his longstanding critiques of 
French policies and adding that these policies were the best propaganda for nationalist 
movements.350 The idea that Morocco and Tunisia could still be conceived as protectorates was a 
farce. There was no longer any regime which would threaten their territory and France had no 
policies in place to support and develop their internal interests. Islam was the glue that held all 
three territories together, but for no good reason France lacked a political program geared toward 
its Muslim subjects. Tunisia and Morocco should be treated not as protectorates, but as 
“associated states,” and the Assembly of the French Union should be given federative powers to 
“decide on questions concerning overseas territories.”351 Algeria similarly needed to shed its 
status as a colony masquerading as three départements and take on a more independent position. 
Rather than realize promised postwar reforms, Algeria had become more autonomous in favor of 
the non-Muslim population. Nationalist political parties and the ulemas, when they were able to 
participate in governance, were sidelined through legal means by conservative and liberal colons. 
By closing off legal channels to reform, French Algerians, Julien predicted, made recourse to a 
violent solution to Algerian problems a foregone conclusion. Electoral reforms were a possible 
solution, but only if Muslim Algerians were given their own unique electoral college separate 
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from the possibility of colon corruption.352 Julien presented the development of nationalism as 
the history of lost opportunities and hoped the near future would not squander whatever paths 
beyond the status quo remained. In the thirties, even Algerian nationalist groups argued 
indigenous emancipation was the only way to build a lasting French Algeria. The Third Republic 
had been the era of empire-building, and Julien worried that the Fourth Republic was quickly 
becoming the era where opportunities for moving beyond empire would be forever lost. 353 
Within two years of the first edition’s publication, the beginning of the FLN’s war with the 
French government confirmed Julien’s worries about Algeria.  
The thesis that the period from the First World War through the end of the Second 
marked the birth of North African nationalism quickly became the standard line of interpretation 
amongst other historians of North Africa. Henri Brunschwig, for instance, one of the pioneers of 
archive-based African history, readily accepted this narrative. His 1949 textbook on European 
colonialism upheld many longstanding pro-colonial assumptions, and it was not until the climax 
of the Algerian War that he placed these biases under heavy scrutiny.354 In his 1960 Myths and 
Realities of French Colonial Imperialism, he lamented the fact that there were hardly any serious 
works on French imperial history after 1885, and this lack only compounded the 
misunderstandings of recently decolonized nations—a curious statement for many reasons, not 
the least Julien’s series on colonial history as well as his own published works. However, 
Brunschwig argued that continental nationalism, part of the driving force behind the French 
empire’s spread, had after World War I the unintended consequence of finding fertile soil in 
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imperial territories. The colonized turned France’s own universal principles against the 
metropole and adopted French nationalist rhetoric for themselves. “Exploited or not,” 
Brunschwig claimed, “colonized peoples have in fact been civilized and westernized… The new 
states that have since 1947 acquired their independence are nations of the western variety.” The 
technical progress that had marked western history from the age of exploration to the industrial 
revolution had made its way to these formerly conquered terrains. What was most striking about 
this westernization, according to Brunschwig, was “the nationalist passion of those people who 
today gain access to independence. Impregnated with western nationalism, which is essentially 
based on History, they will never stop until they construct a past comparable to that of the old 
metropoles.” These élites should, however, take pride in their colonial projects. 355  The 
chauvinism in Brunschwig’s formulations is striking (and even more marked in some of his 
earlier writings). Yet alongside this chauvinism is the clear recapitulation of Julien’s claims: that 
colonialism incorporated the non-West into the West’s own historical development, an influence 
that could be felt in the Algerian War, and the birth of colonial nationalism happened in the 
interwar years.356  
 Anticolonialist intellectuals and their organizations quickly put Julien’s assessment of 
Algerian nationalism to use during the Algerian War. Not only did he provide a detailed account 
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of many of the different Algerian political groups’ internal transformations as well as the 
complete governmental obstinacy in response, Julien also portrayed Algerian nationalism as a 
real phenomenon that transcended stereotypes of oriental despotism, Muslim fanaticism, or Cold 
War puppeteering. Alongside Daniel Guérin’s In the Service of the Colonized, Julien’s book is 
one of the most cited works on the topic in the first four years of the Algerian War. And despite 
their different views on Algeria’s future, Julien’s North Africa on the Move is one of the most 
frequently cited books in In the Service of the Colonized itself.357 Collette and Francis Jeanson’s 
Outlaw Algeria similarly relied on Julien’s History of North Africa and North Africa on the Move 
for their discussions of North African history, even feeling obliged to begin their book with a 
brief discussion of the Berbers as the starting point for all subsequent North African 
civilization.358 Both Guérin and the Jeansons held more radical positions than Julien, being more 
readily supportive of an Algeria divorced from French influence, but they nonetheless saw 
Julien’s work as useful support for their political positions.359 Contributors to the journal Esprit 
followed the same outline as Julien’s analyses of North African national consciousness, even if 
his work was not directly cited. François Sarrazin’s early take on the Algerian crisis argued that 
“for better or for worse, it is difficult not to admit that a diverse mixture of elements in Algeria is 
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well underway, and that, already, we are assisting the birth of a nation.” 360  Jean-Marie 
Domenach and Georges Suffert likewise saw the combination of French and uniquely Arab 
elements in the formation of North African nationalisms. This new amalgam, they hoped, would 
allow these new nations to escape the dangers associated with the French element on its own: 
among them the Great Fear of 1789 and purges in the Midi in 1944.361 When responding to 
Governor General Jacques Soustelle’s indictments of intellectuals supporting Algerian rebels, the 
Committee Against the Pursuit of the War in North Africa appended a quote from Diderot about 
telling the truth in politics and Julien’s passage above quoted from North Africa on the Move that 
characterized the French government as the true oriental despots.362  
 During the war, Julien leveraged his specialist credentials in short essays and editorials 
that reinforced the legitimacy of Algerian nationalists’ complaints and criticized the bad faith 
positions of the French government. Echoing Daniel Guérin’s pamphlet “Algeria has never been 
a part of France,” Julien responded to the official claim that Algeria was part of the Republic. If 
it truly was, it would not need its special administrative status, nor would the majority of its 
population be left out of the political process. Domination of Algeria had to be a thing of the 
past, but a federated system was still possible if the government would acknowledge reality.363 
By even Ernest Renan’s celebrated definition of nationalism, the Algerian nation counted as a 
                                                 
360 François Sarrazin, “L’Algérie, pays sans loi…” Esprit 23, no 9 (August 1955), 1630, 
original emphasis. 
361 Jean-Marie Domenach and Georges Suffert, “Algérie et renaissance française,” Esprit 
24, no 6 (June 1956), 947. 
362  Dated 3 December 1955. “Texte imprimé reprenant les étapes successives de la 
polémique Jacques Soustelle/Comité d’action,” Fonds Dionys Mascolo, MSC 8.15, IMEC. The 
Diderot quote is from his “Réponse de Diderot a l’examen du prosélyte répondant aux lui-
même,” Introduction aux grandes principes, Œuvres Complètes II (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1754), 
94: “Though not all men have the same sentiments, all are obliged to be sincere, and though one 
is not guilty of being wrong, one is guilty of betraying the truth.” Julien, L’afrique du nord en 
marche, 396. 
363 Julien, “Algérie n’est pas la France,” Demain (4 January 1956). 
 161 
legitimate incarnation, and the political processes at work needed to be placed in the same 
context as France in 1789 or Russia in 1917. And as late as 1961, Julien made a case for an 
independent Algeria that could still include French cooperation. 364  His status as an 
unimpeachable historian of North Africa even led one of the state’s prosecutors to cite him in the 
trial of the Jeanson network’s FLN collaborators. Unfortunately for the prosecutor, who tried to 
use Julien’s work to justify the French invasion of Algiers, Julien denounced the prosecutor’s 
improper use of his work in the pages of Le monde.365 
 The political ramifications of Julien’s contributions to North African history were not 
bound only to the metropole, either, but also influenced the self-understandings of Algerian 
nationalists themselves. André Raymond’s claim that “for a number of Maghrebin nationalists, 
[The History of North Africa (1930)] aided an awareness of the existence of a Maghreb whose 
past historical continuity allowed them to imagine a future independent of the colonial episode,” 
is certainly supported by Julien’s FLN readership.366 Before the beginning of the war, historian 
and eventual FLN militant Mostefa Lacheraf dedicated his study of nineteenth-century 
anticolonial rebels like Abd el-Kader to Julien, looking for his stamp of approval.367  
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Between the destiny of the gods and the freedom of men 
 The recognition of North Africa’s relevance as a world-historical force begged larger 
world-historical questions than those broached by Julien’s work. For example, to what extent 
would the transmission of French history and civilization transform the already-existing realities 
on the ground in North Africa? How did North African nationalist movements figure into 
broader contexts of decolonization? While it was first necessary to recognize the agency of North 
Africans and their ability to make their own history, it was equally necessary to ask in what sense 
France’s imperial expansion had determined its present historical moment. Rather than seeing 
the development of North African nationalism and the Algerian war as simply the product of 
political hybridity, Jacques Berque postulated they were historical moments that recapitulated the 
history of the modern West in a new key. Whereas Julien’s relevant work largely predated the 
Algerian War, Berque formulated his views on Algeria’s historical development from within the 
war itself, ultimately seeing the end of French-Algeria as built into the fabric of French 
expansion. 
Berque’s historical and sociological writings during the Algerian War, as well as much of 
his later work, bear the marks of an uneasy balance between treating North African history on its 
own independent terms and placing it within Eurocentric world-historical processes. This tension 
may seem surprising, given Berque’s critical reputation and legacy in the social sciences. For 
instance, as critical as Edward Saïd had been of most specialists of the Arab world, Berque was 
one of the few whose work passed muster.368  The new generation of sociologists to which 
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Berque belonged—along with Maxime Rodinson and the slightly younger Pierre Bourdieu—was 
certainly part of a broader shift away from previous essentializing, orientalist modes of 
investigation. Yet the specter of French history haunts the framework of Berque’s views of North 
African history surrounding its decolonization. Through much of the war Berque was committed 
to the need for French modernization efforts in North Africa. The French colonial presence was 
one of tutorship in modernity. Even when he was willing to let this notion pass, he still saw the 
stages of modern European historical development as a blueprint for divining the future direction 
of North African history. Like Sauvy and Julien, Berque believed any future for North Africa in 
general and Algeria in particular would need to rely on the technical and political developments 
of western history over the previous two centuries. Rather than see Berque’s movements between 
specific studies of the Maghreb and pronouncements on the larger Arab world as a “slippage of 
his scientific problematics from the local toward the global,” his writings highlight the 
embeddedness of the intellectual in a period of dramatic change and ever shifting horizons.369 
His writings on North Africa during the Algerian War demonstrate this self-conscious and self-
reflexive tension between the universals of socio-historical development and the particular 
experiences of Arab cultures, the structural and the not-yet-determined, or what Berque at one 
point referred to as “the destiny of the gods” versus “the freedom of men.”370 
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 Berque’s early life and work were in many ways direct products of the French empire. 
His father, Augustin Berque, was a second-generation colon in Algeria, a specialist in Islamic 
law, and served as a local government official.371 Berque’s mother descended from nineteenth-
century Spanish settlers. Berque’s father insisted Jacques study both standard Arabic as well as 
local Arabic dialects as a child. After first studying at the University of Algiers, he studied for a 
year and a half at the Sorbonne. His formal studies were cut short, however, after being offered a 
position as “officier des affaires indigènes” in Morocco in 1934. Over the next twenty years 
Berque’s position in the colonial administration would serve as the launch pad for an ad-hoc 
course in social ethnography. In the 1930s Berque published studies on local legal codes, his first 
forays into the examination of North African social structures. Though unaffiliated with any 
university, he established contacts with Fernand Braudel and regularly incorporated work 
published in the journals Année sociologique and Annales into his studies.372 When the war came 
in 1939 Berque served in the military in North Africa until the French surrendered in June 1940. 
Afterwards, Berque resumed colonial administrative duties in Morocco, under Vichy control 
through the end of 1942. Following the liberation of Morocco from Vichy forces, Berque became 
                                                                                                                                                             
the two only introduced themselves in 1965, Berque did note that he had always appreciated 
Guérin’s study of the French Revolution, even if he did not agree with its conclusions. Berque to 
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2. 
371  Augustin Berque maintained a good reputation with both colon and indigène 
populations in Algeria and was friendly with early nationalist leaders. Augustin Berque and 
Jacques Berque, Écrits sur l’Algérie, Archives maghrébines (Aix-en-Provence: Édisud, 1986). 
372 Berque’s sociological orientation in the 1930s relied heavily on the debates between 
Georges Gurvitch and Georges Davy. Marcel Mauss’ “Essai sur le don” remained a seminal 
work for Berque throughout his whole career. Berque’s understanding of rural social structures 
also relied heavily on Marc Bloch. Jacques Berque, “Le contrat pastoral à Sidi Aïssa,” Revue 
Africaine (1936), 899-911; Contribution à l’étude des contrats Nord-Africaines (Algiers: La 
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the director of education in Rabat and worked on plans to reform property rights in the Moroccan 
Protectorate. These reform plans received considerable resistance from local colons and from 
1947 to 1953 he was exiled to a post in the High Atlas Mountains. Following the banishment of 
King Mohamed V in 1953, Berque resigned his position and worked with UNESCO on mission 
to Egypt. During his time in Egypt, Berque developed a more favorable position toward 
anticolonial movements, claiming he became a “third wordlist” there.373 He also published his 
first monograph from his ethnographic fieldwork in the Atlas Mountains, The Seksawa: 
Research Conducted on the Social Structures of the Western High Atlas Mountains.  
 The reform programs Berque proposed in the postwar called for massive investments in 
reforming the agricultural base of Morocco. Openly critical of what he characterized as “the 
myth of progressive reforms” instituted gradually over a long period of time, he called for 
“nothing less than the refabrication of the Moroccan countryside,” claiming reforms “will either 
be complete or amount to nothing at all.” Such a program would not only improve the material 
lives of rural Moroccans—and Berque claimed these rural peasants were, like the rural French, 
the true peuple of the country—but would also be the foundation for social and cultural 
modernization. According to Berque, this “apprenticeship to modern life” was directly tied to the 
“majority” of the people, meaning both their democratic will and their legal maturity. Though 
most changes would be initiated via colonial administrators, local councils would also have a say 
in reform projects. Via this plan, “the tractor and the threshing machine would become materials 
for freedom.”374 Not only would Berque’s plan have provided a framework for greater political 
participation within the Moroccan protectorate, implicit in its formulations was the assumption 
                                                 
373 “Moi, je me tiers-mondisais.” Jacques Berque, Mémoires des deux rives (Paris: Seuil, 
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374 Jacques Berque, “Vers la modernisation rurale,” Bulletin d’information du Maroc 
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that the direction of the Moroccan economy should be handled by local Moroccans, and not 
either the French state or European settlers. While Berque did not yet advocate for Moroccan 
independence from France, such a proposal clearly threatened French political and economic 
hegemony in Morocco.    
 Though many hailed as progressive the reform plans that brought Berque trouble,375 these 
reforms nevertheless postulated the violent overhaul of traditional economic systems as the only 
way forward for Moroccan society. Modern western technology was the key to ameliorating 
Moroccan poverty and under-development. While he did not want to simply force a European 
economic standard onto Morocco and label traditional systems “economic nonsense,” France’s 
mission was still one of tutoring less-developed peoples in the arts of modernity.376 Though 
Berque would back away from the rhetoric of civilizational tutorship by the end of the Algerian 
War, he nonetheless remained adamant that the traditional socio-economic structures of the 
Orient were insufficient for the modern world. The more and more resistance he encountered 
among colonial administrators, the more doubtful he became of France’s prospects of successful 
assimilation and development.377  
                                                 
375 For instance, see Charles-André Julien’s assessment in L’Afrique du nord en marche, 
above.  
376 As early as 1939, Berque outlined a position that tried to see the logic of the remnants 
of the pre-colonial Moroccan economy while also stressing the need for adapting western 
industry to Moroccan society. Jacques Berque, “Deux ans d’action artisanale à Fès,” Questions 
nord-africaines 15 (1939), 3-28, Opera Minora III, 3-24, 8. Sacriste, 126-7. While he did not cite 
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Keynesian economics what non-Euclidean geometries are to Euclidean geometry” in many ways 
reads as a radicalization of this insight. Pierre Bourdieu, “Le choc des civilisations” Le sous-
dévéloppement en Algérie, edited by François Perroux (Algiers: Secretariat Social, 1959), 64.  
377 Sacriste, 131-132. The years from 1950 to 1953 were likely the climax of Berque’s 
hopes for French administrative reforms. In 1950 he gained certification as a teacher in training 
(stagiaire) for the Centre des hautes études d'administration musulmane (CHEAM) founded by 
Robert Montagne. 
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 The resulting exile to the Atlas Mountains proved fortuitous, however, as it provided the 
basis for his study, Social Structures of the High Atlas Mountains. Berque argued against notions 
of a stable tribal structure to Maghrebian society since tribal affiliations and motivations changed 
according to historical circumstances. Familial ties were not the only consideration to take into 
account; one also had to account for needs relating to pasturage and water as well as the changes 
brought upon by colonial administration. The book was well received when it was published in 
1955, earning him a back-door doctorate. Friendships cultivated with Lucien Febvre and 
Ferdnand Braudel secured him a newly-created Chair of Contemporary Islam at the Collège de 
France and his election to the VIth section at the École Practique des Hautes Études in 1956.378 
In between Berque’s departure from Morocco and his installation in Parisian academic circles, he 
had taken the advice of Charles-André Julien and joined a UNESCO mission in Egypt. While 
there he interacted with a number of Egyptian intellectuals and became convinced of the 
emancipatory potential of Arab nationalist movements. Although he was not won over by Arab 
nationalism at the time, he saw it as a useful intermediary for ensuring the eventual independence 
of North African countries like Morocco and Tunisia. He would also make subsequent UNESCO 
trips to Lebanon, Tunisia, and Morocco in 1958 and 1959 to survey the development of the 
social sciences in recently independent territories.379 Around the same time, Berque began to 
devote time and energy to understanding the crisis in Algeria. When he arrived in France in 1956 
his first lectures at the Collège de France tackled North Africa’s colonial history with an 
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emphasis on Algeria. From 1957-1958, Berque led the University Committee for the Solution to 
the Algerian Problem. He described the aims of the committee’s first conference as offering an 
answer to the question “What is Algeria?”380   
 From 1956 through 1962, Berque’s full-length studies and occasional lectures and essays 
interrogated the legacy of both colonial projects of modernization and the French social sciences’ 
understandings of North Africa (and the Arab world in general). In both cases he found the 
heritage of past projects and studies wanting, yet at the same time an unshakeable point of 
reference. Though Berque saw previous studies of the Orient as severely limited by a lack of 
expertise and chauvinistic assumptions, he nonetheless took from them what he could, always 
beginning with the assumption that those scholars worked in earnest. Even when one granted the 
validity of nationalist movements, it was not clear that post-colonial emancipation and self-
determination should mean anything other than a fulfilment of modern projects begun under 
colonial rule. Berque’s essay “125 Years of Sociology of the Maghreb” and his inaugural lecture 
at the Collège de France grappled with the wider import of these traditions’ legacies while he 
still believed a third way existed as a solution to the war.  
 Berque’s move to Paris and installation at the Collège de France and EPHE coincided 
with his personal accounting of the good and bad of sociological studies of North Africa since 
France’s first expansion there in 1830. Berque’s approach was characteristic of most of his 
scholarship that followed: he went out of his way to applaud as many positive aspects of the 
field, his past and still living colleagues, while also delivering devastating critiques of their 
conclusions and methodologies. The first research conducted in North Africa by the Arab 
Bureaux attached to the colonial administration was certainly limited, and set up a series of 
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blindspots and uneven preoccupations that survived to the present. They focused on the tribe as 
the fundamental social unit to the exclusion of analyzing urban life; they posited a fundamental 
antithesis between Arabs and Berbers (often forgetting Jews of the region); despite the 
predominance of personal experience and testimony in their own writings, they hardly ever 
considered using testimony of the local inhabitants themselves; and they saw the whole project 
as a grand romantic adventure that could cure them of metropolitan bourgeois life. 381 
Furthermore, military men who lacked any specific training beyond currents of Saint-
Simonianism staffed the Bureaux.382 Their conclusions were thus largely speculative, provoked 
more by nineteenth-century metropolitan concerns than adherence to method or data. This was a 
“Prestigious tradition! But dangerous.” Nonetheless, their research was largely conducted in 
earnest, and Berque was not willing to reproach them for not working according to contemporary 
ethnographic standards. The first monographs produced by the generation of specialists 
following the Arab Bureaux similarly had both the merit of tackling expansive topics such as 
comparative linguistics and accumulating all of the given sources and data on North Africa and 
the limitations imposed by earlier Orientalist assumptions and the conflicts that plagued the 
area’s nascent professionalization—rivalries, polemics, plagiarism accusations.383 
 On the surface, Berque’s account of the genesis of his profession seems quite generous 
(and not simply from a twenty-first century post-colonial vantage point, either). Without a doubt 
it is markedly less biting than Charles-André Julien’s stance toward his fellow colonial 
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specialists. Yet with each moment in the development of the profession, Berque’s fellow 
colleagues could easily ask what might be left of these previous works, of which Berque spoke 
highly, once all of the particular biases, blindspots, and limitations were taken into account. And 
it seems, they would have to conclude, not much of substance. To take Émile-Félix Gautier’s 
work, for example, Berque claimed “The merit of E.-F. Gautier is that he constantly embraced, 
via his temperament more than any system, the greatest range of facts… It’s a thought capable of 
making great strides.” But whereas the forms of analysis within Gautier’s work are important, 
the attempt to reconcile structure with phenomena, mediate context and event, its content did not 
stand the test of time. His comments on Robert Montagne’s work followed a similar tone. It 
remains ambiguous whether this sort of analysis is the product of scholarly sincerity or thinly 
veiled insult. Not all of the scholars in his analysis were treated so ambiguously, though. The late 
specialist on Hispanic-Arab history Évariste Lévi-Provençal only received praise, as did his 
contemporaries Jean Dresch and Roger LeTourneau. And as a guiding theme, Berque posited 
that whenever a new observation is made the collective understanding of that topic grows, 
however mistaken the theory supporting the observation might be.384 
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James Whidden, “Jacques Berque,” 26-27; Gilbert Albergoni, “Présentation,” Opera Minora II, 
v.    
Three years later, Berque provided a preface to a reedition of Gautier’s Mœurs et 
coutumes [1931], expanding his account of Gautier’s legacy. On the one hand, Gautier’s work 
was built on a commendable “love-drunk sociology of experience,” that prioritized systems of 
difference, and on the other, “The evolution of the last thirty years does not allow us to accept 
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 Beyond the individual contributions of specific specialists or schools, Berque did see 
common institutional limits on the study of North Africa since the 1830 invasion. Because the 
study of North Africa emerged in a colonial context, it was impossible to separate individual 
studies from their institutional and political support. This was perhaps most clear in the case of 
the Arab Bureaux, whose studies were “too engaged, too contiguous… with their object. Their 
sin was utilitarianism and impressionism.”385 But even subsequent researchers have been carried 
away by contemporary concerns and as a result left significant gaps in the historical record of 
North Africa. Sources for the process of the French conquest, as well as for local social and legal 
conflict, existed and were accessible. But their research did not meet the political demands of the 
present. The result had been the absence of a concrete study of the people of North Africa 
(l’homme maghrébin). Berque believed his own period showed promise of changing this ironic 
situation, even if it was a period where North Africans rebelled against the French. “After all,” 
Berque concluded by paraphrasing Renan, “it is possible for the truth to be sombre.”386   
 Later the same year Berque reiterated his views on the state of the field and offered 
reflections on the political implications of contemporary North African sociology. From the very 
beginning of the lecture, Berque made a point to align himself with the tradition of scholarship 
he claimed Robert Montagne embodied, even beginning his lecture by portraying his own 
academic trajectory as a repetition of his deceased predecessor. It was obvious that any critique 
of French sociology coming from the outsider, newly-admitted to the home of Renan, risked 
throwing stones in glass houses. Berque also concluded the lecture on what today appears an 
overly optimistic note and defense of French tutelage in the Arab world. “I think the alliance 
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between France and the Arab world is old,” he claimed, “too old to disappear so quickly, in one 
deft blow from the winds of current events.” This was partly the fact of prolonged encounters 
with colonized areas, but also due to the profound merits of French civilization that provided 
“the language of the ‘left’ and of missionary education, the mistress of mundane elegance as 
much as perversity, the vehicle of a humanism of [mutually] recognized values and of an 
inquietude that questions them.”387 Algerian nationalism was certainly the result of the racism of 
the colonial system and reification of separate ethnic identities, but even though Algeria could 
not honestly be called part of France, France certainly could contribute to the creation of an 
Algerian nation.388 Earlier the same year, he had described debates about the Algerian War as 
focused on a “false problem.” As the rebellion in Algeria gained public recognition as a full-
scale war, Berque was convinced the only way through the crisis was via French support of some 
kind. He saw the all-or-nothing, “kill or go home,” approach of some commentators as overly 
simplistic binary thinking that should not be reified. The recognition that Algeria had a national 
vocation of its own did not automatically mean France needed to sever all ties. Rather, France 
had “yet to construct a national Algeria after the colonial Algeria… in the name of a tradition, a 
continuity.”389 The tradition and continuity were both the greater Mediterranean heritages of 
which France and North Africa were a product and the more recent inception of French 
republican values since its colonial expansion. The current moment carried Enlightenment 
potential for all sides: escaping the false dilemmas of pundits would be liberation from France’s 
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“fetters,” while the continuation of Algerian nation-building meant aiding “the Arab peoples to 
liberate themselves from their idols.”390  
But beyond the Inaugural Lecture’s due formalities and hopeful prognoses of France’s 
future with the Arab world, Berque did offer a series of trenchant critiques of the sociological 
profession and intellectuals too quick to speak on the Arab world’s behalf. First and foremost 
was an indictment of the continued tendency to speak on behalf of Arabs without actually 
speaking to them or immersing oneself in their culture: “It is no longer possible today, if it ever 
were in the first place, to study what might become of the Arab language or civilization without 
the cooperation of Arabs.” Though abstract methods of quantification and measurement in fields 
like economics and demography were more than ever necessary, Berque warned against seeing 
them as an automatic key for divining the future. Careful attention to local constraints, customs, 
and habits was needed. Studying the vehicles of modern Arab renewal, such as the unifying force 
of radio broadcasts or the desires expressed in novels, make evident these previously silent 
dynamics.391 At the same time, however, Berque stressed that “This history is not autonomous.” 
While it was not appropriate to simply rely on a rhetorical gesture of positing the Arab world as 
the antithesis of the western world—“alterité, according to our philosophers”—the modern Arab 
world was looking for its own identity within a world where the industrialized West had already 
determined the rules of the game. Invoking Octave Mannoni’s then-popular heuristic of colonial 
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revolt, Berque cautioned, “This time, Caliban does not rebel against an enchanting Florentine, 
but against ‘already-existing conditions.’ In the background a tempest rages that no genie could 
appease. We invoke Ariel in vain. No contemporary revolt could succeed without being 
integrated into technical civilization, otherwise known as the merciless dominion of cause and 
effect.”392 The Arab world could neither rely on a notion of radical alterity, cut off from the rest 
of the world, even in a moment of independence. Likewise, the sociologist of 1956 could not 
separate himself from current events. “The researcher is a man, of a particular country,” admitted 
Berque, adding that “Neglecting this fact amounts to a personal fault, hiding it amounts to lying.” 
Responsible science took the world as it presented itself, neither fleeing nor encouraging 
conflict.393  
 The colloquia Berque led in 1957 and 1958 showed the type of active engagement called 
for in the Inaugural Lecture by focusing on the Algerian War. Over these years Berque’s 
position, like that of many intellectuals who tried to hold out hope for Franco-Algerian 
reconciliation, radicalized in favor of Algerian independence. In his June 1957 colloquium, he 
reiterated his belief that whatever position one took, it had to be first of all based on the facts on 
the ground. Any solution had to take into account the multiplicity of groups in Algeria between 
the two extreme poles of French Algerians and Muslim Algerians. A position that took the rights 
of one side over those of the other could not qualify as a solution, but projects for national 
independence could offer a chance at building a new identity capacious enough to include all 
groups. Through his November and April colloquia he reiterated the importance of supporting 
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national independence as the only viable solution, but he backed away from his language of 
French tutelage. Independence would have to go beyond proposals for greater metropolitan 
integration and an independent Algerian would need to be a free and equal partner with France in 
any future relationships.394  
The conclusions Berque reached in his colloquia had a broader public audience as well, 
thanks to shorter editorials in Esprit and Le Monde. In the March, 1958, issue of Esprit, Berque 
agreed with FLN criticisms of French intellectuals who only saw the war in terms of static 
“ideologies” and “sentiments” that failed to capture the realities of the war. He also presented a 
position that replaced his vision of French tutelage and continued through the end of the war. “I 
do not believe,” he stated, “that the existence of these new North African nations represent a 
disavowal, but rather the continuation and surpassing of the work France has done in these 
countries.” If Algeria had been a nation of apprentice-Republicans, now they were journeymen 
on track to overtake the position of their former masters.395 The May 13 coup and return of De 
Gaulle only radicalized this position and made Berque less optimistic that the European 
population in Algeria still had any right to be a part of Algeria’s future. As he explained in Le 
Monde, a divorce from France was now inevitable, but was part of a “natural evolution” that 
demonstrated “the validity of the French project in this country.” Not so for the Europeans in 
Algeria, though, for whom the terms “revolution” and “committee of public safety” do not mean 
the same thing as they do in Paris. The metropolitan French could still see “a number of 
differences between Robespierre and General Massu.” The French Revolutionary tradition was 
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alive in the colonies, but not among the European population that coopted its symbols in order to 
enforce a colonial status quo.396 
This change in attitude toward the future of France’s relations with Algeria accompanied 
his first major statements on the historical trajectory of the Orient (by which he meant the Middle 
East inhabited by Arab peoples). First in Les Arabes (1959) and then expanded in Les Arabes, 
d’hier à demain (1960), Berque outlined a view of history informed by his earliest writings as a 
colonial administrator. Now, he supported his vision of the need for technological reform and 
innovation with a mixture of references to contemporary social theorists and philosophers 
ranging from Georges Gurvitch, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and François Perroux to Gilbert 
Simondon, Ferdinand de Saussure, Henri Lefebvre, and Martin Heidegger. In this historical 
vision, two ruptures punctuated world history: the emergence from the paleolithic era with the 
institution of agriculture and sedentary societies, and the passage from pre-industrial modes of 
production to rationalized industry. The latter shift first occurred in Europe at the end of the 
eighteenth century. The Orient was currently on the verge of going through the same shift; it was 
torn between a pre-industrial “sacral” orientation and an industrialized “historic” orientation.397 
While on the one hand this schema looks in many ways like orientalist dehistoricization of the 
Orient, Berque did not intend to claim the Orient had no history, but rather that its history was 
coded in sacred imagery. The sacral relied on a cyclical vision of time punctuated by ritual, 
tradition, and natural cycles—rhythms that look a good deal similar to early Annales analyses of 
ancien régime France that Berque read in the 30s. The historic, by contrast, displayed a self-
conscious version of technical progress. This framework effectively recoded the reigning 
developmental discourse, outlining a technologically-based Hegelianism. An historical time lag 
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existed between the Orient and Occident, but European colonial projects and western 
technological norms catalyzed the closing of this gap.398   
Between the Orient’s self-idealized past and the challenges of the recent colonial past and 
present, Berque argued the West needed to be inserted as a third, mediating “historic” and 
“philosophical” term. Of course, the West’s imperial expansion had inserted itself into this 
dynamic and changed institutional and physical environments in the Arab world. But as the 
avatar of historical progress, the processes of industrialization begun in the eighteenth century, 
varied and haphazard in their unfolding, existed as regulatory ideals for the Orient. Current 
anticolonial revolts were therefore not simply a revolt where “the colonial age is simultaneously 
the object” of revolt, those colonial ventures were “also the motor of their revolt.”399 This was 
not an automatic transposition of the West’s economic and technological versions of modernity, 
nor did it necessarily require further integration into imperialist markets. From this dialectic 
emerged a new set of possibilities for the Arab world that matched the variation already existing 
in the various spaces counted under the sign Orient. “Concretely,” Berque reasoned, “the study 
[of this phenomenon] must distinguish according to psychological stages, geographic zones, the 
phases of an evolution.” The result is an allochronic map of the Orient’s path toward an 
appropriated western modernization: these evolutionary phases “may even be observed with an 
experimental clarity because the diverse Arab milieux reveal the successive stages and put into 
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play the various themes of modernization.”400  Berque was perhaps overly optimistic of the 
international economic rewards of such a process, parrying the pessimism of François Perroux’s 
theory of economic domination.401 New nations would place themselves “out of circulation,” 
[hors-marché] and create economies of “de-domination.”402  
The development of the Orient, then, sits somewhere between analogy and homology 
with the West—the two modernizations have the same source in Western technology, but 
similarities between their developmental stages and outcomes remain at a structural level—
evolutionary biologists and psychoanalysts describe as the relationship between ontogenic and 
phylogenic development.403 Each new instance of modernization in the Orient would necessarily 
undergo the same essential developments as their modern Western predecessors, albeit with local 
cultures, recent historical experiences, and preserved traditions producing a new species of 
modernization as a result. Berque’s references to European revolutions certainly show this 
dynamic at work. For instance, when describing the process of adapting and at times abandoning 
local traditions and cultures in the process of modernization, Berque opined that “Every society, 
and perhaps [Arab society] more so than others is today constrained to choose between rival 
values and at times between mutually-exclusive options.” He then noted that the same drama of 
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the “liquidation of values” is littered throughout Michelet’s History of the French Revolution.404 
Revolutions in the Orient are therefore only the logical long-term consequence of the West’s 
imperial expansion, despite the West’s refusal to admit as much: “Europe, and above all France, 
refuses to acknowledge Arab fidelity to [Europe’s] lessons in their national and social upheavals. 
Though they are an historical accelerant, they paradoxically, ruinously remain attached to the 
past.”405   
Berque’s description of the Arab Orient largely left the Maghreb out of the discussion,406 
but his subsequent study of the Maghreb in the interwar years applied his analysis of the Orient 
to Charles-André Julien’s basic narrative of the growth in nationalism during the first four 
decades of the twentieth century. As he explained in a discussion with Jean-Marie Domenach 
and Louis Massignon, the Maghreb had already differed from the rest of the Arab world before 
European colonial expansion and its colonial experience were much more extensive than 
elsewhere in the Orient. “In the Orient,” he explained, “only a few social or confessional 
minorities had been truly touched by the West… It’s the opposite in the Maghreb, and especially 
so in Algeria.” He felt he needed to write a completely new book to do the subject justice.407 
Composed in the final three years of the Algerian War, The Maghreb between the Two Wars 
portrayed the political history of the interwar years as the self-destruction of French imperialism 
as the self-fulfillment of the civilizing mission.  
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By the early sixties, Tunisia and Morocco had already gained their autonomy, and Berque 
considered Algeria’s independence a foregone conclusion. In this respect his study was largely 
an autopsy of the colonial system, looking for the root causes of its death. Elsewhere, Berque 
was fond of reciting Gautier’s opinion that “Only the past is easy to predict… the future is an 
ironist.”408 Regarding the Maghreb, “Now that we know how the system has ended, it is easy, 
perhaps too easy,” Berque warned, “to say where it led.” But he considered as his goal the 
reconstruction of the “totality” of the Maghreb’s transformation. Berque’s distance from his 
topic would be “hardly more than a feint,” especially given his proximity to the events; he 
nonetheless thought whatever distance he could manage from the interwar years had granted him 
the ability to discern the “sense” of the history.409  
The direction of the Maghreb’s history matched the rest of the decolonizing Arab world. 
Imperialism transformed the sacral orientation of the Maghreb and in the process the French 
civilizing mission fulfilled its project in its own self-destruction: “the interwar Maghreb, triumph 
of the colonial project, nourished its own loss. It contained within itself, as the philosopher 
would say, its own negation.”410 The Maghreb’s unhappy consciousness in the interwar period 
grew from the tension built into the colonial project and the subsequent tensions within 
modernizing Maghrebian society. The former was epitomized between the “conflict between the 
thing and sign” [de la chose et du signe]. French identity and Maghrebin identity were mutually 
opaque, and the idealized notion of French values, “the great principles of 1789,” matched 
neither term. The actions of the French never lived up to their own rhetoric—the colonial venture 
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was “just as wasteful of the faculties of the colonizer as of the colonized’s existence.”411 The 
only thing saving this historical process from tragedy was the belief that “history carries in itself 
its own remedy and perhaps its pardon.”412 In the process of fulfilling French ideals, however, 
the Maghreb also had to enter into a struggle with itself, an attempt to mediate its past and future 
orientations. The result was a new jihâd in the Maghreb, according to the dual meanings of the 
term as a struggle against an outside force and a struggle within oneself: “less as a war against 
the Other than as a war against the self, against a certain sort of self. And it is equally in this 
sense that one might interpret the title of this book.”413 
Amidst this admixture of pre-colonial, colonial, and idealized French identities, the 
French Revolution again carried a privileged position as both referential analogue and 
revolutionary standard. The new political force of Islam after World War I, for instance, turned 
from being “a moral reserve and ultimate shelter” to assuming, under the ulama, “a rationalism 
that one would nearly call Jacobin.”414 Rabat, Tunis, and Algiers were similarly portrayed as new 
Parises, where the people of la rue were the protagonists of a struggle against a corrupt and 
despotic government.415  
In retrospect, Berque characterized his stance on the Algerian War as typical of most 
leftist intellectuals in Paris. None of them planned on taking up arms against France, and only a 
small minority, such as Francis Jeanson, actively aided the FLN. It was the job of Algerian 
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nationalists “to make their own revolution.” Berque’s job, as he saw it, “was to make the 
legitimacy and plausibility of their revolution comprehendible to us [metropolitan French], and 
to show that it did not necessarily mean a catastrophe for our people.”416 Yet the importance of 
the French Revolutionary tradition in Berque’s developmentalist history of the third world 
clearly went beyond simply translating foreign events to known referents. Even when one could 
agree that Algeria was not, in fact, France, and that it constituted its own state in formation, the 
history of France’s own technical and political development was the fount from which much of 
this new nation emerged.  
The rhetorical frame that portrayed the fruits of the civilizing mission as finally ripe 
found echoes in other analyses of Algeria’s future prospects. In journalist Alfred Fabre-Luce’s 
Tomorrow in Algeria (1958), we can see the elements of Berque’s lessons about the result of 
France’s mentorship in universal ideals and recapitulation of modern politics. 
Thus all of the elements of an explosive situation find themselves united. France has even 
lit the match. In a country where the laws give one ‘French’ voice the weight of eight 
Muslim voices (and, from the outset, elections are not free), it has celebrated the cult of 
Democracy. The tribes have felt the grandeur of the Nation. These insecure students, 
whom homegrown French do not truly treat as their equals, have been given the tales of 
the Revolution and Resistance to read and they have been taught the art of translating the 
cries of empty stomachs into universal formulas. To this framework, too, they only bring 
a portion of their civilization. Because they have not only endured the experiences for 
which these lessons have provided a model, they have also assimilated, and in a certain 
sense, even gone beyond them.417 
 
For both Berque and Fabre-Luce, the French presence in Algeria destabilized the population and 
gave them the tools with which to right colonial wrongs.   
Berque’s narrative of the war and the future development of Algeria found support 
among FLN militants themselves. Those located in Paris were frequent attendees at his Collège 
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de France colloquia.418 While in prison in France, from 1957 to 1961, Ahmed Taleb-Ibrahimi 
read Berque’s writings with other FLN inmates. Ibrahimi thought Berque was overly-generous 
about the positive legacy of French imperialism, but he nonetheless concluded that “Any young 
Arab of our epoch, faithful to his values and aware of both his potential and of his ‘dangerous 
stance,’ would recognize himself several times over in your book.” In other correspondence, 
Ibrahimi’s concerns for the next generation’s need to find an authentic relationship to Western 
progress matched Berque’s arguments as well. He confessed as much, writing to Berque about 
reading in The Arabs from Yesterday to Tomorrow, that the book “answers to a number of 
questions on the Arab world and its entry into technological civilization.”419  
 
Malthus, Sieyès, and the Third World  
As influential as Julien and Berque’s theorizations of North African history were during 
the French-Algerian War, just as important were arguments about the future of France’s presence 
in North Africa based on demographic analyses. Along with other social sciences such as 
ethnography and sociology, demographic analysis played an important role in the 
conceptualization and evolution of French decolonization, both inside government institutions 
and within the realm of public debate.420 General overviews of postwar history and specialized 
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accounts of the war often cite Sauvy as the economist turned demographer who coined the term 
“third world” in the 1952 essay “Three Worlds, One Planet,” an essay that made explicit 
reference to the French Revolution, but Sauvy’s place in changes in thinking about North 
Africa’s past and future went beyond terminology.421 Sauvy’s influence on the development of 
demography in postwar France has been well documented, yet the influence of his demographic 
publications on the writings of intellectuals in favor of an independent Algeria suggest his 
influence extended beyond this institutional domain.  
Analyses of Sauvy’s contribution to debates surrounding Algerian decolonization tend to 
fall within two camps, both of which obscure Sauvy’s own position on decolonization and the 
Algerian War, but grasp the importance of how Sauvy’s demographic theories were received. In 
one version, Sauvy is assumed to have intended a straightforward anticolonial message 
synonymous with the aims of the 1955 Bandung Conference.422 And in another version, Sauvy’s 
demographic analyses of North Africa are assumed to have been constrained by the racist ghosts 
of Vichy-era population studies and only aided and abetted a functionalist view of decolonization 
that minimized the French state’s violence and the concerted efforts of Algerian 
revolutionaries.423 Like those of Berque and Julien, Sauvy’s analyses of historical change in 
North Africa relied on the French Revolution as a historical reference. He likewise also held out 
hope for continued French developmental efforts in Algeria to prevent the radical break we now 
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associate with Algerian decolonization before embracing the cause of Algerian nationalism. 
Despite his own public commitments as well as the emphasis his population theory placed on 
debunking false binaries and historical fatalism, his developmentalist rhetoric provided a 
vocabulary that naturalized a decisive break with France as a foregone conclusion. 
Sauvy began his career working as an economist and statistician for the Léon Blum, 
Daladier, and Paul Reynaud administrations. After serving in the Italian Front in 1940, he 
worked in the Vichy finance ministry and consulted for the Fondation Alexis Carrel. Following 
the Liberation, he consulted with de Gaulle’s Provisional Government. In the postwar decades 
Sauvy’s career followed a three-tiered track linking his coordination of French population policy, 
the development and popularization of his theory of population change, and his involvement with 
North African demographics.  
The problematics of demographic study in postwar France were inseparable from fears of 
social decline and revolution. When viewed in the context of the history of the study of 
populations in France, these concerns were certainly nothing new. What changed, however, was 
the location of the object of study. Whereas population studies from the eighteenth century 
through the 1940s were concerned primarily with the French population, in the postwar the focus 
became global.  The link between population trends and social vitality is part of the larger history 
of population studies in France, going back as far as the late Enlightenment. Then, the figure of 
Malthus’ 1798 An Essay on the Principle of Population loomed large. However, despite French 
Malthusian fears in the early half of the nineteenth century, by the nineteenth century’s end, 
those who commented on and studied populations were not worried about problems of over-
population and material scarcity. Instead, they were predominantly natalists worried about the 
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steady decline of French fertlility that had begun the century earlier.424 World War One and the 
interwar only increased these natalist concerns, and both the Popular Front and Vichy 
governments were concerned with reversing the trend of an aging non-reproducing nation.425  
 After the Liberation, the Provisional French Government disbanded Vichy’s population 
institutions, selectively prosecuting those deemed collaborators. The Institut national d’études 
démographiques (INED) replaced these institutions in 1946 with Sauvy as the head of the group. 
The Provisional Government of France placed INED under the purview of the Ministry of Public 
Health and charged it with “studying demographic problems in all of their incarnations.”426 The 
goal of the institute was to provide information and advice to France in the wake of World War 
Two, but from very early on the institute and its journal, Population, published a diverse array of 
inquiries into global populations.427 This global focus was partially driven by then-forming Cold 
War considerations among other major western demographic entities in the postwar. In the eyes 
of America and its allies, economic development was one of the best tools for combatting Soviet 
influence.428 However, in the case of INED, providing the government with policy advice on the 
                                                 
424  Joshua Cole, The Power of Large Numbers: Population, Politics, and Gender in 
Nineteenth-Century France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000). 
425 Andrés Horacio Reggiani, “Procreating France: The Politics of Demography, 1919-
1945,” French Historical Studies 19, no 3 (Spring 1996), 725-754; Paul-André Rosental, 
L’intelligence démographique: Sciences et politiques des populations en France (1930-1960) 
(Paris: Odile Jacob, 2003), 69-70. 
426 “Ordonnance n° 45-2499 du 24-10-45 portant création de l'Institut National d'Études 
Démographiques,” Population 1, no 1 (1946), 187. 
427 For instance, the first issue of Population carried a study of agricultural resources in 
Europe by Paul Vincent, a study of the location of industry and its effects on birth rates by Louis 
Chevalier, along with a study on immigration by Sauvy. Population 1, no 1 (1946), 9-19, 21-34, 
91-98. 
428  Simon Szreter, “The Idea of Demographic Transition and the Study of Fertility 
Change: A Critical Intellectual History,” Population and Development Review 19, no 4 
(December 1993), 679, and Matthew Connelly, Fatal Misconception, chapter 3. 
 187 
administration and control of North Africa was a more important driving force behind such a 
global purview.429  
Sauvy arguably carried the most influence in postwar French demography through his 
appointments within France and the United Nations as well as his general commitment to 
popularizing demographic knowledge to inform public debate. Outside of INED, Sauvy held the 
Chair of Social Demography at the Collège de France from 1959 to 1969 and was France’s 
representative on the United Nations’ Population Commission from its inception in 1946 to 
1974. He was convinced, however, that although specialists should play an important role in 
shaping and directing public debate, the ideas of specialists should not be closed off from the 
average citizen. In a strong Republic it is the duty of specialists to inform democratic debate.430 
In this respect, he published numerous studies of world population trends directed at non-
specialist audiences and regularly contributed essays and articles to L’Observateur and 
L’Express in the 1950s and 60s.  
These engagements made specialist accounts of national and international population 
problems accessible to lay readers and worked to dispel numerous demographic questions mal 
posées and false dichotomies. Neither the Malthusian approach of merely limiting the number of 
births in a given population nor the Marxian approach of ameliorating standards of living was an 
adequate way of thinking about population trends. Rather, both sides of the equation deserved 
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consideration. While technological advances and a well-developed infrastructure could raise the 
“natural ceiling” of a given population to accommodate greater life expectancy and a steady birth 
rate, birth control and other measures which reduce birth rates could also bring the ratio of 
annual births to deaths to manageable levels.431 Just as industrialization in Europe correlated with 
a lower birth rate and a higher standard of living, developing the industrial and economic 
infrastructure of underdeveloped nations would provide a solution to future threats of 
overpopulation. As Sauvy put it in his General Theory of Population, every society must choose 
who lives and who dies: policy choices lay bare the priorities of any given polity and always 
contain moral implications.432 
One of the main theoretical approaches embodied by Sauvy’s work and the studies done 
under his direction was historical. For demographers, history could provide “a demographic 
observatory.” 433  As with Berque’s developmentalist assumptions, periods of demographic 
change could be used as guideposts for future demographic development in less-advanced areas. 
In order to understand the future of global populations, one needed to first of all cast their eyes 
on the development of the modern western industrialized world, since it represented the telos of 
global development. Although the choice of historical referents one chose when doing historical 
demography depended on the researcher and the specific questions posed, the historical break in 
the French past embodied by the French Revolution of 1789 played a particularly important role 
in demographic analysis of North Africa from the postwar through the Algerian War.  
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The French Revolution was always already in the background of these postwar 
demographic studies. Standards for premodern fertility rates, for instance, were normalized at the 
birth rate of old regime France. Population’s top two contributors to North African 
demographics, Louis Henry and Louis Chevalier, transitioned from INED to working on 
histories of the French population in the old regime and nineteenth century. Their writings on 
France and North Africa shared common assumptions as well: for Chevalier, the connection was 
between unchecked population growth and social and political unrest; for Henry, both pre-
Revolutionary France and North Africa posed methodological problems for accurately measuring 
population since neither source base had robust systems of data collection.434 Outside of INED, 
Marcel Reinhard produced the main reference for the history of the world’s population and 
founded the Société de démographie historique in 1963. Reinhard was also Chair of the Institut 
d’histoire de la Révolution Française (1955-1973) and a specialist on the French population 
during the Revolution.435  
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Though these three demographers’ specific contributions were far from homogenous, 
their use of the French Revolution to describe demographic changes in North Africa contributed 
to the understanding of Algeria as on the brink of revolution. It is not simply that these three 
demographers associated with INED, or even INED as an institution, were directly involved with 
Algerian nationalist activities. Rather, their analyses of North African populations corroborated 
the notion that Algerians were no longer an ahistorical or historically frozen people, but were on 
an historically modern path with modern political potential independent of French 
administration. Algeria’s fertility rate was the same as pre-Revolutionary France. Like France at 
the end of the eighteenth-century, social and economic conditions were ill-equipped to deal with 
this increased fertility. Lessons from France’s demographic past suggested these conditions lead 
to social unrest and revolution. 
Sauvy’s popular accounts of demographic change built on this consensus about Algeria’s 
future and formed an important part of arguments in favor of Algerian independence. These 
discussions brought the specialized and technical reports that researchers such as Henry and 
Chevalier conducted directly into the realm of accessible public discourse. While Algeria’s 
future had been tied to the future of France since the beginning of France’s civilizing mission, by 
the end of the French-Algerian War the future of Algeria would be synonymous with its 
independence. Demography and French history, particularly with respect to the Revolution, were 
conceptually, methodologically, and institutionally linked in France.  
Both the historical importance of the French Revolution in demographic research and the 
moral implications of development plans are essential for understanding Sauvy’s views of 
France’s North African territories, whose steadily-increasing population was a continual 
touchstone in Sauvy’s popular works on demographic trends. From the very first INED studies 
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on North African demography, Sauvy connected increasing North African populations to the 
threat of political crisis and instability. According to Sauvy, if one thing was for certain it was 
that in order to avoid war or “social instability,” France must “prepare for sensible growth in the 
[North African] populations and over the longue durée.” 436  France and its North African 
territories existed in a reciprocal relation with one another: while France’s population declined at 
a time when it needed an influx of skilled labor, the North African population was growing at a 
pace which outstripped its available infrastructure. The solution was to push for a more equal and 
more just French Union and encourage emigration from North Africa to the metropole.437 While 
Sauvy’s concerns bore considerable weight with the government, other population advisers set a 
more pessimistic tone. Matthew Connelly has noted the prevalence of demographic concerns in 
the French Government in the beginning years of the war as well as the possibility that 
demographic trends influenced the military’s counterinsurgency tactics, lending them an 
exterminationist valence.438 Whereas Sauvy saw a demographic surplus in North Africa as a 
potential resource, Fernand Boverat, worried that increased North Africans in metropolitan 
France would destabilize family planning measures.439  
If Sauvy’s early formulation of North Africa’s demographic problems seems less than 
radical, even in contrast to dominant government worries, Sauvy’s most famous iteration of the 
                                                 
436  Alfred Sauvy, “Préface,” Louis Chevalier, Le problème démographique Nord-
Africain, INED, Travaux et documents, Cahier no 6 (Paris: PUF, 1947), 7. 
437 This message was also expressed in Alfred Sauvy and Robert Debré, Des français 
pour la France: Le problème de la population (Paris: Gallimard. NRF, 1946). While it would be 
wrong to see Sauvy’s immediate postwar population opinions as antinatalist or multicultural 
avant la lettre, it would also be wrong to assume a direct continuity with prewar attitudes of 
earlier natalists like Georges Mauco. As Sauvy and Debré stated, “In order to see clearly, we 
must thus let go of the doctrines born of exasperated nationalist passions like pan Germanism. 
Those thinkers who defend these doctrines betray science” (125).  
438 Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, 87-90. 
439 Connelly, Fatal Misconception, 121. 
 192 
problem, “Three Worlds, One Planet,” upped the rhetorical ante. The essay appeared in the 
summer of 1952 in the left-leaning magazine L’Observateur and its neologism “third world” 
soon became essential vocabulary throughout the world. The essay argued that the developing 
nations of the world constituted a geopolitical power with at least as much importance for the 
world as the powers of the liberal West and communist East.440 According to Sauvy, the gridlock 
between the two world powers contained vitriol reminiscent for the wars of the religion and 
threatened to hinder any real progress for either side. However, though people were preoccupied 
with the two worlds of the Cold War, Sauvy argued that “we too often forget there is a third 
world, the most important one, and chronologically speaking the first one.” Placing the third 
world as the oldest of the three existing worlds demonstrated demography’s implicit historical 
understanding that existing non-modern societies could stand in as examples of pre-modern 
worlds (and vice versa). The communist East and the capitalist West had in the previous two 
centuries left the rest of the world behind and embarked upon two different paths to modernity. 
Looking to the future, Sauvy concluded that the third world might just as easily choose the path 
of the West as that of the East. As the result of imperial interactions, the underdeveloped regions 
of the world had entered into a new phase of their development. Sauvy presented the third world 
as not only premodern, but “feudal”; the third world’s birth rate, he noted, was the same as 
France’s in the eighteenth century.441 According to Sauvy, this third world was not merely one 
frozen in time and a relic of the past. For relatively low cost, vaccinations and insecticides had 
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the power to save lives.442 As a result, the third world had the premodern fertility of the ancien 
régime but an increasingly modern life expectancy as well. This greater life expectancy, while 
increasing economic output in these regions, would ultimately be problematic without proper 
investments in infrastructure. Political consequences, too, followed from the movement into the 
new phase in the third world’s development. From one end of the Mediterranean to the other, 
from the Côte d’Azur to Tunisia and Egypt, the West could already see evidence of the changes 
Sauvy described. These events furthermore went deeper than simple “palace revolutions or the 
rumblings of a few ambitious men.” “Because finally,” Sauvy concluded, echoing Sieyès’ 
pamphlet from 1789, “this Third World that is ignored, exploited, despised like the Third Estate 
also wishes to be something.”443 Far from a passive network of impoverished territories, the 
demographic reality of the third world also entailed a politics beyond the East and West’s 
opposition—one that had revolutionary potential. In order to avoid political disaster, it was time 
for the West to pay proper attention to the third world.  
The ideological weight suggested by Sauvy’s third world-third estate analogy did not 
alter his earlier views of French policy in Algeria. In the early years of the Algerian War, Sauvy 
applied his general analysis of developing nations to popular articles on the state of affairs in 
Algeria in the weekly magazine L’Express. While the analogy of developing nations to the 
revolutionary masses of ancien régime France appealed to antiicolonialist activists eager to use 
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443  Abbé de Sieyès, “What is the Third Estate?” in Lynn Hunt, ed., The French 
Revolution and the Invention of Human Rights, translated by Lynn Hunt (New York: Bedford/St. 
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the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen against the French Republic, Sauvy’s early 
political essays in L’Express remained hopeful of the prospects of continued French rule in 
Algeria until 1957.444  
The position Sauvy initially held on Algeria mirrored that of many colonial humanists on 
the left—if Algeria is part of France then it should be consistently legislated as such. In the light 
of Algeria’s high rate of fertility and the lack of basic infrastructure for the Muslim population, 
governing Algeria responsibly would necessitate extensive investments in infrastructure as well 
as a more open policy of worker migration from Algeria to the metropole. Whereas postwar 
French infrastructure and standards of living steadily increased after World War II, Algeria’s 
infrastructure was inadequate even for its present population, let alone an increased future 
population. As early as 1955 Sauvy offered the solution to problems in Algeria in the form of an 
ultimatum that sounded structurally analogous to the calculus of Bernard Legatte and Raymond 
Cartier. Legatte and Cartier had begun to publicly weight France’s postwar empire in cost-
benefit terms, ultimately claiming that it was against France’s economic interests to maintain so 
many overseas holdings, particularly in Africa.445 For Sauvy, the choice was clear: either commit 
to infrastructure development in Algeria that would make good on the French dictum that 
“Algeria is France” (and not a colony), or embrace an independent Algerian nation. Sauvy’s 
position in this article, however, was not one meant to support the latter proposition. His stated 
goal was to advocate for the proper treatment of Algeria. The act of “pleading for the weakest 
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445 Bernard Legatte, “L’empire, source de notre prosperité?” Le Monde (26, 27, 28 July 
1956); Raymond Cartier, “En Afrique Noire avec Raymond Cartier,” Paris Match 383-384 (18, 
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and worst treated part of France” was far from treasonous, he reasoned, rather it was the “best 
way to prevent a definitive break.” 446  As he would put it later that year, dismissing the 
conclusions of cartierisme, “The argument that France should abandon Algeria ‘because it costs 
too much’ is insufficient.” 447  French expansion into Algeria had caused its problematic 
demographic patterns. Yet Sauvy believed, like Julien and Berque in their own ways, that the 
French state also provided the tools necessary to fix the situation. The problem itself contained 
its solution. 
These early essays for L’Express did not have the impact that Sauvy hoped they would, 
either for the general population or Algerian nationalist supporters. For the metrpolitan public, 
rather than highlight the necessity of proper investment in Algeria, Sauvy’s suggestions for 
reform characterized the prospects of Franco-Algerian reconciliation and integration as a lost 
cause. Sauvy recalled overhearing passengers on a train discussing his articles in L’Express, 
opining, “If it’s really like that, me, I’d abandon Algeria.” 448 Algerian nationalists justifiably 
wondered why Muslim Algerians should trust the French government to deliver on promises 
made since the 1930s and speculated that such reform programs would only continue French 
imperialism under new guises. In an open letter to Sauvy, Charles Robert Ageron, one of Julien’s 
students, presented a scathing critique of the argument: 
Nonetheless, M. Sauvy, you seem generous and revolutionary, because you affirm that 
one should end at a fusion of the metropolitan and Algerian populations in the name of a 
sort of reciprocity of territorial occupations… Algeria must be integrated into France 
because Algeria must be our ‘South.’ 
 
                                                 
446 Sauvy, “S.O.S. Pour l’Algérie,” L’Express (26 February 1955), 8-9. 
447 Sauvy, “L’Afrique du Nord entre Poujade et Armand,” L’Express (16 April 1955), 8-
9. 
448 Sauvy, La vie en plus, 144-145.  
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Even if Sauvy’s intentions were pure, Ageron reasoned, it was hard for him to believe that the 
controllers of French capital would ever agree to make such massive investments in order to 
raise the standard of living for Muslims.449  
Two years later, in the midst of the public scandals around the French military’s use of 
torture and suppression of pro-nationalist dissent, like many other intellectuals originally in favor 
of French reform in Algeria, Sauvy reversed his position.  At a conference held at the Centre du 
Landy, Sauvy argued that not only did Algeria become an underdeveloped territory by virtue of 
France’s colonial domination, as he had argued before, but that this underdevelopment was a 
primary cause of nationalist rebellion and a reason for Algerian independence. 450  Sauvy’s 
argument was twofold. First, based on economic projections provided by specialists at INED, it 
could no longer be said that sufficient development of Algeria’s infrastructure “costs too much,” 
but rather the costs of development were unrealistic. Even if the population of Algeria ceased to 
grow at the rate of other under-developed nations and all went according to plan, France would 
need to spend an estimated FF 507 billion by 1966. Furthermore, Algeria would most likely 
always be economically inferior to the metropole, whether or not the proper investments could 
be made.451 Secondly, Sauvy referred to the psychological detriment of colonialism as outlined 
by Albert Memmi’s Portrait of the Colonized, published in 1957. The inferiority complex caused 
                                                 
449 C. Ageron, “Lettre Ouvert à M. Sauvy,” Consciences Maghrébines 5 (1955), np, copy 
found in Fonds Daniel Guérin, F delta 0721/78/5, Bibliothèque de documentation internationale 
contemporaine, Nanterre. Ageron’s original underscored the last sentence and used the English 
word “South.”  
450  Alfred Sauvy, “Le sous-développement économique et les conditions de 
développement.” The conference’s talks were published in La question algérienne, by Jean 
Dresch, Charles-André Julien, Henri Marrou, Alfred Sauvy, Pierre Stibbe (Paris: Éditions de 
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by domination of all types, Sauvy concluded, meant that a prosperous Algeria needed its 
independence. Even a loose form of federated association with France would only reproduce 
colonial anxieties under new guises, which would harm economic development. Once free from 
imperial domination, Algerians would be able to take the necessary steps needed to reform their 
own infrastructure that the French were unable and unwilling to do. Far from resigning in the 
face of their demographic difficulties, the fact of the Algerian uprising illustrated that the will to 
remake Algeria’s future already existed. As Sauvy put it, “Muslims, one often says, are passive 
[mous], fatalists, and have no sense of organization. Recent events lead us to revise this 
cliché.”452 In a dry and matter-of-fact tone somewhat odds with the rest of his essay, Sauvy 
concluded, “Thus, from considerations strictly economic and demographic, naturally applied to 
the experiences of other countries, we are led to recommend an emancipation that oppressed 
peoples claim for themselves with violence.” His argument was, of course, not strictly economic 
and demographic, even if he strategically framed it as only a matter of data. From the outset of 
the essay Sauvy invoked the moral stakes of French rule in Algeria when he ruled out the 
Malthusian option of simply pulling all investments from Algeria to induce heightened mortality 
rates and relieve demographic pressure. Sauvy saw the arguments in favor of this approach, most 
notably promoted by the American William Vogt, as particularly reprehensible.453 Though he 
cited Vogt in his text, Sauvy undoubtedly knew that this theory held sway in some corners of the 
government, particularly those who used demographic analyses to support resettlement camps in 
Algeria and encourage as much military destruction as possible.454 
                                                 
452 Sauvy, “Le sous-développement économique,” 116-117. Albert Memmi, Portrait du 
colonisé, précédé du portrait du colonisateur (Paris: Buchet/Chastel, 1957).  
453 Sauvy, “Le sous-développement économique,” 120. See also Sauvy, Malthus et les 
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Invocations of North African demography were ubiquitous in discussions of Algerian 
independence during the Algerian War and attest to both the power of specialists in post-war 
France as well as the effectiveness of Sauvy’s commitment to public outreach. INED’s analyses 
and Sauvy’s own statements on Algeria gained an audience well beyond the chambers of the 
government. Francis and Collette Jeanson’s Outlaw Algeria, one of the first books arguing for 
Algerian independence once the war began, contained a separate chapter on the demographic 
state of Algeria and cited one of Sauvy’s essays from L’Express. 455  For the Jeansons the 
demographic trends and lack of the necessary social and economic structures available to support 
the population were proof that France had treated Algeria as an entity separate from the 
Republic. Jean-François Lyotard also cited the same article from L’Express in his first statement 
on North Africa in the journal Socialisme ou barbarie.456 Raymond Aron’s two studies arguing 
for France’s withdrawal from Algeria, The Algerian Tragedy (1957) and Algeria and the 
Republic (1958), by contrast, cited demographic analyses and referred to Sauvy’s writings in 
particular, but did so as part of an extra-moral calculus that saw Algeria as too expensive for 
France to fight over.457 By the time a young Pierre Bourdieu began writing reports for the 
Algerian Gouvernement Général in 1959, it was expected to mention the “demographic upsurge 
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brought about by an increase in fertility and a decline in mortality.”458 This, for Bourdieu was the 
starting point: as Sauvy concluded, Bourdieu argued the destruction of indigenous social systems 
combined with the lack of any development was a prime factor in the formation of Algerian 
revolutionary consciousness.459 
The demographic terms in which Sauvy characterized the Algerian War became one of 
the main touchstones for supporters of an independent Algeria. Beyond the ideological force of 
characterizing the developing world as a new revolutionary third estate oppressed by both the 
West and the East, the effect of describing events in Algeria in terms of large numbers added to 
the overall sense of historical (and mathematic) fatalism hanging over the French Empire. While 
Sauvy’s arguments coexisted with postwar international arguments about the demographic 
problems colonial populations posed to colonial powers, as well as the cost-benefit arguments 
popularized by Raymond Cartier, it should be apparent that Sauvy’s own positions on North 
Africa are much more complicated than these narratives would suggest. Sauvy’s position was not 
merely one that theorized Algeria as swept up in the tide of history—making decolonization of 
Algeria an inevitable outcome and downplaying the active role of Algerian nationalist actions—
but stressed the political potential in a changing demographic climate.  
Though his change of heart on the future of Algeria occurred before Algerian 
decolonization was definite, for Sauvy, as for so many other critics of France’s empire, an 
Algeria independent of France was not an automatic position. Despite the fact that he placed a 
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high degree of importance on the effects of population growth that could outpace a region’s 
infrastructure and resources, his demographic conclusions were not Malthusian. Rather, for 
Sauvy human agency and economic planning always had the potential to subvert foregone 
conclusions and supposed Malthusian determinisms. Sauvy was neither caught up in describing 
the process of a self-destructing imperial domination, nor simply a process in recognizing an 
Algerian other on its own terms. Rather, the more Algeria looked like pre-Revolutionary France, 
the less tenable it became to conclude that Algeria should be, in fact, a part of France itself. But 
the parochial conceptualization that equated the third world to the third estate was not merely a 
way of disavowing responsibility in the face of impersonal historical forces, or simply 
reinforcing a sense of development that kept Algeria at arm’s length, since the result of these 
characterizations of Algeria stressed its close relationship with France. Sauvy’s stance presented 
a form of Berque’s historical recapitulation with a mathematically-objective veneer.  
 
Neither Julien, Berque, nor Sauvy should be viewed as prime movers of Algerian decolonization. 
For one, the way “decolonization” played out was at odds with Julien’s longstanding vision of an 
autonomous, yet federated post-colonial North Africa. Berque and Sauvy only came to embrace 
an independent Algeria midway through the war, and even then both thought complete autonomy 
for Algeria was a risky prospect. For another, despite the profound connection between Julien’s 
politics and historical practices, he tried to maintain a position that did not conflate political 
idealism with historical idealism. Making up or forcing an anticolonial narrative to combat a 
colonial narrative would betray any notion of historical truth.460 And despite their recognition of 
the political relevance of their work, Berque and Sauvy saw themselves as describing processes 
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that were already unfolding. The importance of their work lay in the ways in which they 
reframed historical understandings of North Africa, describing it in ways that were not at odd 
with the type of history ascribed to metropolitan France and arguing Algeria was at the advent of 
a modern political existence.  
 The project of Algerian decolonization certainly had to be invented; these three figures 
provided some of the raw materials with which the end to French Algeria was constructed. But 
two key caveats to this conclusion are just as important to remember. First, seeing Algeria as 
historically, politically, and demographically proximate to modern France did not automatically 
lead Julien, Berque, and Sauvy to conclude France’s presence in Algeria should abruptly end. 
Even the analogy with the French Revolution was conceptually capacious enough to entertain the 
need for a lasting Franco-Algerian relationship. Not every revolution is thought of as a war of 
independence, nor as a matter of conceptual inevitability.461 But bringing the French Revolution 
into conversation with Algeria’s modern potential did shift the horizon possibilities in a direction 
that gave intellectuals the conceptual tools to think about the prospects of an independent 
Algeria. As Jean-Marie Domenach put it in 1956, “It’s 1789 that made revolution a historical 
possibility. It foregrounds the experience of the revolutions currently underway in the world; 
they know its difficulties, detours, points of weakness.”462 As the possibilities ended for first 
equal assimilation then federation ended, this historical vision that conceptually integrated 
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Algeria into French Revolutionary history also justified its independence. While most modes of 
developmentalist history tend to stress the distance between the West and the rest of the world, in 
this case the result was proximity.463  
 Physical proximity and strong intellectual networks also gave legs to these new historical 
positions. The fact that Algeria was first and foremost home for both Julien and Berque, in 
addition to their relationships with Algerian nationalists, meant it was less possible for them to 
see Algerians as a distant other. Their dedication to making the civilizing mission work, and 
repeatedly seeing it fall short, made them well placed to rethink received wisdom. The 
institutional and personal networks of all three, on top of their public presence during the French 
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The Dialectics of Historical Violence 
Like other anticolonial intellectuals in the 1950s and 60s, Jean-Paul Sartre occasionally 
compared colonial repression and racism to the lofty ideals on which the French nation 
supposedly stood. Before the war began, for instance, he explained to the journal La République 
algérienne that “neither the ‘right of peoples to decide their own fate’ nor the ‘rights of man 
formulated in 1789’ have been recognized for the colonized by the colonizers.”464 Yet amidst the 
direct parallels others made between revolution in Algeria and France’s own revolutionary 
tradition, Sartre did not make the analogy in his pubic interventions on the topic. Perhaps the 
closest Sartre came to using French Revolutionary language in those writings was his essay “The 
Frogs Who Wanted a King,” following de Gaulle’s May 1958 coup. Yet despite Sartre’s 
conclusion that de Gaulle was a “constitutional monarch,” the essay’s title was a play on Aesop’s 
fable of the same name, not a direct reference to the French Revolution.465 
The French Revolution nonetheless haunts the theory of history and revolutionary 
struggle Sartre formulated in the 1950s; and through this lens Sartre engaged Algeria via the 
French Revolution. The French Revolution may have been a subterranean referent in Sartre’s 
views on the Algerian War, but it was crucial to the genesis of his most complete statements on 
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revolutionary politics, The Discourse on Method, published in 1957, and The Critique of 
Dialectical Reason, Volume 1, published in 1960.  
 
 In the 1950s, to think about revolution Sartre often thought through the French 
Revolution. He was preoccupied with the French Revolution from the postwar through the 
Algerian War in at least two different contexts, both important prologues to the Critique. First, 
amongst his revolutionary theory sparring partners in the postwar, the French Revolution and 
arguments over its correct interpretation were frequent points of reference. Differences in 
interpretation between Sartre and his interlocutors often used the French Revolution as their 
medium of explanation. Second, amidst Sartre’s statements that appeared ex negativo, he worked 
on a series of eventually abandoned analyses and dramatizations of vignettes from the French 
Revolution. Within these unedited notes Sartre first worked through some of the concepts that 
would be central to his revolutionary philosophy in the Critique: seriality, the fused group, the 
pledge, and fraternity-terror.      
 Sartre thought these three terms—revolution, French Revolution, Algeria—concurrently, 
even if he did not always explicitly vocalize them together. In order to understand what made the 
revolutionary struggle in Algeria legitimate we need to make explicit what Sartre himself and 
much of his audience only thought implicitly. Aside from adding another footnote to the ever-
growing commentary on Sartre’s life and work, integrating this dimension of his historical 
approach also informs analysis of other more contentious areas of Sartre studies, most notably 
his preface to Frantz Fanon’s 1961 analysis of decolonization, The Wretched of the Earth. 
 Like many other postwar French political theorists, Sartre used the historical material of 
the French Revolution as a laboratory in which he could test his own historical-political theories. 
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Unless one were an antiquated counterrevolutionary monarchist or an unrepentant partisan of the 
far right (whom Sartre would not hesitate to call fascist), the credentials of the French Revolution 
were unimpeachable. If a theory of history and political change could account for the Revolution, 
then it had purchase as a framework for metahistorical analysis. Like a jazz musician learning the 
master standards before writing his own music, Sartre’s political and historical theories that 
emerged in the midst of the Algerian War were fundamentally imbued with Sartre’s 
understanding of the French Revolution’s structure. There could be no more perfect political 
standard than the French Revolution for those seeking to reinvigorate historical and Marxist 
theory, especially after Russia ceased being the obvious standard-bearer for world revolution. 
And in this regard it is not surprising that so many radical theorists along with Sartre drew on the 
Revolution’s melodic structure and time signature to form their own compositions. If the bases 
for the French Revolution were unquestionably sound for radical leftists, then differences in 
interpretation came down to variations on the theme.  
 
Sartre and Colonial Revolution 
The end of World War II marked important change in Sartre’s philosophy. After the war, 
Sartre began to connect his first statements on his existentialist philosophy to its engagement 
with the world of politics and celebrity. Though he claimed before the war he was apolitical, 
after 1945 Sartre argued the aim of the intellectual was to engage with a wider public and he 
quickly looked for avenues to assert the political relevance of the ideas in Being and Nothingness 
(1943). Not coincidentally, his 1946 “Existentialism is a Humanism” moment was also the 
moment of his explicit political radicalization and Marxist fellow traveling. The need for direct 
political engagement had become painfully clear for many survivors of the Occupation and 
 206 
Resistance.466 Many of Sartre’s political essays from the forties through the early sixties can 
easily be charted as a roadmap highlighting where Sartre positioned himself in the postwar leftist 
political spectrum. Sartre’s theoretical engagements in the postwar have typically been defined 
by his relationship to Marxism and his position towards the French Communist Party and the 
USSR, even if those engagements have only recently been systematically examined.467 To be 
sure, Sartre had encountered The German Ideology and Capital in the 1920s while at university, 
and his wartime experiences led to his self-aware Marxist conversion.468 Though he rebuked the 
rigid and caricature-like Marxism of PCF philosophers like Roger Garaudy and Pierre Naville, 
he nonetheless saw the task of his own philosophical program to find a via media between 
existentialism and Marxism, adding a moral and political program to the philosophy of free will 
in Being and Nothingness.469 Initially, Sartre placed his political hopes in the third-way political 
group Rassemblement Démocratique Révolutionnaire. After this faltered, he came close to 
aligning himself with PCF orthodoxy—a move for which he has been criticized highly—only to 
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rebuke Stalin and Stalinism following the invasion of Hungary in 1956.470 Sartre then dedicated 
a large part of the Critique of Dialectical Reason (and especially its posthumously published 
second volume) to finding a way of critiquing the Soviet Union through an existential-marxist 
analysis.471 In the midst of these shifting positions Sartre also engaged, often caustically, with 
Albert Camus and Raymond Aron’s antirevolutionary stance, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s own 
shifting positions vis-à-vis Stalinism, and the ultra-leftist position taken by Daniel Guérin.  
            If the trajectory of Sartre’s communism seems tortuous, his commitment to revolutionary 
critiques of colonialism at the same time was not subject to the same on-again-off-again 
rollercoaster. The early editorial decisions for Sartre’s journal Les Temps modernes reflect a 
willingness to offer outlets to critiques of colonial regimes. Sartre himself also quickly extended 
his analysis of anti-semitism to colonial racism. Well before the Algerian War began, articles on 
colonialism had appeared in Les Temps modernes. Sartre was also on the editorial board for the 
anticolonial journal Présence africaine. In 1953 he came to the defense of Henri Martin, a 
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French naval soldier who refused to fight in the Indochinese War.472 During the Algerian War 
Sartre increased his commitment to anticolonial politics and broadened his interests to Latin 
America and China, and his philosophy reflected that increased commitment. From the fifties 
through the seventies, there was no anticolonial or third worldist cause to which Sartre would not 
lend his name and unequivocal public support.473 
 Many of Sartre’s statements on Algeria were in line with those of other anticolonial 
intellectuals during the war, initially calling for peaceful negotiations, then recognizing the FLN 
as the rightful representatives of a new revolutionary political entity. In “Colonialism is a 
System,” Sartre largely built off of the same arguments offered by Collette and Francis Jeanson.  
Algeria, like the rest of France’s empire, was the victim of economic exploitation. The Algerian 
workers had become an “immense agricultural proletariat” caught up in the contradictions of a 
bourgeois capitalist society. Not even the extension of France’s so-called universalist laws could 
amend the economic scenario that treated Algerians as “sub-human.” While describing Algeria 
as the site of capitalist exploitation, Sartre also echoed other strains of anti-colonialist discourse 
that labeled the relations in Algeria as feudal relations pushed to their limit: “The liquidation of 
feudal structures, after having weakened the Arab resistance, has the effect of facilitating this 
adoption of collective consciousness… Algerian nationalism is not the simple revival of ancient 
traditions, of ancient attachments: it is the singular issue inducing Algerians to end their 
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exploitation.”474 A diverse group of intellectuals and academics, from Alfred Sauvy to Jacques 
Berque, Jean-Marie Domenach, Charles-André Julien, and Daniel Guérin, came to agree on the 
broad outlines of the crisis. French economic exploitation led to the growth of a modern Algerian 
national identity. After the May 1958 coup that signaled de Gaulle’s return to power, Sartre’s 
diagnosis of the political situation echoed many others’ on the left, drawing on the image of an 
attempt at a royal restoration. Sartre argued there were dangers in believing in a heroic de Gaulle 
who would be able to bring peace to Algeria on his own, not least of all because he was 
supported by the same colonial officers who were responsible for the worst examples of Algerian 
violence. Ahead of the plebiscite arranged to confirm de Gaulle’s formation of a new Republic, 
Sartre reminded readers of Express that sovereignty resided in “the French people themselves,” 
and that saying no to General de Gaulle would amount to saying no to monarchy and to 
endorsing a new Constituent Assembly. The Fourth Republic was dead, but the Fifth could only 
be formed by the will of the French nation.475 Revolution in Algeria had provoked a potentially 
revolutionary situation at home. Sartre’s publicly unwavering support for the Front de Libération 
Nationale (FLN), even amidst terrorist campaigns and evidence of war crimes, made him an 
ideal target for the right-wing Organisation de l’armée secrète (OAS), which bombed his Paris 
flat twice, in July 1961 and January 1962, along with the offices of Les Temps modernes in May 
of 1961.476 For the OAS, attacking Sartre was as good as attacking an FLN leader.  As the war 
entered its final years anticolonialists increasingly discussed Algerian nationalists as brothers 
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from the same (French) revolutionary family. In turn, Sartre gave the editorial board of Les 
Temps modernes carte blanche to use his name in defense of the accused members of the 
Jeanson network that aided the FLN in Europe. As the Manifesto of the 121 declared in 1960, 
“The cause of the Algerian people, which is decisively contributing to the destruction of the 
colonial system, is the cause of all free men.” Sartre contributed his name and the support of Les 
Temps modernes to the Manifesto, though no journal risked printing it.477 
 
The Standard 
 As we have seen (in previous chapters), each of the episodes during the Algerian War in 
which Sartre was engaged was imbued with the language of the French Revolution. The 
Revolution in the forties and fifties followed the historiographical school centered on the Society 
for Robespierrist Studies. For these historians, Revolution represented the promise of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, the overcoming of premodern social structures, the 
birth of the secular French Republic, the strength of citizen defense forces, and the tragic 
necessity of the Terror in the face of the Revolution’s enemies. And importantly, most agreed 
with Clemenceau’s claim that the Revolution could not be taken piecemeal. Rather, it had to be 
taken en bloc.478 When applied to Algeria, this understanding of the Revolution played out in 
often surprising ways. Supporters (and even some detractors) of the Committee Against the 
Pursuit of War in North Africa referred to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, as 
did those who criticized the first revelations of the French Army’s use of extraordinary rendition 
and torture. The coincidence of Robespierre’s 200th Anniversary and de Gaulle’s May 1958 coup 
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intensified and diversified invocations of the Revolution. By the war’s closing years the left 
accepted that the Algerian War was really the Algerian Revolution. Being faithful to France’s 
Revolutionary heritage meant recognizing this and embracing efforts toward an independent 
Algeria in a spirit of revolutionary confraternity.  
 Even before the Algerian War began, however, the French Revolution entered into 
political theorists’ discussions of the shape postwar France should take. For instance, already in 
1947, Paul Ricœur noted that all postwar “separatist movements” had “the same passion that 
animated our 1789.”479  The very structure of discourse on North Africa naturalized the analogy 
between colonial agitation and late ancien régime crisis. North Africa was not only backward, 
but stuck in a “feudal era” that contained political problems similar to the Third Estate of the 
1780s, hence Alfred Sauvy’s claim that the third world was the third estate’s equivalent. As 
Sartre himself explained in 1956, one of the causes of colonial revolt was the destruction of 
feudal structures.480 In addition, since many in France saw the Second World War as a struggle 
to preserve the French Revolution’s legacy against fascist Germany and a counterrevolutionary 
Vichy Régime, it is not altogether surprising that postwar debates over revolution in France were 
often mediated through discussions of the Revolution. This is no less true for many of Sartre’s 
main postwar interlocutors.  
For a short time, Albert Camus rode high on the revolutionary zeal of the post-occupation 
purges, claiming in the pages of Combat, “This country does not need a Talleyrand. It needs a 
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Saint-Just.”481  By 1951, however, Camus reconsidered the desirability of revolution, opting 
instead to support the idea of rebellions that recognized their own limits. In The Rebel, the 
French Revolution represented the moment in modern history where such limits were thoroughly 
transgressed and the era of all consuming revolutions began. “The French Revolution,” claimed 
Camus, “inaugurates modern times simultaneously with the era of formal morality… Morality, 
when it is formal, devours.” The death of Louis XVI marked the desacralization of society and 
the destruction of political limits. The evils of modern revolutionary politics could be traced back 
to this impulse.482 When the war began in Algeria Camus remained tied to the notion of a 
genuinely French community and its civilizing potential for all Algerians, Muslim and non-
Muslim alike. He had no truck with the claims of anticolonialists who saw a separate national 
identity that could counter France’s claims. Those who used the French Revolution justify 
support for the FLN would not find an endorsement from Camus—they had doubly erred in their 
reasoning.483  
Raymond Aron came to similar conclusions around the same time. Aron had already 
noted the ways in which the Revolution’s historiography was determined by the political 
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leanings of its historians, even among the so-called scientific approaches.484 In The Opium of the 
Intellectuals, Aron went further to say that the left’s idealized versions of the French Revolution, 
whatever their bearing on historical reality, served a vital unifying function. Despite the left’s 
many internal divisions, all parts of the left could agree on the importance of 1789. The 
Liberation had only re-stoked such revolutionary sentiments. But beyond the Revolution’s role 
as political myth, it also represented an ideal-type highlighting the dangers of modern politics. 
By being inherently utopian, all revolutions since 1789 risked justifying all manner of evil in 
service of their cause. For Aron, this impulse betrayed the essence of the political: reform and 
negotiation around the ever-changing demands of the present.485 Such a stance also drove Aron’s 
position on the Algerian War. No ideological stance mattered in the face of the material and 
economic interests of both parties. By 1958 it was clear to Aron that the only political solution 
meant an independent Algeria.486 
 Even among those more sympathetic to revolutionary politics, however, the French 
Revolution was the standard history with which intellectuals and ideologues bolstered their 
political theories. Daniel Guérin’s history of the French Revolution, Bourgeois et bras nus, 
written under the Occupation, made the case for the postwar relevance of the French Revolution, 
by calling into question the then-dominant interpretation of the Revolution that supposedly 
favored the Jacobins as its true heroes. Rather, according to Guérin, a nascent proletariat drove 
the French Revolution towards the goals of economic equality and the dissolution of the state. 
The bras nus working masses bore the subjective character of proletarian ideals, despite the 
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objectively bourgeois outcome of the Revolution. Then, as in the postwar, a strong Jacobin state 
was not the political solution but rather the problem. Just as most historians panned Guérin’s 
history of the French Revolution, his history served as a common punching bag for both Stalinist 
and anti-Stalinist intellectuals.487 Largely in response to positions taken by other leftists, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, too, justified many of his views of history by critiquing Guérin’s narrative of the 
French Revolution. In Adventures of the Dialectic Merleau-Ponty harshly criticized those, like 
Lukács and Garaudy, who would give Stalinists a blank check to do whatever they wanted in the 
name of a better tomorrow.488 But he also took supporters of the idea of permanent revolution 
like Daniel Guérin to task. Guérin had presented the bras nus of the French Revolution as a 
proletariat in formation eventually betrayed by the Mountain, who were the guardians of 
bourgeois interests. The solution was to promote a sense of continual revolution, so that 
revolutionary energy from below, like that of the working-class bras nus, could never be 
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betrayed by a counter-revolutionary state apparatus. Guérin saw the statist Jacobinism of the 
Revolution as directly correlative to Stalinism and the PCF, and to a certain extent so did 
Merleau-Ponty. However, if one were to believe Guérin’s view of history, Merleau-Ponty 
claimed, then all losers in history are by default the proletariat, all winners the bourgeoisie, and 
“all of history is only the eve of a tomorrow which is always deferred, the privation of a being 
which will never be.” 489  According to Merleau-Ponty, a metahistory built from the French 
Revolution flattened the historical circumstances and contingencies that form the basis of all 
political action. In other words, “It is a dream of an ‘end of politics’ out of which one wants to 
make a politics.”490 One could and should learn lessons from the history of the Revolution, but 
those lessons, like all politics, were based on specific contexts and contingencies. It was wrong 
to replicate the leitmotif of 1789 for every time and place. The Guérin-Merleau-Ponty polemic 
reflected their positions on Algeria as well. Guérin supported the Mouvement National Algérien 
(MNA), since he thought they represented the Algerian workers against the centralizing FLN, a 
position that mirrored his preference for the bras nus over the Jacobin club.491 Merleau-Ponty, 
however, claimed there was a breakdown in the left’s stance over Algeria because they had 
merely wanted to import their Marxist categories into the colonies; the left had forgotten that 
“revolutionary politics was a project [un faire], a realism, the birth of a force.” This project had 
to be rooted in the struggle’s specific historical and political circumstances. 492 
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Going to the Woodshed 
It is through these contexts, including the debates surrounding Guérin’s interpretation of 
the French Revolution, that Sartre engaged the contemporary political relevance of the French 
Revolution during the Algerian War. In published form, the Discourse on Method outlined 
Sartre’s response to Marxist historical writing and The Critique of Dialectical Reason fleshed out 
the workings of his new theory. The former primarily staked its arguments on historical 
interpretation in analyses of the French Revolution (with fewer but equally important discussions 
of Sartre’s later passion, Gustave Flaubert). The perils of colonialism only appear in passing. In 
the latter work, however, Sartre increased his discussion of colonialism and other historical 
instances of oppression (e.g., nineteenth-century rebellions, the Russian Revolution, the 
American South). But the French Revolution still played a key interpretive role. In addition, 
several of Sartre’s unpublished manuscripts that preceded both the Discourse and the Critique 
reveal the French Revolution’s importance in the genealogy of Sartre’s theories of revolution.     
As early as the 1940s, Sartre attempted to piece together the implications of his 
existentialist philosophy for understanding change over time. In his War Diaries, he began his 
first foray into existential psychoanalysis, speculating about the effects of German Emperor 
Wilhelm II’s childhood and their historical consequences.493 His 1946 essay “Materialism and 
Revolution” explained the inadequacy of Marxist explanatory frameworks for history since their 
extreme mechanistic frameworks were unable to account for the role of human freedom and 
contingency in historical developments. His unpublished Notebooks for an Ethics, composed 
between 1947 and 1948, continued in this vein, opposing determinist Marxist views of history 
and existentialist interpretations of history that stressed moral projects. His early vision of an 
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existentialist history stressed contingency, the lack of any pre-determined culmination or 
totalization at history’s end, and the role of individuals working toward their own projects and 
those shared with other individuals.494   
From 1950 to 1955 Sartre began at least three separate studies on material concerning the 
French Revolution.495 None of them were published in their composed form, yet all three dealt 
with material that was central to the Critique and are Sartre’s earliest extant manuscript notes 
that could be seen as part of the Critique’s creation. Sartre titled the first manuscript “May-June 
1789.” It dealt with the political divisions at the Estates General that eventually led to the 
formation of the National Assembly and the swearing of the Tennis Court Oath and was likely 
composed between 1950 and 1951.496 The second manuscript, written from 1951 to 1953 and 
titled “Liberty-Equality,” dealt with the formation of a bourgeois ideology from the old regime to 
the Revolution.497 The last manuscript was an abandoned treatment for a screenplay centering on 
the Jacobin politician and contemporary of Maximilien Robespierre, Joseph Le Bon (1765-
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1795), composed around 1955.498 In particular, the first two of these manuscripts demonstrate 
Sartre’s interest in working through the historiography of the French Revolution, with numerous 
references to historians Alphonse Aulard, Jean Egret, Gérard Walter, Jacques Godechot, Georges 
Lefebvre, and Albert Soboul. They also demonstrate engagement with primary sources, drawing 
heavily on the eighteenth-century newspaper Le Moniteur, Buchez’s Parliamentary History, 
Robespierre’s correspondence, as well as memoirs from Malouet, Bailly, and l’Abbé de 
Grégoire.499 When discussing the genesis of ideologies, Sartre drew heavily from Montesquieu’s 
Spirit of the Laws and mirrored many of the analyses Lucien Goldmann was developing at the 
same time.500 Sartre made no reference to Goldmann in the manuscripts, but did cite him in the 
Discourse on Method.501 The manuscripts primarily demonstrate a deep engagement with the 
French Revolution’s history, and many of the concepts that form the backbone of the first 
volume of the Critique were fleshed out in these manuscripts on the Revolution. Secondly, Sartre 
developed the most important concepts of the Critique in these manuscripts: seriality, the group 
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in fusion, the pledge, and fraternity-terror. Sartre’s thinking on revolutionary struggle in the 
1950s began with the French Revolution, and it was the French Revolution that provided the 
template for understanding Soviet tragedy and the Algerian Revolution.502  
By 1957, Sartre would put his studies of the Revolution to use in published writings. Like 
many historians and political theorists, Sartre directly responded to Guérin’s new challenge to 
Jacobin narratives of the Revolution, echoing many of Merleau-Ponty’s criticisms. The 
Discourse on Method, first published in the Polish journal Twórczość [The Work] with a revised 
version appearing in Les Temps modernes in 1957 under the title “Existentialism and Marxism,” 
would later act as the introduction to Sartre’s larger Critique. Here, Sartre claimed both Lukács 
and Guérin each presented their own vulgarized form of Marxist history in which individual 
freedoms did not ultimately matter in the face of metahistorical struggles. Though Sartre partly 
felt an urgency to respond to Lukács’ criticism that existentialism and Marxism could never 
coexist, he frequently criticized both Lukács and Guérin in the same breath. Guérin perhaps 
garnered a slightly kinder treatment—Sartre opined it was one of the better contributions to 
Marxist thought in recent years—but still went out of his way to elaborate the mistakes Guérin 
made in his attempts to “force history” into his predetermined molds.503 Individuals and their 
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free actions simply dissolved “in a bath of sulphuric acid.”504 Thus, for Guérin, the actions of the 
Convention were driven by bourgeois mercantilist interests and not the day-to-day politics or 
Revolutionary aims of each of its members. Sartre’s reaction was similar to that of professional 
historians who had criticized Guérin. Reducing key moments in the Revolution to mercantilist 
economics made little sense—even less so when the result was a picture that painted Girondins 
and Jacobins as anti-revolutionary. Sartre specified that this sort of historical reductionism was 
not just a problem for Guérin and Lukacs, however, but for nearly all contemporary Marxists.505 
To understand historical individuals, for example Gustave Flaubert, to whom Sartre would later 
in life devote most of his critical attention, it was inadequate to take ready-formed categories and 
fit individuals into them. Though much of Flaubert’s life encapsulated stereotypes of French 
nineteenth-century petit bourgeois culture, a good deal also escaped them. To use Sartre’s later 
terminology, the task was to find the proper balance between the universal and the particular—a 
balance that would not reduce the one to the other.506  
 On the one hand, Sartre made his negative case against vulgar Marxist attempts to write 
history. But he also put forth a positive framework for thinking about history that he thought 
would do justice to an existentialist framework of free action and a Marxist view of material 
conditions and history moving towards a totalizing goal. It was possible, Sartre claimed, to 
account for both the subjective and objective forces of history, individual will and material 
conditions, at the same time. As evidence, Sartre approvingly cited Henri Lefebvre’s work on 
                                                 
504 Sartre, Questions de méthode, 37. 
505 Sartre also criticized Gestalt psychoalanalyst Abram Kardiner and sociologist Kurt 
Lewin, preferring Henri Lefebvre to the former and Claude Lévi-Strauss to the latter. Sartre, 
Questions de méthode, 51-54. 
506 Ibid., 45-46; Sartre, L’Idiot de la famille, 3 Vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1971); Sartre, 
“L’universel singulier,” Situations IX (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), 152-190. 
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rural sociology. From Lefebvre’s method of dealing with “vertical” (diachronic) and “horizontal” 
(synchronic) complexities, Sartre created his “progressive-regressive” method.507  
 The progressive-regressive method is the tool that allowed Sartre to escape the traps into 
which he saw Guérin and Lukács falling. Taking Marx’s statement from the Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte that “Men make their own history but not under conditions of their 
own choosing,” Sartre insisted that too much emphasis had been placed on the material 
constraints of history. The former part of the equation needed to be given its due, and this was 
the task of existential analysis. Humans act as free agents within the material conditions into 
which they are placed, and it is this freedom that eventually might provide an exit from 
oppressive conditions. 508  Human existence is defined by its praxis, or humans’ intentional 
interactions with the material world. The results of this praxis, both intended and unintended, are 
                                                 
507  Henri Lefebvre, “Perspectives de sociologie rurale, Cahiers internationaux de 
sociologie 14 (1953), 122-140; Sartre, Questions de méthode, 41-42n. Lefebvre did not quite 
accept Sartre’s praise or adaptation. Lefebvre thought he had not done anything that Marx and 
Engels had not done before, and was pessimistic of Sartre’s attempt to align existentialism and 
Marxism. Stuart Elden, Understanding Henri Lefebvre: Theory and the Possible (London: 
Continuum, 2004), 36-39. Sartre’s division between the subjective and objective resembles 
Guérin’s professed methodological position. However, if Guérin’s heuristic did influence Sartre, 
he does not indicate this influence in his text. Further, if Guérin’s fault was with over-
emphasizing the objective side of the duality, Sartre’s favor lay on the subjective side, if only as 
a corrective to the Marxist interpretations against which he wrote.  
508 Sartre, Questions de méthode, 60-61. Sartre attributes this line to a letter written from 
Engels to Marx, but it more famously appears in the opening of the Eighteenth Brumaire. I have 
not been able to find the letter Sartre mentions, and other textual references point to Sartre 
engaging with the Eighteenth Brumaire, such as his reformulation of Marx’s statement that the 
revolutionaries of ’89 knew no other way of acting than through ancient Roman ideals. Compare 
Sartre’s, “To return to our Romans of ’89, their way of calling themselves Cato is their manner 
of being bourgeois, members of a class who discovered History and who already wanted to stop 
it, who purport to be universal and base the proud individualism of its members on competitive 
economics, at any rate the inheritors of a classical culture” (38-39), to Marx: “Camille 
Desmoulins, Danton, Robespierre, Saint-Just, Napoleon—these heroes of the former French 
revolution, as well as the political parties and massed crowds alike—accomplished the business 
of the day in Roman costumes and with Roman phrases: the unleashing and consolidation of 
modern bourgeois society.” Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in Later 
Political Writings, edited by Terrell Carver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 32. 
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what will lead to an historical totality. The method, according to Sartre, was thus both 
progressive and regressive: progressive because it acknowledged the objective results of history 
and regressive because it analyzed human freedom acting within given situations.  
To explain how his method could comprehend human freedoms and the projects that 
arise in situ, Sartre again predominantly relied on examples from the French Revolution. The 
Marquis de Sade, for instance, could neither be reduced to feudal nor nascent bourgeois 
ideologies. Sadism, so to speak, was the by-product of a person who felt alien to the feudal world 
in which he was born but used the language of nature and bourgeois universalism in ways 
foreign to other revolutionaries. The sans culottes were similarly tough to pin down in the 
process of the Revolution. The people were the locomotive force of the Revolution, and yet their 
political manifestations changed depending on material and ideological circumstance.509  
If the Discourse set out the stakes for Sartre’s project, then the Critique was an attempt to 
give flesh to the process through which individual goals mediated by the material world become 
the ends of history. The end result was a general framework encompassing the processes of all 
revolutionary movements. So, Sartre contended that “man as the future of man” is the ultimate 
end of historical action, “but the end is always a refashioning of the material order that by itself 
will make man possible.” 510  This was not simply a continuation of the arguments in 
“Existentialism is a Humanism,” though the language is similar, but rather a continuation of 
Sartre’s response to claims that his account of human freedom in his earlier works was divorced 
from material reality and historical constraints. If dialectical materialism were to be divorced 
from the primacy of human history, it would risk losing all meaning. The attempts of the natural 
sciences to encompass human history within the natural world’s immutable laws and processes, 
                                                 
509 Ibid., 75-80. 
510 Sartre, Critique de la raison dialectique, I, 192. 
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especially under the guise of biology and structuralist anthropology, lead to an epistemological 
impasse since they propose a totalizing system which cannot be known by the humans it 
encompasses. History had to be intelligible through the everyday experiences and desires of 
human beings operating within the material world.  
Throughout the Critique, Sartre vacillated between highly specific terminology and very 
concrete examples of human relations. Human praxis interacts with the material world and 
organizes it into a recognizable totality or system of relations (a passive category Sartre called 
the practico-inert). The material world of scarce resources and competition sets limits upon 
individual freedoms, but individuals and groups are nonetheless still free to rearrange the world 
in purposeful ways. Human beings in this system can be both the arrangers of their passive world 
as well as passive entities themselves as a collective (also termed “social beings”), insofar as they 
may represent a labor resource or obstacle for another person or another group. If an ensemble of 
individuals is defined by their differences from one another, or a lack of reciprocity, then they 
are considered as operating as a series. Human seriality is the domain of economic competition 
and scarcity, and another version of Sartre’s description of the objectifying process of 
“othering.” In the condition of seriality, humans are defined by an outside agent Sartre labels a 
“third” and not by this ensemble’s own common aims and ambitions (if indeed they have any). 
Humans in serial collectives are the stuff of economic exploitation, colonialism, racism, slavery. 
And we can see this as Sartre’s existentialism-friendly version of Marx’s analysis of commodity 
fetishism. Material scarcity forces individuals and objects to trade positions, with objects gaining 
life and agency while humans as labor capital are treated as objects.511 If, however, an ensemble 
is unified in its praxis and acts in a manner that respects each individual’s freedom reciprocally, 
                                                 
511 Karl Marx, Capital, Volume One, Part I, Chapter 1, Section 4, in The Marx-Engels 
Reader, Second Edition, edited by Robert Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 319-329. 
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then Sartre sees this new group, the group in fusion/fused group, as the way out of exploitation 
and othering.512   
The goal for any successful historical moment is to move from reified, non-reciprocal 
ensembles taken as a series to groups fused together under the auspices of reciprocity and 
common goals. Early in the Critique, Sartre posed the following quandary: “Existentialism 
denied the a priori existence of essences. At present do we not have to admit that they do exist 
and that they are the a priori characteristics of our passive being? And if they exist, how is 
praxis possible? We once said that one is never a coward or a thief. Accordingly, should I not 
now say that one makes oneself a bourgeois or a proletarian?”513  Sartre argued that social 
identities are at once the work of individual actions that affirm (or at least do not deny these) 
identities and identities that are reproduced in social relations. Passive social and material 
relations, or “playing this role,” can reaffirm these group identities, and active praxis has the 
power to transcend them.514 Out of such series, passive collectives of individuals form—such as 
                                                 
512 The move Sartre makes from his analyses of other-oriented interpersonal relations in 
Being and Nothingness to an other-oriented group dynamic with Marxist overtones in the 
Critique is far from obvious, though it is certainly foreshadowed in the unpublished Notebooks 
for an Ethics and Sartre’s postwar discussions of anti-Semitism and racism. For the tie to the 
Notebooks, see Thomas Anderson’s discussion of “The Group” in Sartre’s Two Ethics: From 
Authenticity to Integral Humanity (Chicago: Open Court, 1993), 97. For Sartre’s formulation of 
“marginal groups,” see Arthur, Unfinished Projects, Chapters One and Two. 
One can, however, see that Sartre’s moves were not wholly unexpected. André Gorz 
wrote a number of unpublished essays that tried to anticipate Sartre’s answers to the challenges 
posed by critics such as Merleau-Ponty and Lukács. Based on the introduction to the Critique 
published in Voies Nouvelles, no 3 (Juin-Juillet 58), Gorz anticipated a number of the themes 
covered in the rest of the Critique. “Ce travail a pour but de montrer la continuité philosophique 
qui relie l’Etre et le Néant…” [The aim of this work is to demonstrate the philosophical 
continuity that unites Being and Nothingness (to the Critique)…] Fonds André Gorz 1.1 IMEC. 
Based on material Gorz references in the text, 1959 appears to be a reliable date of composition. 
513 Sartre, Critique, I, 289, emphasis in original.   
514 Ibid., 293, emphasis in original, and “[A worker’s] attempt to unite with his equals 
and to oppose exploitation by a practical negation must be made through the projection of what 
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individuals tuning into the same radio broadcast at the same time. Each individual becomes the 
same generic object in his or her relation to the broadcaster.515  
In this scenario, violence is present in the world both in the form of direct interpersonal 
and intergroup relations and dispersed throughout the material world. Here Sartre followed 
Alexandre Kojève in giving the Hegelian master-slave dynamic a larger social-historical 
context.516 Sartre’s version, though, was in many ways more optimistic than Hegel’s for the 
capacity of this struggle to recognize the freedom and humanity of both groups. Even if the self 
and other are necessary counterparts, there are “an infinity of different forms” their reciprocal 
relations can take—there are options available for resolution that do not result in mutual 
annihilation.517 Even when serialized individuals make the transition to fused groups their pledge 
of reciprocity is still formed under the sign of violence. When individuals adopt what Sartre 
termed “the pledge” as an organizing principle of rights and duties within a group they at once 
affirm the fraternity between the group’s members as well as the threat of terror for betraying the 
group. According to Sartre, despite the fact that this violence can be subject to illegitimate abuse, 
“What matters is that no usurpation of violence (or conquest of power) can be intelligible unless 
violence is initially a particular, real, practical bond between freedoms within common action: in 
other words, this violence must be the kind of action on itself of the pledged group, in so far as 
                                                                                                                                                             
he is into his very praxis” (297). In this formula, Sartre saw similarities with Marx’s stance in 
The German Ideology.  
515 Sartre, Critique, I, 320. 
516  Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, compiled by Raymond 
Queneau, translated by James H. Nichols, Jr. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980).  
517  Ibid., I, 193. Also see Sartre’s statements on the passé nature of the Soviet 
Revolutionary model: “today, wherever a new socialist régime establishes itself, the already 
developing socialization of half the world will produce this new revolution in a conjuncture and 
historical totalization quite different from those that characterized the revolution of 1917” (630, 
emphasis in original). Paige Arthur also sees this important critique of Hegel and Kojève in the 
earlier unpublished Notebooks for an Ethics. Paige Arthur, Unfinished Projects, 27. 
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this action is re-created, carried out and accepted by all.”518 It is not a question, then, of denying 
or refusing violence, but rather choosing between a reified and oppressive violence of the 
practico-inert or the violence directed towards the formation of historically progressive 
projects.519 The former violence is aligned with seriality, the latter is aligned with the fused 
group.  
This overly-pessimistic view of human relations remained a consistent thread from 
Sartre’s early philosophy through the Critique. Sartre cast relations with other people as 
fundamentally conflict-ridden and pessimistic in Being and Nothingness: “So long as [multiple] 
consciousnesses exist, the separation and conflict of consciousness will remain; we shall simply 
have discovered their foundation and their true terrain.” Or, as his contemporary play No Exit 
                                                 
518 Sartre, Critique, I, 448. 
519 See also Sartre, Critique, I, 303n. “Every system of values rests on exploitation and 
oppression; every system of values effectively negates exploitation and oppression (even 
aristocratic systems, if not explicitly at least in their internal logic); every system of values 
confirms exploitation and oppression (even systems constructed by oppressed classes, even if 
unintended, they do so in the fact they are systems); every system of values, in so far as it is 
based on a social practice, contributes directly or indirectly to establishing measures [dispositifs] 
and apparatuses which, when the time comes (for example, on the basis of a revolution in 
techniques and tools) will allow this particular oppression and exploitation to be negated; every 
system of values, at the moment of its revolutionary efficacy, ceases to be a system, and values 
cease to be values: their character was due to the fact that they could not be transcended; and 
circumstances, overthrowing structures, institutions and exigencies, transform them into 
transcended significations. Systems are reabsorbed into the organizations they have created and 
the organizations, transformed by the overthrow of the social field, integrate themselves into new 
collective actions, carried out in the context of the new exigencies and newly-discovered values.” 
Recent debate on Sartre’s approach to violence has focused precisely on this dimension of the 
Critique as an often-passed-over part of Sartre’s work. See Ronald Santoni, Sartre On Violence: 
Curiously Ambivalent (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003); Marguerite 
La Caze, “Sartre Integrating Ethics and Politics: The Case of Terrorism,” Parrhesia 3 (2007), 
43-54; Michael Fleming, “Sartre on Violence: Not So Ambivalent?” Sartre Studies International 
17, no 1 (2011), 20-40; Ronald Santoni, “Concerning the Ambivalence of Sartre on Violence: A 
Commentary/Rejoinder,” Sartre Studies International 19, no 2 (2013), 112-128. Fleming argues 
that in order to grasp the full dimensions of the violence of the practico-inert in Sartre’s thought 
it has to be delineated into its varied unintentional (economic violence and symbolic violence) 
and intentional (direct repression) forms (24-25). 
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summarized his position, “Hell is—other people,” a secular stance that begs the impossibility of 
a secular salvation.520 While the unpublished Notebooks for an Ethics pondered ways out of 
interpersonal conflict, the power of Sartre’s published analyses of anti-semitism and racism attest 
to the unrepentant pessimism of the system. 
Colonial rebellions around the world occupied much of Sartre’s political engagements 
while writing the Critique and it is no surprise that he applied his revolutionary theory to the 
oppression and racism inherent in colonial systems. In the Critique, colonialism acts as a limit-
case where the logic of alterity cemented in social relations exists as an extreme that could not be 
escaped except through violent conflict. As Sartre described the violent relationship of alterity 
and resistance in the context of colonial Algeria, “for the child of the colonialist, violence was 
present in the situation itself as a constitutive social force; the son of the colonialist and the son 
of the Muslim are both the children of the objective violence that defines the system itself as 
practico-inert hell.” This very reification of colonial violence makes the violence of the 
colonized a foregone conclusion, since “the colonialist discovers the violence of the native, even 
in his passivity, as the obvious consequence of his own violence and as its sole justification.” ⁠  
Liberal reforms, as well as any other attempts to defuse the violence of colonial Algeria, Sartre 
argued, are from the start doomed to fail. Since the colonizers’ justification is in fact the 
argument that the colonized are inherently violent and subhuman—a status that justifies their 
exploitation as a sub-proletariat—and any attempts at reform and negotiation are mistakes that 
will only push the pro-colonialists to further violent extremes.521 ⁠  
                                                 
520 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, translated by Hazel Barnes (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1992), 319; No Exit [1945], in No Exit and Three Other Plays, translated by Stuart 
Gilbert (New York: Vintage International, 1989), 46. 
521 Sartre, Critique, I, 675, 676, 681. See also Arthur, Unfinished Projects, 80-84. 
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Though the French Revolution occupied fewer pages in the Critique than in the 
Discourse, Sartre refers to the French Revolution at key moments when discussing each of his 
conceptual tools: seriality and the group in fusion, the pledge, and fraternity-terror. Since Russia 
and Stalinism are rarely mentioned in the first volume of the Critique, it is not surprising that 
Sartre does not bring the French Revolution into conversation with these topics the way he had 
done in his polemic with Guérin and Lukács. However, his discussion of these concepts does 
form a different constellation of referents, one linking the French Revolution to colonial racism 
and violence.522 For each of the Critique’s main sections on the development of revolutionary 
movements, Sartre used a moment in the French Revolution to explain his argument. The Great 
Fear illustrated seriality and the formation of collectivities. Drawing on Georges Lefebvre’s book 
on the subject, Sartre argues that the news and rumor of aristocratic plots against the peasants in 
the countryside reduced each peasant to the same level of alterity. As the news of one localized 
incident spread, those who heard the news acted in response in the same way.523 The storming of 
the Bastille differed from the haphazard violence in the countryside by virtue of the 
insurrectionaries’ concerted goal. What began as a serial action, individuals arming themselves 
against the King’s troops, ended in the common group aim of overtaking a manifestation of the 
                                                 
522 As the unpublished second volume of the Critique more directly addresses Stalinism, 
the French Revolution is brought into conversation with the Russian Revolution in two key 
moments. First, when discussing the Bolshevik’s seizure of the country’s economy from an early 
point in the Russian Revolution, Sartre claimed this move prevented an independent peasant 
revolt of the variety France experienced during the Great Fear of June-October 1789. Second, 
Sartre compares the inadequacy of reducing Stalinism to Stalin’s psychology to the inadequacy 
of explaining the Terror via Robespierre’s personality. For example, reducing the Terror to 
Robespierre’s personality neglects the elements of praxis involving economic scarcity, civil war, 
and the threat of invasion. Sartre, Critique II, New Edition, translated by Quintin Hoare (London: 
Verso, 2006), 69. 223-224. Sartre made the same point on the limits of Robespierre’s psychology 
as explanatory device earlier in Question de méthode, 46.     
523 Sartre, Critique, I, 340-344. Georges Lefebvre, La grand peur de 1789 (Paris: Amand 
Colin, 1932). 
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regime’s violence. 524  The Tennis Court Oath represented the mediated reciprocity of the 
revolutionaries. Its affirmation that the National Assembly would never dissolve until the work 
of the Revolution was done affirmed the group’s united negation of its own external threats.525 
An institution subsequently formed from this pledge, creating its own organs for action against 
the mistrust and fear that members of the group may not uphold the pledge. The Committee of 
Public Safety thus insures the internal unity of the Convention as well as the pledge against 
foreign enemies.526 By escaping seriality, the actions of the institution guarantee the promises of 
fraternity, liberty, and the path toward equality. The institution, however, guarantees the escape 
from seriality through terror. The future of the fused group and its revolutionary aims is thus a 
reformulation of Robespierre’s conjunction “virtue-terror”; it is always both fraternity-terror and 
liberty-terror, terror guaranteeing the former in both cases.    
The importance of the French Revolution and the frequency with which Sartre refers to it 
in the Discourse and the Critique has been attributed to the historical conditions surrounding any 
French person from the first half of the twentieth century who took political ideas seriously, and 
                                                 
524 Sartre, Critique, I, 389. See « Liberté-Égalité », 177-178 and Critique, I, 410-411, on 
the taking of the Bastille as instance of an Apocalyptic moment in the sense in which Malraux 
used the term in the novel L’Espoir. Sartre sees this moment as the sublimation of seriality into 
the group in fusion. 
525 Sartre, Critique, I, 439-440, 477, « Mai-Juin 1789 », 85-88, and especially 154: “avec 
le serment du Jeu de Paume: 1) L’individu devient sacré à titre de liberté. Il est une personne. Il 
revêt un nouveau masque, celui de la liberté pratique. 2) Il devient le défenseur de la Constitution 
à naître, son chevalier servant” [with the Tennis Court Oath: 1) The individual becomes sacred 
via liberty. He is someone. He wears a new mask, that of practical liberty. 2) He becomes the 
defender of the Constitution to be born, its dedicated knight.” 
526 Sartre, Critique, I, 576. The whole Joseph le Bon treatment is an extended rumination 
on the institutionalization of violence under the Committee of Public Safety and its self-
destructive impulses, represented by the execution of Mayor of Toulouse, Eulogius Schneider, in 
1793, and le Bon’s execution in 1794. Joseph le Bon briefly appears in the Critique as well on 
page 416. 
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surely this is one reason.527 The wide-ranging polemic against Daniel Guérin’s interpretation of 
the French Revolution’s legacy and Jacobin traditions in France is surely another. But perhaps 
just as important as these reasons is the fact that Sartre first generated the central concepts of the 
Critique in sustained study of the French Revolution.  
The Discourse on Method and the Critique demonstrated both an interest in current 
historiography of the French Revolution and a detailed enough knowledge of the Revolution’s 
events to hazard sustained criticism of Daniel Guérin. Throughout, Sartre cites Georges 
Lefebvre’s and Albert Soboul’s work as the basis of his interpretations of the Revolution. What 
is less obvious from these two texts in their published form, however, is the extent to which 
Sartre also conducted his own research into the Revolution while developing the concepts he 
would put to work in them.   
 
Variations on the Theme: The Revolution and the Algerian Revolution 
Sartre designed his revolutionary theory to take account of all revolutionary processes—
and in this respect he performed in the same universalist key as eighteenth-century French 
Revolutionaries themselves. When it came to Algeria, on the one hand Sartre claimed the French 
public had failed to understand the aims of Algerian nationalists. On the other hand, Sartre’s 
gamble was that a national self-understanding held important keys to comprehending colonial 
revolution (just as it mattered for an analysis of the Soviet Union). The French Revolution was 
                                                 
527 Specifically in reference to Sartre’s discussions of terror, Ian Birchall rightly reasons 
that “The French Revolution remained at the heart of Sartre’s concept of terror,” especially since 
growing up as a child in the Third Republic, he would have been reminded by Larousse’s Grand 
Universal Dictionary of the 19th Century that the Catholic Church had done much worse over the 
years than the Committee of Public Safety and that the Revolution had to be taken en bloc, as 
Clemenceau claimed. Birchall, “Sartre and Terror,” Sartre Today: A Centenary Celebration, 
edited by Adrian van den Hoven and Andrew Leak (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), 252-
253. 
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on Sartre’s mind and pen when the Algerian War began and it stayed there through the 
composition of the Critique of Dialectical Reason.  
Within the Critique there are moments when Sartre’s description of French 
Revolutionary events connect directly with his observations on colonial violence. As an 
archetype for all forms of social and revolutionary formation, the basic framework of the 
Critique would automatically apply to colonial revolution as well. Sartre interrupts his discussion 
of the effects of public opinion during the Great Fear, however, with a three-page note to remind 
his readers that the same dynamic is at work in the effects of colonial racism. The colonialists 
used racist stereotypes of the natives to reinforce their own seriality and their racist discourse 
also objectified native communities. 528  Later in the Critique, Sartre moved beyond the 
objectifying effects of racism and restated his position from “Colonialism is a System”: “In every 
case, repressive tactics, divisive politics, dispossession of land, above all, rapidly liquidated the 
feudal structures [in Algeria] and soon transformed this society that was backward yet structured 
as ‘atomized crowd’ into an agricultural subproletariat.” Despite speaking of the “supposed 
Rights of Man,” France’s domination of North Africa placed Algerians in a position of extreme 
seriality.529  
The preface Sartre composed for Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth translated the 
violence of the colonial situation and the violent means needed for its undoing into common 
terms for metropolitan readers. The violence of colonialism has come “on the rebound” and the 
Algerian War represents “the age of the boomerang,” according to Sartre; Fanon is the first since 
                                                 
528 Sartre, Critique, I, 346n-349n 
529 Ibid., 672. 
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Engels and Sorel to capture violence’s role as the midwife of history.530 In perhaps Sartre’s most 
public and straightforward support for the FLN Sartre justified the group’s use of violence and 
claims that it is the violence of French colonialism coming home to the metropole. Even if 
ordinary French citizens never felt particularly tied to the Republic’s colonial projects, they were 
nonetheless implicated in their passive acceptance of the system. Café and airport bombs were 
the populace’s wakeup call. Either they could choose to heed it or pay the consequences.  
Paige Arthur has argued that the Critique speaks mainly of “terror” as such in one 
particular sense: terror linked to fraternity is a terror against those who would betray the bond of 
their pledge, which is the sort of terror within revolutionary movements meant to ensure 
solidarity and prevent treason: in Sartre’s language, a terror that prevents the fused group from 
falling back into directionless seriality.531 As such, the emphasis Sartre places on the legitimacy 
of the FLN’s violence against the metropole appears confusing, as if Sartre has slipped from the 
usage of terror he established in The Critique to a different sort of terror in the “Preface” to The 
Wretched of the Earth. Throughout his preface, Sartre avoided discussing this type of fratricidal 
violence and painted the violence of colonial revolution as unequivocally on the side of historical 
progress. “Like Achilles’ spear,” Sartre claimed, this violence could “heal the wounds it 
inflicted.”532 Since Sartre’s aim throughout much of the Critique is to describe the process of 
groups in formation and the dynamics at work within these revolutionary groups it makes sense 
that less attention would be devoted to actions operating between a revolutionary group and its 
outward political adversaries. In fact, the opposite relation is given much more attention—the 
actions of the party, sovereign state, colonial authority, or bureaucracy in relation to serialized 
                                                 
530 Sartre, “Preface,” The Wretched of the Earth, translated by Richard Philcox (New 
York: Grove, 2004), xlix, lii, liv.   
531 Arthur, Unfinished Projects, 93. 
532 Sartre, “Preface,” lxii. 
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groups in formation.533 Even if we take the seeming equivocation between the two types of terror 
for granted, a further worry of attentive readers then becomes whether Sartre was painting an 
otherwise optimistic picture of a scenario that in the Critique he had argued is much messier and 
perhaps much more pessimistic.534  
Three points of clarification bear stating, however. First, it would be wrong to suggest 
that Sartre, while writing the Critique, did not also have on his mind the sort of revolutionary 
terrorism experienced in the 1950s and used by the FLN, or that Sartre’s comments on violent 
political action have no bearing on his stance on terrorism directed outside of fused groups.535 In 
the text of the Critique Sartre does in passing mention other forms of terrorism, such as “fascist 
terrorism,” “counter-terrorists,” and “anarchist terrorism.”536 But more importantly, because the 
Terror of the French Revolution formed the basis of Sartre’s conceptualizations, Sartre meant 
terror to be a bivalent category encompassing both violence directed inwards and outwards. 
When discussing the concept of the institution via the Committee of Public Safety, for instance, 
Sartre notes that he uses “the Terror” in a generic sense and that there is no “Platonic ideal” of 
terror. Rather, the formulation of “the Terror” in any definite sense is a synthetic creation of later 
historical analysis. Sartre’s own historical understanding of what counted as terror during the 
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Revolution is telling, though. He claims the storming of the Bastille, an event where a fused 
group’s violence strikes out against the government, is the beginning of terror in the Revolution. 
Terror occurs and recurs throughout the whole of the Revolutionary process up to Thermidor 
when Sartre thinks the Revolution has ended:  
The plurality of Terrors, even in the course of the revolutionary Terror (from ’89 to ’94), 
is for me so obvious that here I take one restrained and induced terror as an example (the 
circular Terror within a homogenous group being eroded by its seriality), whereas the 
main phenomenon (the Terror as fundamental relation between the French people and the 
Assembly as government) is produced to fight against indefinite non circular seriality.537  
 
Terror’s main function is to counter any threat of seriality, whether that comes from inside the 
group or outside of it. As a system of relations within all revolutionary movements, it has the 
possibility of taking the form of violence directed within a group or towards a group’s outside 
enemies. Sartre’s choice to focus on the Terror of 1793-94 was meant to highlight the extremes 
to which institutions could inflict violence on the fused group. It also pointed to the possibility of 
Stalinism, where the bureaucracy of the group’s institutions closes itself off from the group and 
perpetuates terror indefinitely.538 The Terror of the French Revolution may not have been a 
Platonic ideal, but it was a heuristic for interpreting any form of revolutionary terror, one that 
echoed Sartre’s already-pessimistic vision of human freedom. 
Secondly, it would be wrong to assume Sartre’s unequivocal public support for the FLN 
meant he was a bloodthirsty demagogue. Sartre warned his readers that Fanon “has made himself 
spokesman for the situation, nothing more,” and Sartre was spokesman for Fanon.539 Though 
Sartre was publicly supportive of the FLN, in private Sartre was highly critical of their violent 
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methods and harbored no illusions about the FLN’s role in the massacre of fellow Algerians, 
such as those in the village Beni Ilmane in the Mélouza region. When the roughly 300 pro-MNA 
villagers refused to pledge allegiance to the FLN, they were assembled in front of the village 
mosque and summarily executed.540 Despite these reservations, in a 1958 conversation with Jean 
Daniel, Sartre insisted, “Listen, whatever the FLN is, it is there [in Algeria], the Algerian 
Revolution, that’s what it is. You’ve got to take it as it is.”541  
Finally, and most importantly, within the logic of the Critique and Sartre’s public 
statements about the Algerian war, revolutionary terrorism is inscribed in the analyses of the 
violent possibilities inherent in anticolonial struggle, especially through Sartre’s uses of moments 
in French Revolutionary history. Even the dynamic of fraternity-terror fits a good deal of FLN 
actions during the Algerian War, whether Sartre would publicly admit it or not. All of history 
moved through a world of violence, and though this means that until the world of material 
scarcity and oppressive social relations ceases to exist, there is no completely satisfying moment 
of irreproachable revolutionary process. The French Revolution and the Russian Revolution both 
resulted in fratricidal terror—but they were still revolutionary movements through which Sartre 
saw historical progress at work. Achilles’ spear had both violent and palliative qualities. 
Likewise, the colonized is an “offspring of violence, he draws every moment of his humanity 
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from it.”542 Sartre’s stance in the preface was that decolonization could not be reduced to either 
violence or progress—both were linked.  
It should also not be terribly surprising that Sartre’s language and argument from the 
Critique appealed to some of the FLN’s supporters. By the end of 1960, French police had 
arrested and tried members of the network led by Sartre’s friend and former Les temps modernes 
editor Francis Jeanson. Their activities did not include direct violent acts against the French state, 
but they did participate in an international money laundering system and they helped shelter FLN 
operatives in Europe. Sartre was in South America while the trial occurred, though he did give 
Les temps modernes permission to use his name to compose a statement of solidarity with the 
accused. As we saw in Chapter One, during the trial, one of the defendants, Jean-Claude Paupert, 
a former soldier who was friends with then editor of Les Temps modernes editor, Claude 
Lanzmann, openly declared in Sartrean language his rationale for supporting the FLN. Under 
examination, Paupert defined the “colonial regime as a form of terrorism,” and this terrorism 
caused the Algerians to “live in violence.” Violence “is their memory and their destiny. They 
may not leave it—they may only blow it up.”543 Paupert’s analysis of the colonial world as 
imbued with violence mirrored elements of Sartre’s essay “Colonialism is a System” and the 
Critique. Algerian independence was part of the same universal history inaugurated by the rise of 
the modern French nation.544  
  
Sartre’s criticisms of Guérin and Lukács for dissolving humans in the acid bath of history, or 
reducing historically contingent actors and situations into idealized types, could easily lead to the 
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conclusion that he was on guard against the sort of French Revolutionary anachronism that 
flourished during the Algerian War. If an hypostatized proletariat and bourgeoisie were not only 
undialectical but also mistaken for ignoring human beings in their particular situations, then it 
would also be a mistake to see the third estate reproduced in the third world, the Terror 
reincarnated in anticolonial revolution. As Sartre explained at length, with both Guérin and 
Lukács in mind, 
The open concepts of Marxism have closed in on themselves. They are no longer keys or 
interpretive schema. They are presented for their own sake as already-totalized 
knowledge. To speak in the language of Kant, Marxism creates constitutive concepts of 
experience from these singularized and fetishized types. The real content of these 
concept-types is always made from past knowledge; but contemporary Marxism makes 
them into an eternal knowledge.545 
 
Even worse, this ideological dogmatism risked aiding the accompanying totalitarian politics of 
the eastern bloc. The “terrorist practice of ‘liquidating the particularity’” of historical 
circumstances went hand in hand with the actual liquidation of historical actors.546 However, 
Sartre’s manuscripts on revolutionary materials as well as the Critique of Dialectical Reason’s 
use of the French Revolution to generate a template for historical change demonstrate Sartre was 
guilty of the same formal error. Claude Lévi-Strauss went so far as to reduce Sartre’s whole 
project to the question “under what conditions is the myth of the French Revolution possible?” 
While Lévi-Strauss’ remark may be overly reductive, it remains quite accurate. Instead of strictly 
Marxist tropes, Sartre replaced an eternal struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie with “the 
myth of the French Revolution.”547 This myth went beyond the status of “guideposts”548—the 
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same status Sartre gave to Marxist analysis—in the ways Sartre reproduced it throughout the 
Discourse and the Critique. Within the French Revolution Sartre believed he could analyze the 
defining characteristics of all revolutionary struggles.  
Lévi-Strauss further faulted Sartre for an inability to take Algeria and Algerians on their 
own terms. The human sciences were designed to analyze, but they were not equipped to 
perform the totalizing role Sartre desired of them. Sartre saw historical humanity as a function of 
its historical praxis toward its totalizing humanity, but this amounted to claiming groups only 
counted insofar as they played the game of western revolutions in the mold of French history.549 
Though Sartre may have presented Algeria as caught up in a “tide of History” that might “change 
the world for the better,” it was always going to be a French History with a majuscule H.550 
While it may be plausible to discern an anti-historicist logic from Sartre’s insistence on the 
fragility of social bonds and the near impossibility of historical development toward any one 
concrete goal for very long (before the retreat into seriality),551 this was not what Sartre expected 
of his project. No matter how pessimistic the language appears, Sartre kept faith that a better 
future was possible, even if he wanted to avoid notions of Hegelian or Marxist progress.552 
If the mediation of dialectical necessities found within historical situations was what 
primarily interested Sartre in the French Revolution as a great historical laboratory in which he 
could test his hypotheses, 553  he would have to do more than assume the same historical 
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conditions in other situations. In this regard Robert J. C. Young was correct in suspecting that 
Sartre was merely rewriting the standard narrative of western historical development.554 On the 
one hand, the extreme pessimism of all revolutionary action gained from Sartre’s analyses of the 
French Revolution offered a perhaps sobering effect on what for many in the fifties, sixties, and 
seventies would become a drunken rêverie of third worldism. 555  Yet on the other hand, by 
thinking of Algeria through the French Revolution Sartre had already pegged Algeria’s future to 
a predetermined set of expectations regarding both the justifiability and inevitability of the 
FLN’s violence. In an interview amidst another wave of revolutionary enthusiasm in the Maoist 
1970s, Sartre again returned to the French Revolution and reflected on the Algerian War. Asked 
by his interlocutor if he was in support of political murder, Sartre opined, “Yes… You can 
always get out of prison. The Revolutionaries of 1793 had probably not really killed enough and 
thus unconsciously effected a return to the status quo, then the Restoration.” Sartre further 
explained that he nonetheless remained opposed to the show trials that occurred in Russia, but 
still asked rhetorically, “Is it possible to conceive of an independent Algeria without the FLN’s 
liquidation of [its rival political group] the MNA? And how would we reproach the FLN’s 
violence, confronted daily during those years with the French Army’s repression, its torture and 
its massacres?”556 The foreign invader and threat of civil war justified terror in the 1950s, just as 
it had in the 1790s.  
 Sartre’s example highlights the power the French Revolutionary imaginary had over the 
anticolonial left during the French-Algerian War. Though he did not seem to refer to the 
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Revolution when campaigning for Algerian independence, it was always lurking in the 























The Limits of French Historical Reason 
During the French Algerian War, the image of the French Revolution was capacious 
enough to bring together conversations about economic development, historical theory, and 
political legitimacy, yet specific enough to demarcate points of contention. The French 
Revolution as paradigm for historical change and modernity represented not just the Sartrean 
universal particular, but also a very particular type of universalism. The limits some anticolonial 
intellectuals saw to this republican language during the French-Algerian War are an important 
antipode to this story. They also highlight the strangeness in the continued afterlife of this line of 
reasoning in contemporary discussions of North Africa.  
First of all, the analogy with the French Revolution acted as an ideal type, or regulating 
norm, for France. Like the princely mirrors of the Renaissance, the French Revolution offered 
not only historical examples, but also moral standards for French politics. In metropolitan France 
this was even more apparent following the Nazi Occupation and the Vichy government—both 
institutions that presented themselves as challenges to the Revolution’s legacy. And this “certain 
idea of France,” to use De Gaulle’s term of art, was one that fulfilled the French Empire’s 
civilizing mission without contradicting it.557  For some, like many of those involved in the 
Committee Against the Pursuit of the War in North Africa or colonial humanists like Charles-
André Julien and the young Jacques Berque, the legacy of the French Revolution meant fulfilling 
the duties of the Republic to its imperial subjects and would-be citizens. Being anti-imperial in 
these terms may sound odd to modern ears. But if the benefits of French civilization were as 
universal as these proponents believed, empire was a vehicle through which these benefits could 
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spread. The ultimate goal, of course, would be to remove the imperial training wheels once 
Algeria’s republican apprenticeship was over.  
Early in the French-Algerian War, then, the French Revolution appeared in public 
interventions first and foremost as a way of criticizing the nation’s conduct in Algeria. Living up 
to the ideals of the Rights of Man and Citizen meant ensuring an end to colonial torture, terror, 
and assassinations. The nation and its empire had already waged war against the 
counterrevolutionary fascist regimes of the 30s and 40s in the name of these ideals. Now they 
needed to purge the same tendencies from their own ranks.  
The constitutional crisis of May 1958 brought on a general feeling of crisis in Algeria as 
well as the metropole and as a result people were less inclined to look to 1789 as they were to 
invoke the radical period of the founding of the First Republic and the Terror, 1792-1794. France 
found itself once again in need of creating a new republic and intellectuals looked to the 
founding of the First Republic for their bearings. Whether De Gaulle’s return symbolized a new 
monarch to be dethroned and whether a new Reign of Terror might be needed to purge 
counterrevolutionary (and fascist) elements from the nation were hotly debated questions, 
especially among the group involved with the magazine 14 juillet. In this period, the French 
Revolution went beyond a regulating ideal—it tapped into a nationalist spirit that François Furet 
would later call a political passion.558 These thinkers and activists saw themselves and Algerian 
nationalists in positions similar to those of Revolutionary France. From this point of reference 
they could draw lessons to direct their own political action in the present. 
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Of course, this division between 1954 and 1958 was not absolute. For some, like Georges 
Lefebvre, Daniel Guérin, or Jean-Paul Sartre, the French Revolution was not a heritage worth 
having unless it were continually mobilized for the present. While both Lefebvre and Guérin 
disagreed on what the identity of the Revolution truly was, they both saw it as a living political 
force. The various testimonies in the Jeanson network trial also stressed the connections between 
the French Revolution as a living heritage and solidarity with Algerian nationalism. In Sartre’s 
case, the Revolution’s political relevance was not outwardly as apparent, but its dynamics proved 
the shibboleth for understanding any and all revolutionary action, especially in Algeria. The 
same was true for many of Sartre’s detractors as well. For Raymond Aron and Albert Camus 
many of the dangers of contemporary politics were precisely due to the violent legacy the 
Revolution imparted to modern politics.559 
 Beyond the ambivalence some writers felt toward the French Revolution’s legacy and 
their anticolonial ventures, others pushed back definitively against seeing the French Revolution 
as a viable way of grounding any contemporary politics. When Lévi-Strauss indicted Sartre for 
merely reproducing the “myth of the French nation,” he was not alone in this general position. 
From the forties through the sixties a number of intellectuals had already begun pushing beyond 
the limits of a parochial French universalism—either on the grounds that such a French universal 
did not exist, by suggesting that such a universalism might be the cause of France’s problems 
and not merely its way out, or by looking for other, deeper structures behind politics and the 
human condition. These limits to French historical reason point to changes in larger intellectual 
trends in postwar France: the rise of structuralism, more firmly-entrenched anti-humanist 
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positions, and concerns for ethical forms of action that, while not anti-revolutionary, pointed to a 
different form of revolutionary politics. Examining these resistances to utilizing a French 
revolutionary memory also highlights exactly what this memory could and could not do. 
Lévi-Strauss' biggest position on the problem of historical similarity and difference 
during the war was his 1952 UNESCO book Race and History. The book in part intervened to 
clearly state that there was no meaningful scientific basis for a category called race. Lévi-Strauss 
said the science was in and it was clear. In addition, however, it addressed the question of 
evaluating different cultures and their relationships to one another. It was wrong to assume that 
modern western historicity was the only standard measurement of historical time. While such 
cultural standardizing was a way of trying to make sense of cultural diversity, it relied on a “false 
evolutionism.” If each culture simply manifested a different stage in a singular development, 
then cultural difference collapsed under a humanity that was self-identical. As a consequence, it 
was inadequate to line up other cultures who do not meet the modern west's historical criteria 
and thus label them backwards or ahistorical. Rather, if western historical time's basis was 
diachronic changes in technological sophistication, a non-western culture's sense of time might 
line up on an axis that is tangential or perpendicular to these changes.560 Lévi-Strauss’ stance 
further indicted the very discipline of ethnography as “the handmaiden of colonialism.”561  
A younger generation of intellectuals and activists, such as Pierre Bourdieu and those 
involved in the group and journal Socialisme ou Barbarie, like Cornelius Castoriadis or Jean-
François Lyotard, echoed Lévi-Strauss’ rejection of the type of political historicism the French 
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Revolutionary analogy entailed and applied it directly to Algeria. Bourdieu questioned the 
relevance of using western developmental models to study Algeria. While at the onset of the war 
he had originally planned on earning a degree in philosophy, his academic studies were 
interrupted when he was called up to serve in Algeria. He spent two years working with the 
colonial administration on developmental projects and afterwards decided to shift his studies to 
sociology. Whereas previous analysts saw the economic plight of Algeria as caused by its 
maladaptation to western economies, Bourdieu argued that the west should not be the reference 
point for economic development. Like Berque, Bourdieu argued that colonialism tried to impose 
a western economy on Algeria but was never able to get Algerians to think like western 
economic agents. But Bourdieu went further than Berque in distancing the west as a point of 
reference, whether historical or developmental. In Bourdieu’s estimation, those analyzing 
Algeria needed to provide “what non-Euclidean geometries are to Euclidean geometry.” 
Furthermore, for Bourdieu, the violence was not just a war against imperial France, but also a 
revolutionary reorganization of society. Bourdieu saw more clearly than many that as a social 
reality for Algerian nationalists, “Decolonization started with the beginning of the war,” and the 
130 years of French colonial domination meant that decolonization was not going to be a simple 
process of subtraction. Rather, it was a total social transformation marked with as many solutions 
as new problems. While many caught up in third worldist politics saw decolonization as the key 
to a brighter future for oppressed workers everywhere, Bourdieu was much more measured. The 
problems posed by unemployment, underemployment, and what shape an independent society 
should take were real and did not have immediate answers, despite “demagogues who promise 
radical and magical solutions.”562  
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Though Cornelius Castoriadis was highly critical of French colonialism, his critiques 
were much more focused on moves toward socialist worker-management in Algeria than in 
idealizing a third world proletariat he was not even sure existed. In 1956, Castoriadis was happy 
to use what he saw as the obvious evils of French imperialism in North Africa as a way to draw 
attention to Soviet control of the eastern bloc, but he was more concerned with revolutionary 
movements in Hungary and Poland than Algeria.563 It wasn’t just that the Algerian War did not 
fit a French Revolutionary model, for Castoriadis, third worldist movements were not even 
Marxist: “If Marxists search for the roots of revolution from now on in colonial countries, and 
the contradictions of capitalism in the opposition between the West and the Third World or even 
in the struggle between the two blocs, they might just as well stop calling themselves 
Marxists.”564 The third world was not modernized, so there was no proletariat. The French who 
embraced third worldism were simply evading real issues at hand with (an actual) European 
proletariat. Having been born and raised in Greece, Castoriadis was likely not immersed in the 
Revolutionary hagiography to which his peers were exposed. Whether the discourse on 
revolution he favored was any more or less valid is perhaps not as important (or striking) as the 
fact that he completely sidestepped the dominant discourse on the French Algerian War. 
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During the war, Socialisme ou Barbarie assigned Jean-François Lyotard to cover events 
in Algeria. While he embodied a similar pessimism about the potential of third worldist 
movements his commentary does not stick out quite as anomalously as Castoriadis’. For 
instance, Lyotard was willing to give the French Algerian War a revolutionary label. By 1957, 
Lyotard was convinced the war represented a true revolutionary moment for Algeria, having 
“crystalized” an Algerian national identity, and especially so once the Algerian communists 
merged forces with the nationalists, “ensuring their place in the martyrology of the Algerian 
Republic.”565 At times, he even flirted with using the French Revolution as paradigm for Algeria: 
the shape of the FLN, for instance, was in his estimation traditionally Jacobin. However, this was 
a problem for France and the FLN, not necessarily a good omen. The FLN’s Jacobin nature 
meant it would likely fall prey to the same dangers of political centralization Socialisme ou 
barbarie decried in France and the Soviet Union. 566  And even if the war was truly a 
revolutionary moment across the Mediterranean, Lyotard was not convinced the war held much 
possibility for revolutionary agitation back in the metropole, despite the movements to refuse 
military conscription or FLN aid networks like the one led by Francis Jeanson.567  
In some cases, when the French Revolution was recognized as a salient political reference 
point, the Revolution was deemed part of the problem, not the solution. The political philosopher 
and Hegel specialist François Châtelet viewed fetishizations of Jacobin ideology as inherently 
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militarist and authoritarian. Jacobinism (and Stalinism) was the left’s problem, not a model for 
its future. At the end of the war, the reaffirmation of the Revolution’s core values meant that 
Châtelet’s estimation of French politics would be bleak. Like Lévi-Strauss, Châtelet observed the 
ways in which the French Revolution acted as a political myth that guided contemporary political 
thought—and like Aron and Camus he thought this was inherently problematic. The “Jacobin 
model” of French politics was “more than a mentalité yet less than a philosophy,” and this 
ambiguous nature made it all the more dangerous since its premises were assumed yet it was still 
amorphous enough to be continually adapted. If it were formally worked out as a political theory, 
Châtelet seemed to think, it would be easier to see how maladapted it was for present political 
needs. According to Châtelet, “in the eyes of the twentieth-century Jacobin, the France that 
inherited its principal characteristics from 1789 remains, despite the evolution of the world and 
the unhappy accidents of history, the national project. There is uncontestably a French 
chauvinism that is at least partially explained by the influence of the Jacobin mentality and its 
development over the course of the last century.” The Jacobins of the postwar were frozen in the 
epic of world history. It was even “probable that the stages and style of French colonization in 
Africa and Asia under the Third Republic and the difficulties the Fourth and Fifth Republics 
encountered during decolonization… continued to spread under its latent Jacobinism.” 568 
Looking back to the Revolution could not point the way forward for either France or Algeria. 
Even supporters of Algerian nationalism would be quickly disillusioned once the war 
ended when the FLN’s national programs did not match their supporters’ hopes and expectations. 
This was particularly true after the head of the military, Houari Boumedienne, overthrew 
President Ahmed Ben Bella. Daniel Guérin, for one, despite his view that the French Revolution 
                                                 
568 François Châtelet, “Le jacobinisme du XXème siècle,” dated November 1962, Fonds 
Châtelet, CHT 1.46, IMEC. 
 249 
held real, positive insights for modern politics, feared that the French Revolution had imparted 
the wrong lessons to Algeria and these lessons would hinder its future. A decade and a half after 
the war ended, Guérin still maintained that the Algerian Revolution was comparable to France’s 
in 1789. Yet as early as 1962 he confided to Mansour, the President of the FLN’s Algerian 
student group, that he had “no more confidence in [Mansour’s] leaders, such as they are. But I 
have always had confidence in the profundity and authenticity of the Algerian Revolution.” 
Algeria’s leaders were repeating the same mistakes as France’s leaders in the 1790s: “I have 
written a whole book denouncing, in the West’s social movements, the misdeeds of what I call 
‘Jacobinism’ or ‘authoritarian socialism.’ The leaders of the Algerian Revolution are Jacobins 
and authoritarians.” The war had given Algeria seven years’ “apprenticeship” in true democracy 
and Algerians did not need to be directed by “men of destiny” or an authoritarian government. 
As with France and the rest of the world, this false socialism had to be replaced by what Guérin 
saw as true libertarian socialism.569 
On the one hand, the French Revolution’s deployment in the war contributed to the 
feeling that France and Algeria were swept up in the “tide of history,” as Todd Shepard and 
Matthew Connelly have argued. This surely made it easier for naturalizing the altogether new 
post-1958 metropolitan consensus that Algeria was not really part of France and that 
decolonization was inevitable.570 On the other hand, it is telling that the French Revolution, the 
anchor to which universal history was supposedly tethered, mediated this reinvention of 
metropole and colony. The French Revolution as myth or conceptual analogue did not 
                                                 
569 Daniel Guérin, 1962 Letter to Mansour reproduced in Quand l’Algérie s’insurgeait, 
1954-1962 (Claix: Pensée Sauvage, 1979), 181-182.  
570 Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking 
of France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: 
Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003). 
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predetermine the outcome of the war, but it did nonetheless shape anticolonial involvement in 
the war in noteworthy ways.  
The extent to which the so-called universal ideals of French civilization penetrated 
Algerian nationalists during the French-Algerian War, for good or for ill, is by no means an easy 
question to address. For some, as we have seen with Fanon and Jean Amrouche, the relationship 
was not straightforward. While both could idealize the potential of the French Revolution's 
promises, they also used such potential as a way of stressing how far it was from the reality of 
France's presence in Algeria. 
Anti-imperial activists and colonial nationalists who came of age before and during the 
interwar period were much more likely to use the language of French universalism against the 
empire, from Senegalese activist Lamine Senghor to Caribbean theorist CLR James and the 
Algerian Ferhat Abbas.571 Pro-reform Algerian journals bore titles like République algérienne 
and La République d’alger, highlighting the possibility of some Algerian republicanism after the 
exit from the colonial relationship. Those nationalists of the next generation, who came of age 
during and after World War II, were less likely to embrace French Republican imagery when 
thinking Algerian national identity. Though many of these younger nationalists were either 
educated in Paris or spent considerable time in the metropole, just like Fanon, Amrouche, or 
Abbas, the failed Blum-Viollette Plan of the 30s was likely the high point of French-Algerian 
                                                 
571 Lamine Senghor, La violation d’un pays [1917] et autres écrits anticolonialistes, 
edited by David Murphy (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2012); C. L. R. James, The Black Jacobins. 
Toussaint Louverture and the San Domingo Revolution (New York: Dial Press, 1938); For 
Abbas, see Benjamin Stora, Algeria: A Short History, 1830-2000, translated by Jane Marie Todd 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 17, and Robert Malley, The Call From Algeria: Third 
Worldism, Revolution, and the Turn to Islam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 
49-50. For the prevalence of this interwar anti-imperial “revolutionary lingua franca,” see 
Michael Goebel, Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World 
Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), Chapter 7.  
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cooperation in their lifetimes, not just a failure. And after the massacres at Mélouza and Sétif, 
cooperation was a quickly vanishing horizon. In the Paris group that formed the journal The 
Young Muslim in the years before the war began, future FLN members such as Mostefa 
Lacheraf, Ahmed Taleb-Ibrahimi, and Malek Bennabi published articles that tried to embody 
relevant reference points for their crystalizing national identity. While Taleb-Ibrahimi wrote 
pieces attesting to the Arab world's contributions to “universal civilization,” the majority of the 
articles in the magazine stressed the distinct character of Algerian identity, writing on topics such 
as interpretations of the Quran, the life of Abd el Kader, and the philosophy behind the Muslim 
Brotherhood's founder Hassan Al Banna.572 
Other nationalists viewed French history as foundational to Algerian identity, but this 
was a relationship defined by oppositions. The poet Jean Sénac unequivocally saw French 
civilization as the problem, not the answer for Algerian nationalism. His poem “The July 
Massacres” presented the victims of a repressed 1953 Bastille Day march in Paris as martyrs of a 
nation distinct from France. While the numbers of MTLD members in the demonstration were 
small in comparison to demonstrators from the CGT and PCF, they were the main targets of 
police action. 573  The poem presented the contradictions between the symbolism of the fête 
nationale and the racist violence of the police:  
 
For the national holiday of free men  
they massacred my friends   
brown skin on gray cobblestones  
                                                 
572 Ahmed Taleb-Ibrahimi, Mémoires d'un Algérien. Tome I: Rêves et épreuves (1932-
1965) (Algiers: Casbah Editions, 2006), 71-72. Mostefa Lacheraf (1917-2007) was educated in 
history at the Sorbonne and taught at the lycée Louis-le-Grand, and Ahmed Taleb-Ibrahimi (born 
1932) studied medicine in Paris in the 1950s. Malek Bennabi (1905-1973), who studied at the 
Institute of Oriental Languages in Paris beginning in 1930, associated with both the older and 
newer generations.  
573 Maurice Rajsfus, 1953. Un 14 juillet sanglante (Paris: Agnès Viennot Éditions, 2003).  
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O Paris how sad you are   
sad and severe with my race 
…  
 
They massacred my friends   
they raised the Bastille 
they executed the flames and the scream  
 
O Paris how sad you are  
cactus blood covers the Seine  
Paris of Beauty of Justice of Misery  
how sad and severe you are for the exiles!574  
 
Sénac’s constant insistence that the police—“they”—are different from his friends the victims 
institutes the distance formalized by the whole scenario. The French Republic refused his 
countrymen as “exiles.” The Berber dramatist and poet Kateb Yacine, too, saw the goal for 
Algerian politics (and art) to set itself apart from French influence. After being forced by his 
parents to attend a francophone school as a child, he thought of himself as an “interior exile,” 
divorced from the language, customs, identity of his ancestors.575 The goal of his work was to 
oppose all forms of colonial representation, even the ones purporting to be universalist. Figures 
such as Abd el Kader were proof for Kateb Yacine that Algeria had its own agency outside of 
French influence. Asked why, late in life, he continued to write in French, he explained, “I write 
in French to tell the French I am not one of them.”576 And the Algerian philosopher of Muslim 
                                                 
574  Jean Sénac, “The July Massacres,” translated by Pierre Joris, in Poems for the 
Millennium: The University of California Book of North African Literature. Volume 4, edited by 
Pierre Joris and Habib Tengour (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2012), 317-318. 
575 Kateb Yacine, Le polygone étoilé (Paris: Le Seuil, 1966), 182. A sentiment beautifully 
captured in the penultimate stanzas of Jean Amrouche’s poem, “Le combat algérien”: “We want 
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memory and without future.” Amrouche, L’éternel Jugurtha (1906-1962) (Marseille: Archives 
de la ville de Marseille, 1985), 55. 
576  Kateb Yacine, Abdelkader et indépendence algérien (Algiers: En-Nahdha, 1947); 
Kateb Yacine, “Toujours ruée vers l’or: Entretien avec Medienne Benamar,” Le Poète comme un 
boxeur: Entretiens, 1958-1989 (Paris: Seuil, 1994), 132; Jane Hiddleston, “Kateb Yacine: Poetry 
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identity, Malek Bennabi, spent much of his intellectual life theorizing what a reborn civilization 
would mean for the Arab world. In his estimation, it would entail rooting out all corrupting 
influences since the fifteenth-century demise of Muslim Spain. Bennabi’s mistrust of all things 
non-Muslim went so far as to criticize the FLN’s internationalist diplomacy.577  
 Rather than accept this sharp break in us vs. them—French de souche vs. real Algerian—
nationalities as a prescient foregone conclusion (since the war’s outcome reflected this position), 
it is better to see it as a diagnostic of political sentiments. For even the most staunch defenders of 
a third way between a complete divorce between Algeria and France and continued oppression in 
a French Algeria, the successive failures at reform from the Blum-Viollette Plan, to World War 
II promises and half-hearted postwar economic and social development, challenged the idea 
there was anything civilized about France’s civilizing mission. While Jean Amrouche saw 
himself as a middle term that could find the best in France and North Africa, by 1955 he 
admitted to Jules Roy, “I no longer believe in a French Algeria. Men of my type are monsters, 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Revolution,” Decolonising the Intellectual: Politics, Culture, and humanism at the End of 
the French Empire (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014), 206-249. 
577 Bennabi’s view to toward western civilization is admittedly more complex, since he 
did simultaneously prize the values of Renaissance humanistic culture while also believing 
Muslim civilization in North Africa had made it fundamentally “colonizable.” Malek Bennabi, 
Discours sur les conditions de la renaissance algérienne: le problème d’une civilisation 
(Algiers: Éditions algériennes, 1949); Malek Bennabi, Vocation de l’Islam (Paris: Seuil, 1954); 
Sadek Sellam, “Le FLN vu par l’écrivain Malek Bennabi (1905-1973): Les relations malaisée 
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historical errors.”578 Amrouche’s fellow Kabyle writer Mouloud Feraoun expressed a similar 
sentiment the following year.579  
Algerian nationalist agitation during the war also mirrored this insistence on recovering 
an Algerian identity that could distance itself from France. This dynamic is sometimes hard to 
gauge based on official FLN publications since they were often written with the purpose of 
persuading the French metropolitan and international audiences that writers like Bennabi so 
mistrusted. For instance, Martin Evans has pointed to the discrepancy between the Arabic word 
thawra and its translation into francophone FLN propaganda as révolution. Whereas the former 
most closely means the rather flat “uprising,” the latter has all of the over-determined 
connotations of the revolution of 89.580  Similarly, because the FLN's main journal was the 
official outward-facing presence of the FLN, El Moudjahid tried to capture a nationalist spirit 
recognizable to francophone readers and an ahistorical national identity that looked more French 
than it was for the FLN’s rank and file. The popular-democratic desires of the FLN under 
Abbane Ramdane and the laic political structures he wished to build were often at odds with the 
overtly-religious politics of the ulema and rural populations. For these latter, the majority of the 
FLN’s early supporters, resistance to France had always been coded with religious symbolism.581  
                                                 
578 Jean Amrouche to Jules Roy, 6 August 1955, in D’une amitié: Correspondance, Jean 
Amrouch-Jules Roy (1937-1962) (Aix-en-Provence: Édisud, 1985), 104. 
579 “When I say that I am French, I give myself a label that each French person refuses 
me. I speak French, and I got my education in a French school. I have learned as much as the 
average Frenchman. What am I then, dear God? Is it possible that as long as there are labels, 
there is not one for me? Which one is mine? Can somebody tell me what I am? Of course, they 
may not want me to pretend that I am wearing a label because they pretend to believe in it. I am 
very sorry, but this is not enough.” Journal entry from February 1, 1956. Mouloud Feraoun, 
Journal, 1955-1962. Reflections on the French-Algerian War, translated by Mary Ellen Wolf and 
Claude Fouillade (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 65-66. 
580 Evans, 120. 
581 For instance, 38% percent of El Moudjahid's articles covered international affairs 
while only 17% dealt with Algeria in general and 4.5% dealt with the history of Algeria. While 
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In this respect, Jacques Berque's insistence on seeing the ulema as Algerian Jacobins only 
conflated these two often-at-odds strands of nationalist sentiment.  
 Yet, whatever the extent to which the narratives of French civilization guided Algerian 
nationalists, without a doubt French colonialism left its mark on the post-independence state. For 
one, much of the infrastructure, physical and bureaucratic, was left over from French rule. Not 
everything would be built from scratch. By the 1970s heavy industrialization programs of the 
type projected by French modernizers like Berque were underway as a matter of necessity. 
Economic hardship following the first year of independence forced Ben Bella to request 
increased economic aid from France, and French interests controlled much of the capital that 
entered the new nation, ensuring that French corporations would continue to reap some profit 
after independence.582 Neither of the two governments, either, could exactly determine whether 
or not Algeria would be included in the Rome Treaty of 1957 (even if Algeria was counted as 
part of France when the treaty was signed).583 Algerian nationalist interests represented by the 
FLN would broach no middle ground between absolute independence and some form of 
federalism with greater local autonomy and continued union to the metropole, despite the wishes 
of many anticolonialists like Charles-André Julien. Yet in the moment that the FLN obtained a 
political divorce from France, they created a highly-centralized and bureaucratic state on the 
Jacobin model. As Samuel Moyn recently observed of the death of the French Union’s federalist 
                                                                                                                                                             
the FLN's opening declaration of 1 November 1954 included faith as part of the nation’s identity, 
by the Soummam conference in 1956 faith was removed from its declarations, as a way of 
distinguishing itself from Pan Islamic movements. Monique Gadant, Islam et nationalisme en 
Algérie: d'après « El Moudjahid » organe central du FLN de 1956 à 1962 (Paris: Editions 
L'Harmattan, 1988), 20, 28, 31-32. 
582 Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, 341; Mahfoud Bennoune, The Making of 
Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 89. 91, 98-
102, 112-113. 
583 On this interesting issue, see the article by Megan Brown in Modern and 
Contemporary France (forthcoming 2017).  
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projects, “for the history of federalism to be more than trivia, it has to be shown that it was 
actually possible and that it might have yielded better results than the nation-state. Neo-federalist 
historians rarely take it upon themselves to solve what ought to be the central puzzle: why did 
the nation-state model win out, when the alternatives were supposedly so compelling?”584 In the 
case of Algeria, the lack of political will backing any meaningful attempt to treat Algeria as the 
three metropolitan departments it legally was supposed to be only fueled nationalist projects that 
saw a total divorce from the French Union as necessary. But this does not account for the fact 
that according to many observers the independent Algerian nation-state itself would look so 
French.585 The fact that, once in power, the FLN began to construct a centralized state so similar 
to a Jacobin republic perhaps attests to the civilizing mission’s—and its corollary visions of 
developmentalism—conceptual and institutional staying power.586 This would be true even if 
these legacies were unintended consequences of France’s colonial legacy. 
Of course, it is almost always an historical error to see the result of any contingent 
process as a foregone conclusion. As Todd Shepard demonstrated, “decolonization” in Algeria 
was an invention, and it was only one of many options available for sovereign and non-sovereign 
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contemporaine: Bilan et solutions pour sortir de la crise, Edited by Gilbert Meynier (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 2000), 81-96: “Il est important de noter que c’est ce modèle jacobin français de 
nation qui a été et rest à l’œuvre en Algérie, même si des nationalistes ont de la peine à le 
reconnaître” (91).   
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territories at the end of the colonial era. Yet the view that an Algerian Revolution could also be a 
variant of the French Revolution did shape the imaginary horizons of persons in France and 
Algeria. Despite the recent studies that take seriously the postwar push for federalist alternatives 
in Africa, by the 1930s, much of North African anticolonial rhetoric expressed itself in very 
western nationalist terms.587 That anticolonial demands were couched in nationalist sentiment 
from the very beginning perhaps shows that federal alternatives, as desirable as they may have 
been, were always going to be Sisyphean projects when it came to Algeria.588 In the 1960s, the 
third world may have replaced the industrialized west as the ideological motor force of world 
revolution, but at least in the case of Algeria it was going to be a revolution according to the 
French model.  
 Of course, another, even more pernicious, alternative is that, try as one might, it is still 
impossible for contemporary observers to un-see and un-think France when dealing with its 
former colonies in North Africa. This problem goes well beyond Algeria in particular and owes 
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much to the application of European ideas of state structures in Africa beginning in the age of 
exploration. Categories such as tribe, chieftain, native king, and emperor were at best 
approximations that smoothed over African particularities in order to use European categories as 
standards. To the extent that nation and state failed to coincide according to Jacobin ideals in the 
French Revolution, it is even more unlikely they would in postcolonial states.589 The habit of 
seeing French-Algeria’s colonial legacy as indelible is only encouraged by the difficulty of 
conducting historical studies of Algeria after independence. Algeria may have a past after 1962, 
but according to the Algerian government its only relevant history is its anticolonial struggle and 
the Revolution.590  
 The French historical reason that permeated demographic analysis in the Algerian War 
may seem to have waned in some respects, but it has certainly not disappeared. Institutionally, 
France no longer needed to focus squarely on Algeria’s population after independence. However, 
Matthew Connelly has noted that the decline in imperialist demographic control also coincided 
with the United Nations’ family planning efforts at the Population Council. He has little faith that 
the latter’s programs would be much different from the former’s.591 Recent studies by INED 
researchers Youssef Courbage and Emmanuel Todd have rightly pushed back against the 
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assumptions built into the early demographic analyses conducted by Sauvy and his team at 
INED, especially the ones that treated large swaths of the global south as homogenous. 
According to Todd and Courbage, there was no common demographic thread among Muslim 
populations, or even in the narrower Arab world. Throughout, Muslim societies’ reproductive 
rates varied and have changed a great deal even over the relatively short period of time since the 
end of World War II. Yet there persists a strange insistence on the centrality of Europe as a 
demographic baseline against which the Muslim world should be measured. Despite their 
insistence in 2007 that “Human societies will never be entirely alike, and it would be absurd—
and sad—to imagine a world that was homogenous in every detail,” Courbage and Todd still 
claimed that “The Muslim world is now at the center of a transition to modernity. The fertility 
rates of some countries have already caught up with those of Europe.” Even demographic 
practices in Arab countries have come to emulate French state practice: “All Arab countries are 
centralizers, like the Jacobins, and tend to blur the ethnic and linguistic dimensions of 
demography.”592 Despite their jettison of Sauvy’s fears that demographic change automatically 
spurs political crisis, they remain wed to the idea that the Muslim world’s historical progress is 
tied to transitions to French standards. 
 The persistence of the French Revolution in anti-imperial discourse and the limits it set 
and continues to set on our conceptual horizon for Algeria most closely fit J. M. Hobson’s 
paradox of modern world relations, what he terms “gradated sovereignty.” It has been obvious 
for some time now to see Eurocentric visions of the world as paternalistic, racist, and imperial. 
But the anti-imperialism of the last century has not been able to escape many of the paternalistic 
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Transformation of Muslim Societies Around the World (2007), translated by George Holoch 
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and othering elements of this dynamic. In the place of Eurocentric domination came “Eurocentric 
intolerance.” In this analysis, “all Eurocentric theories of sovereignty explicitly or implicitly 
invoke a hierarchical conception of world politics that entails the idea of gradated sovereignty.” 
Algeria gained legitimacy as an independent state by aligning with the French Revolution. Even 
when sovereign and independent of France it would still be measured according to that 
standard.593  
The same language used in the 1950s and 60s to argue for Algeria’s political maturity 
resurfaced in the 2011 Arab Revolutions, particularly with regard to Tunisia. Many of these 
Revolutions, in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, earned the idiom “Arab Spring,” which referred 
back to the European Revolutions of 1848, the so-called “springtime of nations.” At other points 
the referent of choice was 1989, when European eastern-bloc countries manifested against 
communist rule. None of these heuristics seem in retrospect particularly helpful for analyzing the 
actual dynamics at work.594 If anything, spectators expecting another 1848 or 1989 could not 
help but be let down when the results (varied as they are) of these different events did not live up 
to these models’ expectations.595 (In some readings, the expectations gleaned from 1848 would 
be admittedly quite pessimistic.) The most striking analogy, however, returned to a hope that the 
French Revolution would finally be realized for Arab countries. Almost fifty years after the end 
of the French-Algerian War the spirit of 1789 had moved on to the rest of the Arab world. Henri 
Guaino, special counselor to Nicolas Sarkozy, for instance, affirmed that these Arab countries 
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“have nearly the same characteristics of the French Revolution of 1789.” 596  Similarly, the 
historian of Algeria Benjamin Stora and journalist Edwy Plenel published a series of 
conversations on the Arab Revolutions titled The Arab 89. Their reference pointed both to 1989 
and to 1789. According to Stora, the problems of colonialism and decolonization interrupted the 
historical development of Arab territories. The events of 2011 showed signs that history was 
again on the move. While there were internal logics to these events that went beyond European 
influences, the revolutionary dynamics at play still remained influenced by European history.597 
Applying his “game of analogies” rubric to media and intellectual responses to the 2011 Arab 
Revolutions, Michel Vovelle highlighted the pitfalls of making such rigid comparisons. 
Commentators had insisted on seeing purely western ideology as motivating events in 2011 and 
were therefore blindsided by the non-western components of the movements, such as the 
dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood.598  
The point, of course, is not that there were no disappointing features of these 
contemporary revolutionary moments. But the failures also cannot be boiled down to a continued 
inability of the Arab world, much of it formerly part of the French empire, to live up to the 
civilizing mission. And choosing a different western revolution as heuristic will not necessarily 
escape this trap, either—move the (historical) goalposts as much as you wish, you’re still playing 
the game.  
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